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PART ONE: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE MINERAL LEASING ACT
I. SCOPE.
This paper will trace the historical development of the
mineral laws of the United States as to the publir domain
from the adoption of the Constitution of the United States to
the enactment of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1^20. Next, there
will be considered the amendments of major nature respecting
oil, gas, and oil shale which have been made to the Leasing Act.
II. MINERAL OWNERSHIP CONCEPT PREVALENT IN COLONIES AT TI'E
TIME OF ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION.
In general the laws of the United States have been derived
from the common law of England that was extant at the tine of
2
the American Revolution. Furthermore, it has been stated that
"Sir William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laus of England
(1765-1760) was much used in America in the contests between the
colonies and the crown which culminated in the Revolution, and
wai accepted by the courts after the Revolution as a statement
3
of the law which we received." Hence, the following statement
from Blackstone's Commentaries, Book II, Ch. II, page 10 indi-
cates the concept of mineral ownership which prevailed in the
colonies
:
"Land hath also, in its legal signification, an in-
definite extent, upwards as well as downwards. Cujus
est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum (whoever has the
land possesses all the space upwards to an indefinite
extent), is the maxim of the law; upwards, therefore,
-1-

no man may erect any building, or the like to
overhang another's land: and downwards, what-
ever is in a direct line, between the surface of
any land and the centre of the earth, belongs to
the owner of the surface; as is every Jay's ex-
perience in the mining countries, So that the
word "land" includes not only the face of the
earth, but every thing under it, or over it."
Although the original states disputed as to whether they or the
National government should control the relatively unsettled
western lands, they accepted the common law principle that the
land surface owner also owned everything beneath his land.
III. PKE-CONSTITUTION MINERAL POLICY.
The Articles of Confederation of 1777 established a "firm
league of Friendship" wherein each State retained its "sovereign-
ty, freedom and independence and every power, jurisdiction and
r
right" not expressly delegated to the United States. ' One es-
sential ingredient withheld from the National government was the
power of taxation. Because of this fact, the Congress of the
Confederation looked to the unoccupied lands of the West as a
means of raising money, and to further this purpose it passed a
resolution on October 10, 17(30, providing for the disposal, for
the common benefit of the United States of the territories ceded
to the United States, for the formation of States out of these
Territories, and for the regulation by Congress of the granting
and selling of these lands.

The question of the treatment of western lands was a
source of considerable controversy between the six States
which had no claims and the seven States which had extensive
claims to western lands. Finally, the argument that the
western land had been attained by common sacrifices, and, there-
fore, should be common property prevailed with New York making
the first cession to the National government in 1701.
The general pattern of disposal of these lands by the
Federal government was established by the Land Ordinance of 17 3.^
whirl; provided for a system of surveying to provide for town-
ships of 6 statute miles square, in each of which townships sec-
tion 16 was reserved for schools and four sections (C, 11, 26,
and 20) were reserved for future disposition. The remaining sec-
tions were offered for sale. The Federal government's only reser-
vation was "one-third part of all gold, silver, lead, and copper
mines, to be sold or otherwise disposed of as Congress shall here-
o
after direct." In making this reservation the Ordinance of 1705
followed the prevalent European practice employed in granting land
10
to the Colonies.
The initial Federal land policies enunciated in the Land
Ordinance were probably dictated more by the exigencies of the
time than by any underlying philosophical basis. There was an
urgent need for revenue and a need for rapid settlement of the
-3-

western lands to establish firmly economic and political ties
11
between these lands and the l?> States; and an expeditious
method of accomplishing these purposes was the underlying de-
sign of the Land Ordinance.
-4-

IV. CONSTITUTIONAL THLATrENT OF PUBLIC LANDS.
The Constitution was silent with respect to what public
land policy should be followed but was explicit in granting
powers to the Congress to handle sucli lands. Article IV,
Section 3, provides:
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the
Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States
. . .
The courts have repeatedly held that this provision gave ex-
clusive and complete authority to the Congress to dispose of
12
the public domain as it saw fit.
-5-

V. MINERAL POLICY OF TIE UNITED STATES BETWEEN CONSTITUTION
AND 1066.
The reservation of "one-third part of all gold, silver,
lead and copper mines" by the Federal government in the Land
Ordinance of 1705 may be considered a leasing policy, which
continued up to 1066. The policy in execution was somewhat
desultory, for most of the minerals in the eastern part of
the United States were disposed of under the agricultural land
13
laws. However, an underlying policy of separate treatment of
minerals was indicated in this period by the reservation of all
salt springs and licks, by the leasing of reserved saline lands,
1-1
and by the collection of information on copper bearing lands.
In 1007 an act provided that lead mines discovered in the Indiana
15
Territory could be leased by the President. In 1016 a law pro-
vided for the reservation and leasing of lead mines and salt
16
springs. However, a leasing system was not exclusively followed
and under legislation enacted in 1020, 1046, and 1847 certain
mineral lands were offered for sale in fee.
Dissatisfaction with the leasing system was expressed by
President Polk in his first message to Congress on December 2, 1045
as follows:
The present system of managing the mineral lands of
the United States is believed to be radically defec-
tive. More than a million acres of the public lands,
-6-

supposed to contain lead and other minerals, have
been reserved from sale, and numerous leases upon
them have been granted to individuals upon a stip-
ulated rent. The system of granting leases has
proved to be not only unprofitable to the Govern-
ment, but unsatisfactory to the citizens who have
gone upon the lands, and must, if continued lay the
foundation of much future difficulty between the
government and the lessees .... I recommend the
repeal of the present system and that these lands
... be brought into market and sold upon such terms
as Congress in their wisdom may prescribe, reserving
to the government an equitable percentage of the
gross amount of mineral product . . .
A radical change of policy resulted from the discovery of
gold in California in 1040. The Federal mineral policy which
has controlled the exploitation of metaliferous public lands to
the present time, and was to control the early exploitation of
oil and gas on the public domain, stems from this time. Mr.
Justice Field described the events of this period in Jennison v.
Kirk, no U.S. 453, 25 L.Ed. 2-10 (1070), a case involving
California water rights:
At pages 457 and 4f>0: The discovery of gold in
California was followed, as is well known, by an
immense immigration into the State, which increased
its population within three or four years from a
few thousand to several hundred thousand. The
lands in which the precious metals were found be-
longed to the United States and were unsurveyed,
and not open, by law to occupation and settlement.
Little was known of them further than that they were
situated in the Sierra Nevada mountains. Into these
mountains the emigrants in vast numbers penetrated,
occupying the ravines, gulches, and canons, and
probing the earth in all directions for the precious
metals. Wherever they went, they carried with them
-7-

that love of order and system of fair dealing which
are the prominent characteristics of our people. In
every district which they occupied they framed certain
rules for their government, by which the extent of
ground they could severally hold for mining was desig-
nated, their possessory right to such ground secured
and enforced, and contests between them either avoided
or determined. TheSe rules bore a marked similarity,
varying in the several districts only according to the
extent and character of the mines; distinct provisions
being made for different kinds of mining, such as placer
mining, quartz mining, and mining in drifts or tunnels.
They all recognized discovery, followed by appropriation,
as the foundation of the possessor's title, and develop-
ment by working as the condition of its retention ....
The first appropriator was everywhere held to have within
certain well-defined limits, a better right than others
to the claims taken up, and in all controversies, except
as against the government, he was regarded as the original
owner, from whom title was to be traced.
. .
. These regu-
lations and customs were appealed to in controversies in
the State courts, and received their sanction; and proper-
ties to the value of many millions rested upon them. For
eighteen years — from 1010 to 1066 — the regulations and
customs of miners, as enforced and moulded by the courts
and sanctioned by the legislation of the State, constituted
the law governing property in mines and in water on the
public mineral lands.
Although Mr. Justice Field observes that the miners in
California "carried with them that love of order and system of
fair dealing which are the prominent characteristics of our
people", the love of fair dealing only extended to their relation-
ships with one another and had nothing to do with their trespass
and appropriation of the wealth of the public domain which belonged
to all the people. Colonel Mason, military governor in California
10
at the time of the first gold discoveries, reported on this feature:
-8-

The entire gold district, with very few exceptions of
grants made some years ago, by the Mexican authorities,
is on land belonging to the United States It was a
matter of serious reflection with me how I could secure
to the government certain rents or fees for the privi-
lege of procuring this gold; but upon considering the
large extent of country, the character of the people
engaged, and the small scattered force at my command, I
resolved not to interfere, but permit all to work freely
Undoubtedly the Federal government acquiesced to these
20
trespasses for several reasons, and after doing so for 18
years (1849 to 1866) it was in a poor position to take a dif-
ferent stand. Congress in 1866 acknowledged the situation by
passage of the Act of July 26, 1866, c 262, 14 Stat, 251 which
provided in part:
That the mineral lands of the public domain, both
surveyed and unsurveyed, are hereby daclr.red to be
free and open to exploration and occupation by all
citizens of the United States , • subject to
such regulations as may be prescribed by law, and
subject also to the local customs or rules of miners
in the several mining districts, so far as the same
may not be in conflict with the laws of the United
States
«
Looking back a century it is difficult to understand how
this great give-away was brought about. The United States might
have had difficulties in restraining unlawful exploitation of the
mineral deposits if it had reserved certain rights in themj how-
ever, the difficulties of protecting such rights is a poor basis




that such a system is accepted in today's society, since the
taxing authority of the National and State governments allows
control over the profits miners make on their discoveries. Through
taxation the largesse of the national resources is generally dis-
tributed to the people. However, in 1866 this condition did not
exist to the degree it does today.
There is little purpose in exploring today what motivated
Congress to establish a policy of free exploitation of the natural
resources. It is sufficient to note that such a policy was es-
tablished. The break with tradition by this policy is noted in
Buford v. Iloutz, 133 U. S. 320, 331-332 (1000):
As evidence of the liberality with which the government
of the United States has treated the entire region of
country acquired from Mexico by the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo, it is only necessary to refer to the fact that
while by the laws of Mexico every discoverer of a mine
.. of the precious metals was compelled to pay a certain
royalty to the government for the use of the mine in
extracting its minerals, as soon as the country cane
under the control of the United States, an unlimited
right of mining by every person who chose to enter upon
and take the risks of the business was permitted without
objection and without compensation to the government;
and while this remained for many years as a right resting
upon the tacit assent of the government, the principle
has been since incorporated into the positive legislation
of Congress and today the larger part of the valuable
mines of the United States are held by individuals under
the claim of discovery without patent or any other instru-
ment from the government of the United States granting this
right, and without tax or compensation paid to the govern-
ment for the use of the precious metals.
-10-

Although the Act of 1066 established a general policy
of free exploration and development of the public lands, it
only provided for the issuance of a patent to mining claims
based on vein or lode discoveries. Consequently, in 1070 the
Congress passed a placer mining law which provided for patent-
22
ino this type claim. Tn 1072 Congress passed a general mining
law which combined the provisions of the Acts of 1066 and 1072
23
into one set of legislation. (NOTE: Apperdix A gives a
chronological list of the major legislative enactments which af-
fect, or have affected, oil, gas, and oil shale development on
the public domain together with a summary or excerpt of the
salient contents of the legislation. Appendix B. tabulates the




VI. POLICY 01 TIE UNITED STATIC TOWARDS HJBLIC OIL LANDS FCOH
1066 TO 1920.
A. First Specific Petroleum Legislation
.
Although commercial production of oil was first, accomplished
by Colonel Drake near Titusville, Pennsylvania in 1850, Congress
had no occasion to consider this resource in connection with pub-
lic lands until after the Act of 1066; the first commercial oil
discovery in a public land state was not made until 1075 in
25
Pico Canyon, California.
Although a Federal court held in 1001 that public land con-
taining petroleum could be acquired under the mining laws appli-
cable to placer claims, the Secretary of the Interior ruled in
1006 that petroleum lands were not Mineral lands and could not be
27
entered under the mining laws. This prompted Congress in 10°7
to pass specific, legislation applicable to public oil lands. The
Act of February 11, 1007, 20 Stat. 526, provided:
That any person authorized to enter lands under the
mining laws of the United States nay enter and obtain
patent to lands containing petroleum or other mineral
oils, and chiefly valuable therefor, under the pro-
visions of the laws relating to placer mineral claims.
Provided, That lands containing such petroleum or other
mineral oils which have heretofore been filed upon,
claimed, or improved as mineral, but not yet patented,
may be held and patented under the provisions of this
Act the same as if such filing, claim, or improvement were
subsequent to the date of the passage hereof.
-12-

0. Public Oil Lands Withdrawn from Entry .
i'rolific disroveries in California made it t fie leading
oil producing state from 19G3 to 1°06; and fron 1007 to 1920
California and Oklahoma traded positions as the nation's
leading producing states..
The rapid exploitation of oil in California during this
period made it the focal point in the formulation of a rational
policy for the public oil lands. A combination of fear of
over-exploita tion of the nation's oil wealth and the need for
oil in tlie conversion of the American I\avy from coal to oil
lead the Director of the 0. S. Geological Survey Geo Otis
Smith to advise the Secretary of the Interior by letter of
February 2<' 1 "00 as follows:
I have the honor to call your attention ... to the
superiority of liquid fuels that is, petroleum
products in one or another form on steamships, an'!
also to the policy of the British Government in using
such liquid fuels as emergency fuels in battleships . . .
It will be easy, if desired, to multiply the authorita-
tive statements already in print concerning the superior-
ity of liquid fuel for the navy. For that reason I have
to recommend that the filing of claims to oil lands in
the State of California be suspended in order that the
Government may continue ownership of valuable supplies of
liquid fuel in this region where all fuel is expensive.
$ ;J8 Sfil 306 $
The present rate at which the oil lands in California
are being patented by private parties will make it
impossible for the people of the United States to con-
tinue ownership of oil lands there more than a few
months. After that the Government will be obliged to re-
purchase the very oil that it has practically given away.
$ $ $ sjt $
-13-

Regarding the petroleum supply, the production last year
did not meet the requirements of the trade, and the re-
serve stock was drawn on to meet the demand. At present
the rate of increase in demand is more rapid than the
increase in production, and this, taken in connection
with the great falling off in certain of the older fields,
due to depletion of the sunds and to flooding by water
of sands which otherwise might be productive, shows how
important is this matter of a conservation of the remain-
ing supply.
As a result of this letter, the Secretary of the Interior
on September 27, 100° issued the first of several withdrawal
orders which closed the public oil lands from entry. The
withdrawals were stated to be "in aid of proposed legislation
affecting the use and disposition of the petroleum deposits on
the public domain . .-. ." At the time of the withdrawals it
was generally believed that the Executive Department did not
have the authority to withdraw public lands from entry without
30
specific Congressional authorization; and because of concern
over the validity of such Executive action Congress passed the
31
Pickett Act in 1^10 which gave the President authority to
withdraw public lands from entry for "public purposes to be
specified in the orders of withdrawals, and such withdrawals or
reservations shall remain in force until revoked by him or by
an act of Congress." Following the Pickett Act the President
confirmed the orders withdrawing the public oil lands from entry,
-14-

As it turned out the passage of the Pickett Act was un-
necessary for the supreme Court in United States v. Midwest
Oil Company, 236 U.S. 459 (191f>), decided the President had
the authority to make the withdrawals without specific Congres-
sional authorisation.
C. Deficiencies in development of public oil lands under
placer mining laws .
From 1909 until 1920 the public domain was essentially
closed to new oil and gas development. This condition was not
allowed to persist without efforts to get legislation to es-
32
tablish a Federal policy for the public oil lands. Congress,
however, was unable to agree on a policy until 1°20.
Congressional hearings during this decade indicated that
the location of oil lands under the placer laws was not satis-
factory. Under the placer mi.iing laws an individual was en-
titled to locate on a 20 acre tract substantially rectangular in
shape. Eight claimants could pool into one location with the
right to proceed to patent once a discovery was made on the land
located; hence, a 160 acre location was the largest unit con-
sidered for patent. There was no limit on the number of locations
any particular person or association could make although the 20
33
acre limitation applied to any particular location. ° The dif-
ficulties under this system were:
(a) The Federal government maintained no authority to
regulate production practices. Consequently, the
-15-

rule of capture was allowed full sway without
regard to safeguarding the natural resource.
'
J
(b) Since discovery was an essential element of pro-
ceeding to patent, the initial locator night be
beaten out by another who would first make the oil
and gas discovery.
(c) "Dummy locations" were prevalent, and the contesting
of these locations by the Department of Justice had
cast considerable doubt on the validity of many oil
and gas operations. A "dummy location" was one made
by an individual not in his own behalf, but for the
benefit of some corporation or other individual.
(d) Paper locations were made; that is, locations were
staked out and notice filed locally (Federal filing
was not required until an application for patent was
made) without proceeding to discovery, primarily for
speculative and nuisance purposes/'
-16-

VII. MINERAL LEASING ACT OF 1020.
A . Congressional Discussions .
Congress clearly recognized the shortcomings of using the
placer mining laws to dispose of oil lands, but had difficulty
in deciding upon another method. There were two major areas of
disagreement. Generally speaking Congressmen of the West wanted
the discoverer to be given a patent to the land, and Congressmen
of the East wanted the United states to retain title to the land
and lease it for exploration and developmert. The same geographi-
cal grouping formed in connection with what should be done about
claimants to the withdrawn land, that is, those who had some equit-
able position with respect to the land, but no legal basis for
applying for a patent under the Petroleum Placer Act of 1007.
Congressman Thompson of Illinois was a leader in urging that
the United States lease these lands. He argued that the public
lands belonged to the United States and not to any particular state
since the Federal government had bought the Louisiana purchase, and
30
much other territory, with money from the general treasury.
Typical of the arguments against retention of the oil lands by the
United States and a system of leasing is the following summary of
the position of Representative Taylor of Colorado:
. . . that it would result in the development of a
huge bureaucracy which would absorb the royalties in
expensive administration, would create a host of government
-17-

employees who could never be pried from their jobs;
that tenants would never take as good care of the
property as owners; that the leasiny system involved
a heavy loss of taxes to the state and counties of the
West; that it deprived the western people of their
freedom, compelling them to surrender the sovereign
right of American citizens to local self government and
become permanently helpless, if not servile, tenants
under federal tyrants and autocratic predatory bureau-
crats, ... an outrage upon a free people.
This type of rugged individualism denuded many of the
forest lands of the country, cleared and cultivated lands until
they were exhausted and then abandoned them, and produced oil
41
and gas in a lamentably wasteful fashion. Fortunately, the




knowledge of the wasteful procedures used in production of oil
43
and gas from the public lands molded the thinking of Congress
so that it was not swayed by such platitudes.
Related to the leasing or patenting argument was the question
of how to dispose of the royalties if the land was leased. Legal
acceptance of the principle that the minerals on the public do-
4 1
main belonged to the National government, * and not to the State
where the mineral was located, should have pre-determined this
issue; however, such was not the case. In opposing the payment of
royalties into the Federal treasury Senator Thomas J. Walsh of
45
Montana in 1916 said:
There would be a perfectly valid objection to the
exaction of a royalty which should go into the Federal
Treasury for the general expenditures of the Government
-10-

like the ordinary revenues. Tribute so paid would be
nothing less than a tax levied upon a particular section
of the country.
The reasoning was persuasive since the Act as passed earmarked
only 10?' of the royalties to the Federal Treasury. This was quite
a departure from the position that had prompted 7 of the original
13 states to cede the unoccupied western lands to the National
government since they were won by common blood and toil.
The problem of the relief to be given to claimants with
varying equitable claims to the withdrawn oil lands wa? accentuated
by a division between two departments of the government. The De-
partment of Interior was in favor of a reasonably liberal provision,
•16
whereas the Department of the Navy was for a stricter provision.
The Navy was concerned since it was saddled with a number of claimants
in the naval petroleum reserves which had been withdrawn in Wyoming
47
and California. This disagreement frustrated many of the legis-
lative proposals during the period 1010 to 1920, when this question
was being considered by Congress.
The significant dates in considering the various types of
claimants involved are September 27, 1909, the first executive order
withdrawing the public oil lands from entry, June 25, 1910, the date
of passage of the Pickett Act by which Congress expressly granted to
the President the authority to make such withdrawals, and July 2,
1910, the executive order entered after passage of the Pickett Act
-10-

which confirmed the 1000 public oil land withdrawals. It was
not until 1915 that the Supreme Court in United States v. Mid—
in
west Oil Company determined that the President, even in the
absence of the I'ickett Act, had acted within his constitutional
powers when he entered the withdrawal order of September 27,
10Q9.
With this background the claimants on the withdrawn lands
49
may be fitted into the following classes:
(a) Those who were on the lands and made a discovery
prior to the withdrawal order of September 27, 1900.
(b) Those who were on the lands in a proper and lawful
manner, and had tried with due diligence to find oil,
but had not yet made a discovery at the time of the
withdrawal order of September 27, 1900.
(c) Those who had filed on the lands properly before the
withdrawal of September 27, 1900, but had not pursued
the work with due diligence, and had not made a discovery,
(d) Those who had gone on to the lands prior to the with-
drawal of September 27, 1900, but had not been at the
time of the withdrawal in diligent prosecution of a




(c) Those who assumed the withdrawal order of September
27, 190° Wus invalid and had entered the withdrawn lands
after this withdrawal, but before the confirmatory exe-
cutive withdrawal of July 2, 1910.
(f) Those who had entered the withdrawn lands after the
passage of the Pickett Act of 1910 and subsequent to
the confirmatory executive withdrawal order of July 2,
1910.
TO
The provisions of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 which
51
resolved the treatment of these claimants are complex. How-
ever, in general anyone who entered the withdrawn lands prior to
the confirmatory executive order of July 2, 1910 and proceeded
to make a discovery was given the right to surrender all claims
based upon such entry and discovery in return for a 20 year lease
to such lands at a royalty of not less than 12!^'; provided,
that if such entry and discovery was made on a naval petroleum
reserve the lease was granted only to the producing well or wells.
If entry was made on such lands prior to the withdrawal order of
September 27, 190°, and no discovery had been made, the claimant
was entitled to a prospecting permit under the general terms of
the Act, provided that no such permit would issue if the naval
petroleum reserves were involved.
— 4.1 —

13. Salient Features of the Act Insofar as Oil, Gas, anrl
Oil Shale Deposits are Concerned
.
The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 represented a compromise
on the basic issues outlined above. The United States re-
tained title to the land subject to a system of leasing for
exploitation; however, most of the royalty proceeds went to
the states of mineral location. The treatment of claimants
on the withdrawn lands followed the liberal pattern advocated
by the Department of Interior except that claimants of naval
petroleum reserve lands were strictly treated.
The Act offered the oil and gas prospector an exclusive
2 year prospecting permit covering 2,560 acres of unproved
land. The prospector had to begin drilling operations within
six months, and to drill wells to an aggregate depth of 2,000
52
feet within two years, unless he sooner found oil or gas.
On discovery of oil or gas, the prospector was entitled to a
20 year lease of one-fourth of the land, or to 160 acres if the
permit covered that much land, at a royalty of 5%, and a rental
53
of $1.00 per acre; he was also given a preferential right to
lease the remainder of the land in his prospecting permit, at
a royalty of not less than 121$ to be determined by the Secretary
5-1
of the Interior.
NOTE: See Appendix A for detailed summary of the Act.
.22-

As to known geologic structures of a producing oil or
gas field, the Secretary of the Interior was permitted to
lease tracts no larger than 6 10 acres to the highest bidder
at a royalty of not less than 12.!J', and at a rental of not less
than $1.00 per acre. These were 20 year leases vith a prefer-
ential renewal right for an additional 10 years on terns set by
rr
the Secretary of the Interior.
The act recognised the need for conservation measures,
and to this end prohibited the drilling of a well within 200
feet of the exterior boundary of the permitted or leased area,
56
except under certain prescribed circumstances, provided for
the Secretary of the Interior to grant royalty relief when pro-
57
duct ion from a well fell below 10 barrels per day, and pro-
vided that each lease should be subject to the condition that
all reasonable precautions would be taken to prevent waste of
50
oil or gas.
Concern was shown for preventing monopolies based upon
development of public oil and gas lands; the Act provided that
a maximum of three oil or gas leases could be held by a person,
association, or corporation in any one State, and not more than
one lease within the geologic structure of the same producing
oil or gas field.
-23-

The passage of the Mineral Leasing Act set off a rush to
lay rlain to the public lands not unlike t lie Oklahoma land
rush. ' However, the Act gave authority to the Secretary of
the Interior to prevent the wasteful practices which had been




VIII AI.HWr.EKTS TO MINERAL LEAJIKG ACT BETOSLN 1020 AND 1960.
A. Unitization Legislation of 1^31 .
: rof'iirtio 1 of oil and gas without physical or ecomonic waste
is difficult to achieve under an unfettered "rule of capture";
61
this rule has been stated as follows:
The owner of a tract of land acquires title to the oil
or gas which he produces from wells drilled thereon,
though it may be proved that part of such oil or gas
Migrated from adjoining lands.
The practical results of this legal rule were described ir
62
1021:
The discovery of an oil pool neans that every landowner
or lessee can take as much oil from this common pool as
he can get, and there is always a frenzied scramble to
bring oil to the surface regardless of whether the market
needs it or not.
Under present conditions oil must be consumed practically
as fast as it is found whether it is needed or not. There-
fore the exhausting of our oil resources is not based on
our market needs for oil but on the rapidity with which
our remaining reserves can be uncovered.
During the period 192'! to 1935 a concerted effort to ameliorate
the effects of this rule was made by the Federal and i^tate govern-
6?,
rnents, and by industry. As a result of these efforts two success-
ful regulatory mechanisms evolved, proration and unitization.
Oklahoma enacted the first market demand, or proration, statute in
1°15, and the first statewide proration order under this statute
64
was entered in 1920. Proration was a step in the right direction
but it had limited effectiveness from 1926 to 1935 when the glut of
25-

oil on the market was aggravated by major discoveries at the
Seminole field in Oklahoma, the Panhandle of Uest Texas,
Kettleman Hills, California, Oklahoma City, and East Texns.
1
The primary drawback was the reluctance of a State to enforce
restrictions on its own production absent assurance by other
States that the reduction would not be offset by increased
production elsewhere. The overall effectiveness of proration
legislation was not assured until six States agreed to the
(
"7
Interstate Compact to Conserve Oil and Gas in 19^5. Even
though the Compact does not commit the member States to set a
certain production quota for each State, the community of interest
in not overproducing has resulted in a relatively stabilized market
condition.
Proration statutes effectively prevent waste which results
from crude oil production in excess of reasonable market demands,
but do not touch upon an important facet of the conservation problem,
namely, "The natural unit in oil deposits is the single pool, large
or small ..." and although "Man may draw property lines on the
surface, making a checkerboard for title searchers and lease lawyers
to play on
. . . nature has fixed a boundary line around the under-
ground deposit for geologists to discover and engineers to use
in the development of the hidden resources."
-26-

As early as 1016 the United States Bureau of Mines had
recognized that the drilling for and production of oil and
gas should be effected on the basis of the geologic structure
containing the deposits, rather than on the basis of surface
ownership. However, any cooperative development of a neolofjic
structure was prohibited on public lands by the anti-trust pro-
70
vision of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1°20. In 1024 President
Coolidye created the Federal Oil Conservation Board composed of
the Secretaries of War, Navy, Interior and Commerce for the
purpose of obtaining a "full discussion of ways and means of
safeguarding the national security of our oil", and noted at 1 he
time that "the present methods of capturing our oil deposits is
71
(sic) wasteful to an alarming degree." On March 12, 1020,
President Hoover closed the Government oil lands from further
7*?
leasing or disposal, and they remained closed until April 1, 10^2
so that "the public domain /would/ not contribute to the conditions
of over-drilling and potential overproduction which the oil-producing
7?.
states have been endeavoring to correct ..." The Federal Jii
Conservation Board in its first report (1026) recognized the need
for "cooperative action for the sane and orderly development of new
fields by means of voluntary agreements among operators of a pool
74
to restrict its development and operation."
-27-

Secretary of the Interior Wilbur had an early opportunity
to develop such a cooperative plan. The discovery of the
Kettleman iiills Field in California, which was checkerboarded
with public and private lands, set off a competitive drilling
75
program which resulted in an enormous waste of gas. The
Secretary negotiated a shut-in agreement for the field in 102°,
in 1930 Congress enacted temporary legislation authorizing the
United States to approve a cooperative plan of development for
76
the field, and on January 31, 1031 such a plan was approved.
The success of the plan in reducing production and eliminating
waste in the field resulted in permanent legislation, Act of
76
March 1, 1931, amending the Mineral Leasing Act. The amend-
ment permitted Federal lessees or permittees to enter into unit
agreements whenever the Secretary of the Interior determined it
79
to be advisable in the public interest.
When the public lands were again opened for oil and gas
exploration and leasing in 1932, the Department of the Interior
instituted a policy of issuing prospecting permits subject to
the agreement of the permittee that "prior to the expiration
date of the permit a cooperative development plan for the entire
structure /would_7 be submitted, and that when and if production
Jyia£/ obtained, the area ^vould/ be produced under a unit plan
of operation which under the direction, of the permittees, them-
selves, and under the general supervision of the Secretary of the
-20-

Interior, /would/ insure a ratable share of production to all of
them on the sane structure, and, at the sane time, insure against
„oo
over-production and consequent waste. The principle of com-
pulsory unitization authority in the Interior department was con-
firmed by Congress in the 193?! amendments to the Mineral Leasing
Act, and has been continued in the Act.
Since little development of the public lands occurred ir
the l°>30's, these stringent unitization requirements did not play
a direct role in overcoming overproduction, and wasteful production
practices of this period. However, the indirect effect was si/.e-
able since they set a pattern and to a considerable degree alleviated
industry concern that unit agreements would contravene the Federal
anti-trust laws.
Q. 1935 Amendments .
The 1920 Act was framed at a time when "there appeared to be
serious danger of a speedy exhaustion of the domestic supply of
03
oil and gas," and the decade immediately preceding the 1935
amendments saw "the discovery of one large oil field after another
84
turn apparent scarcity into actual overabundance". Because of
these factors the unusual device of a short term prospecting permit
with mandatory drilling requirements, and the unprecedented 3%
royalty on new discoveries were out of date. In addition the
85
Interior Department was critical of the 3/f royalty because:
-29-

The reward for successful prospecting, the difference
between the special royalty of fi per cent and the cus-
tomary royalty of 12. .T, 16 2/3/'., or more, in practice
has not gone to an operator who expended .noney in search
of oil on the permit area but, in general, to a promotor,
lease broker, or speculator who sold his prospecting rights
to the real operator, reserving to himself the 'reward for
discovery' and oftentimes a cash bonus in addition. This
royalty and bonus, rightful property of the United Jtstes
as owner of the mineral deposits, has been granted by the
terms of the experimental legislation of 1020 to those who
have done little or nothing toward development.
Tor these reasons Congress materially changed the system of
disposing of the public domain oil and gas resources by providing
for the issuance of leases calling for not less than a 12.!? roy-
alty, instead of prospecting permits for ur.proven lands. The
leases did not have any specific drilling requirements.
Another criticism of the 1°20 Act was the 20 year lease v.ith
the right to renewal for 10 year periods on such terms and con-
ditions as the Interior Department may impose. In this connection
07
Interior observed:
There being no assurance of tenure or terms beyond the
first 20 year period lessees attempt to produce all oil
and gas within that period .... In view of the exist-
ing overproduction of crude oil ... it seems only rea-
sonable that the term of the lease should be for the pro-
ductive life of the wells thereon, thus avoiding the
necessity of producing all oil possible within a prescribed
term regardless of conditions in the industry.
Congress adopted this policy and provided for 5 year lease? on ur-
proven lands, and 10 year leases on proven lands, each of which
-no-

continued as long thereafter as oil or gas was produced in pay-
fjfl
ing quantities.
The Interior Department also took a strong position on the
non-competitive procedure of granting rights to itnproven lands.
The Department determined that such procedure was subversive to
the public interest, since:
In particular it offers an invitation and encouragement
to him who in public land parlance is called a "sooner",
ouch an individual, for example, seeing a geological party
ut work, may take advantage of his knowledge of their pres-
ence and hurriedly file application arid substantially with-
out expense or effort obtain a preference right, to the
disadvantage of persons who are in good faith raking expen-
sive preliminary investigations.
Congress did not agree to elimination of the "sooner" from the
public land scene, and continued the policy of giving r.he first
on
applicant the right to le;s? unproven lands. This policy has
01
continued through 1962 but the inequity of such individuals
profiting from those who desire to spend money developing the
public lands is controlled by a !?' limitation on the overriding
02
royalties which can be held on public land leases.
The amendments included two provisions which have continued
through 1962: (1) the right of the Secretary of the Interior to
93
compel a lessee to unitize his lease, and (2) the exclusion
of unitized acreage from computation under the acreage limitations
n
imposed upon individual, association or corporate lease holdings.
-ru-

In addition to these statutory conservation measures, the
Secretary of the Interior undei his statutory authorization
"to prescribe necessary and proper rules and regulations . . .
to carry out and accomplish the purposes of this Act" has re-
tained almost absolute power to control the operations of
lessees. This is done by the insertion of the following pro-
06
vision in leases issued under the Act:
It is conveuanted . . . that the rate of prospecting and
developing and the quantity and rate of production from
the lands . . . shall be subject to the control in the
public interest by the Secretary of the Interior, and in
the exercise of his judgment the Secretary may take into
consideration, among other things, Federal laws, State
laws, and regulations issued thereunder
. . .
This provision is contained in the i960 public land lease.
Although this provision has not been judicially tested, it is
well founded since Congress can dispose of property of the United
States under any conditions it deems appropriate.
C. 1946 Amendments .
i> radical change in the domestic oil supply occurred between
00
1935 and 1916. The Senate Report on the proposed amendments
on
characterized the rhange as follows:
The bill is the first general revision of the Mineral
Leasing Act since the act of August 21, 1^35. At that
time the Nation had an abundance of Petroleum. The
center of gravity, so far as the production of oil is
concerned, was then in the Western Hemisphere, today it
is being shifted to the Eastern Hemisphere. Although ir
the past 05 years 63.0 per cent of all world petroleum
came from the United States, today the Nation possesses
-32-

but ?2 per rout of the est incited crude oil reserve of
the world, t.orld Uar iso. II has demonstrated beyond
peradventure of doubt that the solvation of this Nation
demands that we develop our petroleum reserves to the
utmost, to the end that this Nation shall not risk loss
of either industrial or political leadership.
The great drain placed on our crude oil reserves by world V'ar II,
and the difficulties of carrying on oil and gas exploration as a
result of personnel and material shortages during the war, prompted
Congress to pass several measures immediately prior to and during
ion
the war. In 1040 the payment of lease rentals for the second
3.01
and third lease years was waived, in 1012 the holders of f< year
non-competitive leases were given a preTerential right to renew such
leases for another fi years if the leased lands were not within a
known geologic structure of a producing oil or gas field at time of
102
lease expiration, and in 1042 lessees discovering new oil or
gas fields were permitted to pay a flat 12.5ft royalty or production
for 10 years following the date of discovery.
In 1046 Congress took steps to encourage more exploration
10C
and development of the public lands; it provided for a flat
104
12.5?' royalty on non-competitive leases, shortened the term of
competitive leases from 10 to 5 years, and only required competitive
leases of lands "within any known geological structure of a producing
oil or gas field" in lieu of such requirement, for lands "which are
known or believed to contain oil or gas deposits". Somewhat
-33-

anomalously Congress continued and enacted provisions allowing
speculators to tie up large portions of the public lands with-
out much capital outlay; specifically, it continued the waiver
of 2d and 3rd year lease rentals and the preferential right of
non-competitive leaseholders to renew for fi more years, and en-
larged the acreage limitations.
Tressure applied by public land lease brokers must be given
partial credit for this situation.' However, Congress rationalised
the anomaly by concluding that large holdings of public lands by
single individuals, associations, or corporations would lead to
faster development of the lands. For example, one ratiocination
was that "The enlargement of the acreage limitation is well justi-
fied . . . and is necessary to permit further development of the
public domain by many operators who presently hold the maximum
acreage allowable, much of which is substantially depleted by
many years of continuous production". The departure in acreage
limitations was major. Under the 1°35 Act individuals, associa-
tions, and corporations were limited to leases of 7,600 acres
within any one State and 2,560 acres within a single geologic
structure of a producing oil or gas field. Under the 1946 Act
leases of 15,360 acres were permitted in any State, the limitation
of holdings within a single geologic structure was eliminated, and
interests held under option to purchase or otherwise acquire leases
-34-

when "taken for the purpose of geophysical exploration" were
not to count against the acreage limitations. However, a limit
of options to 100,000 acres in any one State was enacted. The
Department of the Interior favored these relaxations in the
following language:
The option provision legalizes ... a method that has
been commonly employed by industry in the past several
years to assemble sufficient acreage to warrant extensive
geophysical work . . . The cost of exploratory work to
find new oil deposits has increased appreciably in recent
years due to deeper drilling and the difficulties involved
in locating prospective oil pools in areas where the sub-
surface geologic features cannot be interpreted from for-
mations exposed at the surface. If prospecting of the
public domain is to be encouraged some such procedure is
essential.
In 1920
. . . there were relatively few producing oil or
gas structures in the public land States. The market for
oil and gas from these structures was confined to a small
area and under these conditions the ownership or control
by one person of all or most of any one structure could
have resulted in a local monopoly.
Although Interior appeared to favor the option system, it really
was acting defensively. Its historic administrative position was
that option arrangements should not count against acreage limita-
tions. By urging Congress to recognize the fait accompli it
was able to bring some limitation to this type operation. Congress
approved the holding of 2 year options and required semi-annual
statements from option holders indicating their total holdings.
-35-

D. 1947 Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands .
107
This Act does not strictly pertain to the Mineral Leasing
Act of 1920, but does provide the means by which considerable
lands of the United States are leased for oil and gas development;
this is done by providing for leasing under "the same conditions
as contained in the leasing provisions of the mineral leasing
laws." The genesis of the Act was the report of a Special
Senate Committee which conducted an "Investigation of Petroleum
Resources in Relation to the National Welfare" from 1944 through
109
1946. This committee heard testimony as to the ingenuity and
capabilities of the oil industry to maintain adequate crude oil
reserves. However, the committee took a conservative course
in the following statement:
However sanguine may be the hopes of geologists derived
from historical trends of discovery, or however likely
may be the presence of petroleum in untested areas, it
would be unwise to rest conclusions for present purposes
upon any premise other than "proved" reserves as that
adjective is understood by the American oil industry.
If present estimates of future productive possibilities
are later demonstrated to have been conservative, our
national oil policy could be readily adapted to the
happy plenitude of supply. If the future proves less
roseate, our policy will have run concurrently with the
facts and the nation's security will not have been ad-
ventured.
The committee estimated in its final report that there were
150,000,000 acres of Federal lands acquired by condemnation, deed,




not subject to leasing under the mineral leasing laws; ' the
committee urged the Senate to give consideration to the mineral
deposits in these lands. The Act of August 7, 1947 did this.
The only major deviation from the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920,
as amended, was the provision that "All receipts derived from
leases issued under the authority of this Act shall be paid into
the same funds or accounts in the Treasury and shall be dis-
tributed in the same manner as prescribed for other receipts from
113
the lands affected by the lease". Therefore, revenues were
generally earmarked for the Federal and not the State treasuries.
E. Amendments to Mineral Leasing Act from 1946 to 1960 .
1. Prior to General Revision of 1960.
Technical changes were made in the Act in 1954, but
no substantial changes in principles or scope of the Act were
made until 1960. The major change from 1946 to 1960 was relaxa-
tion of the acreage limitations. Presumably the relaxation was
brought about by the sharply increasing costs of finding oil and
115gas deposits, and the relative economic advantage of having
a large block of lands upon which to conduct exploration. In 1951
the acreage limitation in any one State was increased to 46,080
acres, and permissible option holdings to 200,000 acres in any one
State.
2. 1960 Revision Act.
117
The Act of September 2, 1960 undertook to bring the
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Mineral Leasing Act up to date in language, principle, and scope.
118
After extensive hearings Congress was substantially satisfied
with the present form of the Act. In general, it reenacted the
requirements for competitive leasing in blocks of not more than
610 acres of lands within known geological structures of producing
oil or gas fields, at a royalty of not less than 12.5%, and the
noncompetitive, first applicant, leasing of other lands at a flat
12.5% royalty. A five year term for competitive leases was con-
tinued, but non-competitive leases are now issued for 10 year
terms; each type lease continues so long as oil or gas is produced
in paying quantities. The distinction between acreage held under
lease, and that held under option is abolished with an overall
limitation of 246,080 acres in any one State regardless of how
held. The annual rental per acre was raised to 50 cents, and the
waiver of 2d and 3rd year rentals was abolished.
Congress determined that the situation in the United States
was such that it was desirable to make continued exploration of




... in the past several years there has been a potentially
dangerous slackening in exploration for development of do-
mestic reserves of oil and gas so necessary for our security
in war and peace. The decline in exploration is caused in
large part by the falling off of domestic production —
from 7,150,000 barrels daily a year ago to 6,850,000 barrels
daily in May of this year /l960/ as a result of global
factors embracing the fabulously flush production of Middle
-38-

East oil fields and increase in Venezuelan and, most
recently, North African production. At the same time
that our domestic production has been declining by some
3 per cent, our consumption has been rising by about
5 per cent to some 9 million barrels daily.
This falling off of domestic exploration is readily
discernible in the figures of the Interstate Oil Compact
Commission covering active exploration crews. In April,
1960 the number of such crews was 419, in contrast to 490
at the end of 1959 and 725 in the peak year of 1953.
The continuation of the relatively liberal terms under which the
public oil and gas lands may be exploited is consistent with these
observations.
The only major change in the Revision Act was in scope. The
Mineral Leasing Act was extended to cover "native asphalt, solid
and semisolid bitumen, and bituminous rock (including oil im-
pregnated rock or sands from which oil is recoverable only by
120
special treatment after the deposit is mined or quarried)". In
121
speaking of this extension the Senate Report said:
New technology has brought the hydrocarbons now locked in
the interstices of the so-called tar or oil sands to the
edge of commercial production. This section . . . will
make it possible for entrepreneurs to secure an oil sands
lease, generally along the terms already set out in the
law for oil shale lease's.
The avoidance of expensive crushing and the lack of
extensive overburden give petroleum sands a commercial
advantage over the oil shale, its proponents assert. When
exposed at the surface, the oil sands present the possi-
bility of economical open-pit mining. Known deposits exist
in Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, Texas, California, and Missouri
-39-

Underground mining opens the possibility that the oil
sands of old and exhausted fields may also be exploited. By
authorizing the issuance of oil sands leases under the multi-
ple-use principle, the section provides the legislative means




IX. OVERALL OBSERVATIONS REGARDING DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC OIL,
GAS, AND OIL S11ALE DEPOSITS.
A. Principles of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 .
The general principles of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920
have been very closely followed to the present time. However,
national needs with respect to oil and gas have been reflected
by emphasis or deemphasis of these principles. The principles
legislated in 1920 were:
(a) The lands of the National Government should be open
for development of oil, gas, and oil shale deposits
by private interests under a leasing system under
which title to the lands is retained by the National
Government.
(b) The Executive Department of the National Government
should retain control over the manner in which these
resources are developed.
(c) The benefits resulting from the development of the oil,
gas, and oil shale resources should be distributed as
widely as possible, and the concentration of wealth
by virtue of such benefits should be controlled.
(d) The remuneration flowing to the Government from the
development of these resources should be channeled to
the States in which the resources are located.
-41-

Various facets in the implementation of these principles are
discussed hereafter.
B. Lands Available for Oil, Gas, and Oil Shale Development
from 1920 to 1962 .
The demand for petroleum products has grown steadily from
1920 to 1962. The reliance of our national economy and defense
on petroleum products has grown throughout this period. For ex-
ample, in 1920 the production of crude oil in this country was
442,929 thousand barrels, and this crude oil supplied 13.9% of
122
the mineral fuels energy consumed in this country. In 1955
the production of crude oil in this country was 2,484,420
thousand barrels, and this crude oil supplied 42.7% of the
123
mineral fuels energy consumed in this country. * The per capita
consumption of crude oil per year went from 4.27 barrels in 1920
to 16.96 barrels in 1955. The availability of productive
capacity has been the key to congressional action during this
period.
From 1920 to 1962 the petroleum supply picture of the
United States has gone full cycle. In 1920 we were a nation with
a perilously short supply, in the late 1920's and 1930*s we had
an unmanageable oversupply, and since the start of World War II we
have again been fearful of our short supply. Congress and the
Executive Department have reacted to these stimuli by closing the
-42-

public domain to oil and gas leasing during the period of un-
manageable supply, and by thereafter making available more and
more public lands for development.
The 1947 Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands made avail-
able millions of acres which the United States had acquired since
1920, and also applies to lands acquired after 1947. These lands
were not subject to lease under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920
125
which only applied to the public domain. Both Acts exclude
from their coverage lands situated within "incorporated cities,
towns and villages, and national parks or monuments." The
Acquired Lands Act also excludes acquired lands "set apart for
127
military or naval purposes.
Although the Mineral Leasing Act initially excluded military
120
lands, the 1946 amendments to the Act eliminated this exclusion.
Hence, the authority to lease military lands is available if such
lands have as their source of origin the public domain, but not if
129
they have been acquired by the United States. This statutory
restriction placed the Executive Department in an untenable position
in 1941 when oil was being drained from beneath land acquired by
the War Department. However, the Attorney General gave the practical
solution to fill the void in the law by determining that the Executive




in the absence of express Congressional authorization.
This authority extends to all lands of the United States which
are not otherwise available for mineral leasing.
131
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, and its
132
companion Act, the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, " were the
political solution of an impasse which had developed between
133
the States and the United States with respect to offshore lands.
In essence these Acts deeded to the States all lands within 3 miles,
or within 3 marine leagues in certain instances of their coast
lines, asserted United States sovereignty over lands seaward of
the State lands, and made available the lands of the United States
for leasing. It is noteworthy that the deeding of the coastal
lands to the States was a major deviation from the principle of the
Mineral Leasing Act that Federal oil and gas lands should be re-
tained by the National Government. However, the factors leading to
this deviation were so diverse and peculiar to these particular
lands that it can hardly be viewed as a change of policy. On the
other hand, the assertion of sovereignty beyond the 3 mile limit
of the Federal coast line was a policy decision which will have
1 O 1
great significance as the years progress.
135The Multiple Mineral Development Act of 1954 was a great
boon to the development of the public lands. The purpose of the





The intent of the bill ... is to resolve conflicts between
the mining laws of the United States and the Mineral Leasing
Act which have prevented mineral development of the same
tracts of public lands from going forward under both systems.
Land on which mineral locations have been made under the
mining laws has not been open to leasing under the Mineral
Leasing Act, and on the other hand land covered by an oil
and gas lease or permit, or an application or offer for the
same, under the Mineral Leasing Act, or known to be valuable
for oil and gas or other Leasing Act minerals, could not be
located under the mining laws.
... An immediate effect would be the opening of some 60
million acres of the public lands, now under oil and gas
lease, to location for uranium and other minerals. At the
same time, it would stimulate oil and gas development on
the public lands by authorizing operations for leasable
minerals on lands open to location under the mining laws,
and by establishing a means for determining the validity
of any rights claimed for Leasing Act minerals under
patented mining claims located prior to the effective date
of this act.
Existing statutory authority makes virtually all lands of
the United States available for oil, gas, and oil shale de-
velopment. Congressional action is needed with respect to oil
shale lands, development of which is being hampered by both
economic considerations and legal snarls resulting from ancient
mining claims. This need is discussed in detail in Part Three of
this paper.
C. Administration of Oil, Gas, and Oil Shale Leases of Public
Lands
.
Congress has given very broad supervisory authority to the




leases through the delegation of rule making authority. The
rules and regulations that the Secretary makes are the equivalent
of statutory enactments, so long as they do not conflict with
130
existing statutes. The Secretary cannot disregard his own
139
rules, which are quite paternalistic and under which the
140
activities of the lessees are closely supervised.
The ultimate sanction which a lessor can employ is cancella-
tion of a lease, With respect to such action by the Secretary
of the Interior there is a difference of opinion between the
Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia and the 10th
Circuit. Each of these courts have considered the authority of
the Secretary to cancel a lease when the Secretary subsequently
determines that the lessee obtained the lease in violation of the
Secretary's regulations or the terms of the Mineral Leasing Act.
The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals decided Pan American
Petroleum Corporation v. Pierson in 1%0; an injunction was
sought by Pan American, an assignee of the original lessee, against
the local representatives of the Bureau of Land Management who
had instituted proceedings to cancel both producing and non-producing
leases because of fraud in the initial procurement of the leases —
holdings in excess of the acreage limitations specified in the Leasing
142
Act. The court said:
/The Secretary of the Interioj;7 as "guardian of the
people of the United States over the public lands" /has
-46-

the/ obligation to see that neither patents nor leases are
procured by fraud. The courts have repeatedly held that he
is without power to annul a patent once it has issued. That
power is reserved to the courts. In the absence of some
statutory provision giving him power to annul leases under
the Mineral Leasing Act, that power is reserved to the
courts.
On this basis the court concluded the Secretary had no power of
cancellation on the facts presented, and that cancellation should
be sought by judicial action.
The Mineral Leasing Act has only one provision allowing the
Secretary to cancel leases; 30 USC 100 ( 1950) provides:
Except as otherwise herein provided, any lease
issued under the /Mineral Leasing Act7 may be for-
feited and canceled by an appropriate proceeding in
the United States district court for the district
in which the property, or some part thereof, is lo-
cated whenever the .lessee fails to comply with any
of the provisions /of the lease, or of the general
regulations promulgated under the Mineral Leasing
Act in force at the date of the lease7
. . .
Any lease issued after August 21, 1935, under the
provisions of section 226 of this title shall be
subject to cancellation by the Secretary of the
Interior after thirty days* notice upon the failure
of the lessee to comply with any of the provisions
of the lease, unless or until the land covered by
any such lease is known to contain valuable deposits
of oil or gas
. . . (Emphasis supplied)
The Pan American case would suggest that the Secretary could only
cancel a lease under the circumstances set out in the latter
part of section 180, supra.
The Pan American case must be compared with two cases decided




McKay v. Wahlemaier was decided by this court; a corporation,
and the president and vice-president of the corporation, each
filed separate applications for an oil and gas lease which was
to be issued to the winner of a drawing from lease applications.
The corporation president's application was drawn first and
one Wahlenmaier' s application was drawn second. After the
issuance of the lease to the corporation president, Wahlenmaier
complained to the Secretary that the corporation president had
violated the Secretary's regulations by not disclosing his interest
in the corporation in connection with his lease application, and
asked that the lease be canceled and one issued to him. The
Secretary determined that there had been a violation of his regu-
lations but refused to cancel the lease. Wahlenmaier took his
complaint to the Federal District Court which granted the relief
he had asked of the Secretary; the Secretary appealed and the
Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court judgment. The court
stated the Secretary was bound by his own regulations and that
144he was "plainly wrong in refusing to cancel the lease . . ."
,
145
The court also said:
The Secretary's decision was probably based on
confusion as to the nature of the question be-
fore him, and misapprehension of his own power
and duty to cancel a lease obtained as this one
was. If it was not so based, the decision is a
shocking example of arbitrary administrative
action.
In 1961 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals followed this
146
decision in the case of Boesche v. Udall.
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These court decisions do not clearly establish what either
Court of Appeals will do in any specific case. The 10th Circuit
court seems to apply a clearly defined rule of law, namely, once
the lease is issued only judicial action can be invoked to cancel
it unless the Leasing Act otherwise provides, but it restricted
its decision in acting on a petition for rehearing by the United
147
States; the court there stated:
This case involves the administrative cancellation of an
oil and gas lease for fraud by lessees in procurement.
The comments of counsel relating to the authority of the
Secretary to cancel for administrative errors or for
breaches of lease provisions are beside the point and
merit no consideration. We adhere to our view that the
Secretary and the defendant officials are without authority
to cancel an oil and gas lease for fraud of a lessee
precedent to lease issuance.
Accordingly, the Pan American case cannot be considered a precedent
except when fraud by the lessee prior to lease issuance is invoked.
It probably should be given little weight unless the fraud is in
connection with acreage holdings. Section 27 of the Mineral Leasing
Act, as amended, (30 USC 181 (1950)) provides, among other things,
that if any person holds any interest in any lease in violation
of the provisions relating to maximum holdings he may be compelled
to dispose of such holding in an appropriate proceedings instituted
by the Attorney General in the United States district court for the
district in which the leased property is located. This statutory
provision undermines the argument that Congress gave the Secretary
-49-

of the Interior authority to administratively cancel under these
circumstances by Rev. Stat. 441, 5 USC 485 (1958), which es-
tablishes general supervisory authority in the Secretary over
public lands. But conversely, 30 USC 1M gives foundation to
the argument that Congress specifically provided for the acreage
limitation situation because it recognized the general adminis-
trative authority of the Secretary to cancel leases in other simi-
lar circumstances.
ci-ses
The precedent value of the District of Columbia/ is limited
to factual situations similar to those before the court. The
argument of the United States for cancellation authority is suc-
cinctly stated in its brief on the Boesche case, supra, as follows:
Reliance upon the fact that the Mineral Leasing Act
of 1920 does not expressly provide for the type of
administrative cancellation envisaged here ignores
more than 100 years of history. Neither was there
authority more express than 5 U.S.C. sec. 485 in such
administrative adjudications and cancellations as are
found in Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450 (1^20);
Riverside Oil Co. v. Hitchcock, 190 U.S. 316 (1903);
Hawley v. Diller, 178 U.S. 476 (1900); Orchard v.
Alexander, 157 U.S. 372 (1895); Knight v. U.S. Land
Association, 142 U.S. 161 (1891); and Harkness &
Wife v. Underhill, 1 Black 316 (1861). The authority
of the Secretary under 5 U.S.C. sec. 485 enabled him
to cancel a mining claim in the Cameron case; to can-
cel the lieu land selection in Riverside Oil Co.; to
cancel an entry under the Timber and Stone Act, 20
Stat. 89, in the Hawley case; to cancel a homestead
entry in Orchard v. Alexander; to cancel a survey and
approve a later survey which resulted in the change
of the ownership of certain properties in Knight v.
U.S. Land Association; and to cancel a homestead entry




act on the sane general supervisory authority in the
instant case A specific grant is no more essential
under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 than it was
under the statutes involved in the cited cases.
Comparing this argument with 30 USC 188 e supra, it would appear
that Congress has made specific provision for administrative cancella-
tion of validly issued leases when there is a subsequent viola
tion of the lease or the regulations applicable to it, unless the
lease covers lands known to contain valuable deposits of oil or
gas and was issued after August 21, 1935, Therefore, the argument
of the United States in the Boesche case would only apply to mat-
ters surrounding the issuance of the lease. Of course, it was
only as to such matters that the court decided the Wahlenmaier
and Boesche cases; hence, these cases are only precedent for the
cancellation authority with respect to matters surrounding lease
issuance.
The District of Columbia court might ultimately concur with the
result in the Pan American case. It might find in the language of
the Mineral Leasing Act, specifically in 30 USC 184, a congressional
desire for judicial action in factual situations such as Pan
American; however, the District of Columbia court has clearly re-
jected the patent analogy relied on in the Pan American case.
The United States pointed out in its Boesche brief that there
is a practical need for the cancellation power in the Secretary;
in the three year period prior to June 30, I960, Interior issued
-51-

51,000 oil and gas leases and administratively canceled 1,129
of these. The cancellations were based on such reasons as:
(1) issuance to other than the first qualified applicant, (2)
issuance for land in a prior oil and gas lease, (3) issuance
where the offer to lease was withdrawn before the lease was
issued, and (1) issuance of a noncompetitive lease for lands
on a known geologic structure. Surely the smooth administration
of the public lands require the cancellation authority in the
Secretary in such cases as the above. However, cogent arguments
can be made against giving such authority when the lessee has ex-
pended monies on the development of the lease. The extent of
this authority can be defined either by further judicial decision
or by Congressional action; the latter is preferable. Congress
did act in 1959 to place one limitation on the cancellation au-
149
thority. The Act of September 21, 1959 protects bona fide pur-
chasers, even though the rights of the original lessee are subject
to cancellation for violation of the acreage limitation provisions
of the Leasing Act.




In the wake of the 1911 Standard Oil anti-trust case,
Congress was aware of the potentialities for monopoly of oil and
gas supplies, and the Leasing Act carefully limited the amounts
of public lands which any one person, association, or corporation
-52-

could have under lease at any one time. ' As conditions have
changed there have been major relaxations of these restrictions;
however, such limitations are a means by which this aspect of the
public natural resources is regulated. By increasing or de-
creasing the acreage limitations, Congress can give due considera-
tion to the needs of the country as compared to the undesirability
of allowing a few to get rich off the property of all the people.
This flexibility is one of the advantages resulting from retention
of ownership by the Federal Government.
Congress also encourages or discourages exploration and de-
velopment of the public domain by adjustment of the lease royalty
rates. This method was employed to encourage exploration between
1020 and 1935 by the issuance of 3?<S royalty leases. Between 1035
and 1046, essentially a period of plenty, 12!$' minimum sliding and
step scale leases were used; since 1046, a period of shortage, a
flat 12}$ non-competitive lease has been used. The drafters of the
Mineral Leasing Act recognized the need to reduce the Government's
take from a lease when it becomes marginal, and vested the right
in the Secretary of the Interior to grant royalty relief in such
152
cases.
An important monetary feature of the Mineral Leasing Act is
the channeling of revenue to the States where the leases are
1 53located for use in connection with specified programs. This
-53-

arrangement, whereby the United States maintains regulatory
controls which can be uniformly applied throughout the United
States, with the profits going to the States^ is a most
felicitous compromise between the respective interests of the
National and States Governments.
-54-

TART TWO: APPLICABILITY OF STATE OIL AND GAS
CONSERVATION LAWS TO FEDERAL LESSEES
I. PERTINENCE OF THE SUBJECT.
The Federal form of government, which reserved powers to
the States or tc the people except insofar as they are expressly
or impliedly delegated to the United States, was originally a
ronipromi.se born of political necessity. After a hundred and
seventy years that government has emerged as one which permits,
perhaps better than any other that might be devised, State free-
dom to deal with the nation's problems. And yet the proper
relationship of Federal and State governments continues to pre-
sent perplexing and unresolved problems.
Mr. Ross Halone in 1051 stated:
The question of the application and enforceability of
State proration orders to production from a Federal
lease has been the subject of some discussion and
speculation. It is the position of the United States
that the State has no authority to restrict production
from Federal leases but as a matter of comity the United
States Geological Survey enforces an identical allocation
of production to wells on Federal acreage as that pro-
mulgated by the State in which the land is located.
The position of the United States was expressed in 1958 by the
2
Attorney General of the United States as follows:
The laws governing mineral leasing of public lands
stress cooperation with the State conservation programs.
Accordingly, Geological Survey works closely with the
State officials, and exchanges information and views
on current conservation procedures. In general,
Geological Survey requires its lessees to follow the
market-demand proration or other regulations of the
-1-

State within which the land is located. However,
although the Secretary of the Interior is himself
authorized to limit public land production to market
demand, independent of State action, that has not been
done.
Whether or not there is a legal requirement for a Federal
lessee to comply with State proration statutes will probably
be decided by the courts. Such probability warrants an in-
vestigation of the applicability of State oil and gas con-
servation laws to Federal lessees.
-2-

II. STATE LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION.
A. In General .
Legislative is defined as "making or having the power to
make a law or laws". Jurisdiction is defined as "the authority
by which courts and judicial officers take cognizance of and
decide cases. n< Hence, the phrase "State legislative jurisdic-
tion" means the power of a State legislature to make laws
upon which its courts can base judicial decisions. The im-
portance of this power is illustrated by two United States
Supreme Court cases decided on the same day: Penn Dairies, Inc.
v. Milk Control Commission of Pennsylvania, and Pacific Coast
Dairy, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture of California. In
each case the State officials had sought to enforce State regu-
lations governing the price of milk sold to the Army. In the
California case the milk was delivered by the dealer to an area
of exclusive Federal jurisdiction; in the Pennsylvania case the
United States had no legislative jurisdiction over the area to
which the milk was delivered. In the former case, the Court held
that the law of the State had no application in the area of ex-
clusive jurisdiction and that it is unnecessary for Congress to
speak to effect that result. In the latter case, in which legis-
lative jurisdiction was vested in the State, the Court decided that
the operation of the State law did not constitute an interference with
-3-

a Federal function and would therefore be valid.
The dissent of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the Pacific
Coast Dairy case clearly indicates the majority of the Court
reached opposite results in the cases because of the existence
of State legislative jurisdiction in one case and the lack of
such jurisdiction in the other. The rule has been recently
9
stated as follows:
When the Federal Government has acquired exclusive leg-
islative jurisdiction over an area ... it is clear that
the State in which the area is located is without au-
thority to legislate for the area or to enforce any of
its laws within the area.
and continuing further:
Such jurisdiction /exclusive legislative jurisdiction
in the United States/ serves to exclude not only the
operation of State laws which constitute an interfer-
ence with a Federal function, but also the application
of State laws which are otherwise not objectionable on
constitutional grounds.
B. The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 and the Mineral Leasing
Act for Acquired Lands of 1947 .
The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 and the Mineral Leasing Act
12
for Acquired Lands of 1947, in enumerating the lands of the United
States subject to disposition, do not exclude lands over which the
13
United States may have exclusive jurisdiction. Land subject to
a Federal oil and gas lease may be under exclusive, partial, or
concurrent jurisdiction of the United States, or may be land in
which the United States has only a proprietory interest.
-4-

The relationship of the United States and the States under
each type of jurisdiction has been defined in a study titled
"Jurisdiction Over Federal Areas Within the States" substantially
as follows:
(a) Exclusive legislative jurisdiction: the Federal
Government theoretically displaces the State in
which the area is contained of all its sovereign
authority, executive and judicial as well as
legislative.
(b) Concurrent legislative jurisdiction: the Federal
Government has what would otherwise amount to
exclusive legislative jurisdiction, but the State
has reserved to itself the right to exercise con-
currently with the United States, all of the same
authority.
(c) Partial legislative jurisdiction: the Federal
Government has been granted for exercise by it over
an area in a State certain of the State's authority,
but the State concerned has reserved to itself the
right to exercise, by itself or concurrently with
the United States, other authority constituting more
than merely the right to serve civil or criminal
process in the area.
(d) Proprietorial interest only: the Federal Government
has acquired some right or title to an area in a State
but has not obtained any measure of the State's
authority over the area.
1 ^According to the Pacific Coast Dairy case, supra, if the
United States has exclusive legislative jurisdiction over the area
under lease, the State conservation statutes can have no applica-
tion solely on the basis of the State legislative act. This is
true even though the regulation only purports to apply to private
property, that is, to the lessee's leasehold estate, and not to
-5-

the estate of the United States. Manifestly the same is
true if, under a condition of partial jurisdiction, the State
granted exclusive jurisdiction to the United States with respect
to conservation of oil and gas. In this regard, when a State
makes reservations of jurisdiction at the same time that it
transfers the remaining jurisdiction to the United States, the
reservations are strictly construed against the State.
If the legislative jurisdiction of the United States and
the State is concurrent, or if the United States only has a
proprietorial interest in the land, the applicability of State
conservation laws is no longer determinedby the jurisdictional
status of the land. As shown by a tabulation in the study
"Jurisdiction over Federal Areas Within the States", supra,
the vast majority of lands owned by the United States are held
19
in a proprietorial status.
In areas under exclusive Federal jurisdiction Congress has
made some of the State laws applicable. For example, the Assimi-
lative Crimes Act, 18 USC 13, adopts certain State criminal statutes
It might be argued that Congress adopted certain of the State's oil
and gas conservation statutes by enactment of section 30 of the
20
Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 which provides
:
Sec. 30. . . . Each lease shall contain provisions for the
purpose of insuring the exercise of reasonable diligence,
skill, and care in the operation of said property; a
provision that such rules for the safety and welfare of
the miners and for the prevention of undue waste as may
be prescribed by said Secretary shall be observed . . .
and such other provisions as he may deem necessary to
insure the sale of the production of such leased lands to
-6-

the United States and to the public at reasonable prices
for the protection of the interests of the United States,
for the prevention of monopoly, and for the safeguarding
of the public welfare: Provided, That none of such
provisions shall be in conflict with the laws of the
State in which the leased property is situated .
(Emphasis supplied.)
One argument is that no possibility of conflict with the
State laws exists since such laws have no application within
the area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction. However, assuming
no assimilation of the (Opposite State laws, the Secretary of the
Interior appears to be bound to require substantial compliance
by Federal lessees with pertinent State laws. The Secretary,
within the spirit of this section, could promulgate conservation
regulations more stringent than those of the State of location,
but none less stringent.
21
The case of Murphy Corp. v. Fontenot decided by the Louisiana
Supreme Court is in point. A portion of Barksdale Air Force Base
was leased for oil and gas development; the State of Louisiana
imposed a gas gathering severance tax on the lessee which was paid
under protest and was the subject of the litigation. The Base
was under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States and not
subject to the Mineral Leasing Acts. However, on the advice of the
Attorney General, the President of the United States gave the
Department of the Interior authority to lease a portion of the Base,
provided there was no interference with the primary use of the Base.
-7-

This unusual action was taken because of drainage of oil and gas
from under the Base by operations on adjoining privately owned
lands. The lease contained a provision that the lessee should
pay, when due, all taxes lawfully assessed and levied under the
laws of the State or the United States. This provision was
22
identical to one contained in the current Federal lease form.
The court upheld the tax but never clearly spelled out its
reasoning. The court did emphasize that the lease provision re-
quiring the lessee to pay such taxes would be a nullity unless
the tax was held valid. The Supreme Court of the United States
23
denied certiorari.
The taxpayer was not happy with this result and managed
to get a second day in court by resorting to Federal jurisdiction.
He was no more successful there. He appealed from a decision of
the Federal District Court which upheld the tax. Primarily,
the appeal was based on the exclusive Federal jurisdiction over
Barksdale Air Force Base and the rule that the taxing power of the
State is limited to persons within, and subject to, the State's
jurisdiction. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the lower
court decision. The court concluded that:
Only after /the gas/ reaches and is severed from the
surface and becomes personal property does the tax
fall on the severer.
and stated:
In short, the provision /in the lease that the lessee
would pay State taxes7 must and will be construed so
-8-

as to give it effect and as saying in effect that if,
under the general laws of the State, the operator would
be liable, he cannot draw around himself a cloak of
immunity because the United States is lessor, but must,
as a part of the consideration for the lease and his
obligation under the statute, pay the taxes which the
severance tax statutes impose.
The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.''
These cases are significant since they interpret a lease
provision which is standard in the usual Federal lease, and also
because of the validity extended to a State law within an area
of exclusive Federal jurisdiction. An analogy can be drawn
between this case and the proper application to be given to
section 30 of the Leasing Act, supra. If the lessee cannot claim
immunity in the tax situation, he likewise should not have im-
munity from State oil and gas conservation laws in view of the
terms of section 30. A weakness in the analogy is the peculiar
facts surrounding the Barksdale Air Force Case lease; this lease
was specially authorized and at the time of its execution was
known to apply to an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction.
Whereas, section 30 applies to areas under all types of Federal
legislative jurisdiction, and could be construed as being applica-
ble to others; therefore, the choice of either considering section
30 a nullity or giving it application to an area of exclusive
jurisdiction does not exist.
2ft
C. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
.
In the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act the phrase "Outer
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Continental Shelf" means all submerged lands lying seaward and
outside of the area of lands beneath "navigable waters" as de-
29
fined in the Submerged Lands Act. The phrase "navigable
waters" is defined as waters within the three mile geographical
limit around the United States, or waters within the boundary
line of the State where such boundary extends seaward or into
Oft
the Gulf of Mexico beyond three geographical miles/
Presidential Proclamation 2667 of September 0, 194.r was the
first assertion on behalf of the United States of jurisdiction,
control, and power of disposition over the natural resources of
31
the subsoil and seabed of the Continental Shelf. Congress con-
32
firmed the assertion in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in United States v. California,'
discussed the ownership of the subsoil of the three mile coastal
belt around the United States; he stated, after assuming the area
is unclaimed: "I have no doubt that the President and the
Congress between them could make it part of the national domain
34
..." The President and Congress have acted to make the Outer
Continental Shelf part of the national domain.
oer
The Supreme Court in United States v. Louisiana held that
although a littoral State makes a claim to coastal areas, as
Louisiana did by statute in 1938, the United States still has
paramount rights over such areas, "an incident to which is full
-10-

dominion over the resources of the soil under that water area,
including oil."" Assuming that the United States has properly
asserted its sovereignty over the Outer Continental Shelf a
question definitely settled by the Tideland cases insofar
as the States are concerned, it follows that included in its
paramount rights is the right to determine the type of legisla-
tive jurisdiction it has over such lands.
Congress did this in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act (43 USC 1333) by providing:
(a) (1) The Constitution and laws and civil and political
jurisdiction of the United States are extended to the
subsoil and seabed of the Outer Continental Shelf
... to the same extent as if the Outer Continental
Shelf were an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction
located within a State . . .
The "exclusive jurisdiction" established by this provision
30
would, by the authority of the Pacific Coast Dairy case,' supra,
exclude the applicability of the State oil and gas conservation
laws. However, Congress has provided for a policy of comity with
30
respect to such laws. The Outer Continental Shelf Act states:
The secretary may at any time prescribe and amend such
rules and regulations as he determines to be necessary
and proper in order to provide for the prevention of
waste and conservation of the natural resources of the
outer Continental Shelf, and the protection of correlative
rights therein, and, notwithstanding any other provisions
herein, such rules and regulations shall apply to all
operations conducted under a lease issued or maintained
under the provisions of the subchapter. In the enforce-
ment of conservation laws, rules, and regulations the
Secretary is authorized to co-operate with the conservation







Strictly speaking the lessee of Indian lands is not a
lessee of Federal lands. The fee title to Indian lands is in
the United States, but the Indians have the right to occupy
and use the lands. It has been stated that "Since the Federal
government has exclusive jurisdiction over Indian affairs in
matters involving Indian reservations, the state in which the
land is situated has no jurisdiction in the absence of specific
legislation by Congress." The case authority for this con-
elusion is Worcester v. Georgia. "" In this case the Supreme
Court of the United States was considering the validity of a
law of Georgia which subjected to punishment all white persons
residing within the limits of the Cherokee nation, and au-
thorized their arrest within those limits, and their forcible
removal there from, and their trial in a court of the State. The
Court held the law to be repugnant to the Constitution, treaties
and laws of the United States, and through the opinion of the Chief
Justice Marshall said:
The treaties and laws of the United States contemplate
the Indian territory as completely separated from that
of the States. 10
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community,
occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately
described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no
force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no
right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees
-12-

themselves, or in conformity with treaties and with
the acts of congress. The whole intercourse between
the United States and this nation is, by our constitution,
and laws, vested in the government of the United States.
The logic of this case is valid today, and will v'e so as long as
Indian lands are considered to be held by a separate and distinct
body politic. ' The oil and gas conservation laws of Utah would
be no more applicable against the lessee on India): lands within
the boundaries of Utah than they would be against a lessee operating
on private lands in the adjoining State of Colorado.
-13-

III. IMMUNITY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM THE STATE POLICE POWER,
A. In General .
If a State has legislative jurisdiction over the lease
area, it may exercise such jurisdiction "subject to non-inter-
ference by the State with Federal functions, and subject to
the free exercise by the Federal Government of rights with
respect to the use, protection, and disposition of its
47
property. Heice, a State's attempt to regulate a Federal
lessee should be tested to see if it inteiferes with a
Federal function, or if it runs contrary to the power of
Congress "to dispose of and make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property be-
48
longing to the United States."
B. Non-interference by the State with Federal Functions .
A State could argue that the enforcement of its regula-
tions against a Federal lessee is regulation of a private
individual with respect to his private leasehold estate;
therefore, there could be no interference with a Federal
function. A similar argument persuaded the Supreme Court
-14-

of Mississippi in Superior Oil Co. y. Berry.' 'J here the
court considered the validity of a spacing rule adopted by
the State Oil and Gas Board which required the pooling of
the rights of all owners in drilling units prior to the
issuance by the State of a permit to drill on the unit.
The rule defined the term "owner", as used in the rule,
to nean "The person who has the right to drill into and pro-
duce from a field or pool, and to appropriate the production
either for himself, or for himself and another."'" The
nineral and royalty owners complained that it was lack of due
process to force; pool their properties, and a fortiori, when
the lessees could pool the leasehold interest without con-
sulting the lessors. The court said: *
. . .
such mineral or royalty owners by the execution
of the oil ard gas leases have divorced themselves from
the operations for the production of oil or gas, reserving
unto themselves only the right to receive the annual
rental provided for in the lease, the royalty to accrue
under the lease, and the reversionary interest in fee
in the event there is no production from the land during
the life of such lease.
lias the United States by execution of the oil and gas
lease ceased to have a sovereign interest in the leasehold
estate of the lessee? In United States v. General Petroleum
Corporation of California it was stated:'"
-15-

In resolving the foregoing issues /regarding the authority
of the Secretary of the Interior to determine the value
of oil, natural gas and natural gas gasoline, or any of
them for royalty purposes/ it must be remembered that the
government's role is taken to be no different from that
of any private lessor or proprietor, for while the Kettleman
Hills lands involved are public mineral lands, and as such
until their disposition are under the supervision and
control of Congress, the government as to such lands acts
iii a proprietary capacity, and treats with them in the
same way as does the private landowner. Hegardless of the
type of lease Congress might authorize, a lease executed
in accordance with what it has authorized becomes a
private, contractual matter and is to be interpreted
according to the general rules of law respecting contracts
between individuals.
If the State is only regulating the private right of the Federal
lessee, it has almost unlimited police power to regulate and control
53
the drilling for, and production of, oil and gas/
The argument breaks down on the premise that the United States
has divorced itself from the operations for the production of oil
and gas. The standard Federal oil and gas lease reserves to the
United States considerable executory powers insofar as drilling
54
and production is concerned. Examples of such reserved powers are:
(1) authority of the Secretary of the Interior to consent to a unit
agreement covering the leasehold and to require the lessee to join
55
therein, (2) authority of the Secretary of the Interior to require
the lessee to drill and produce such other wells as the Secretary may
reasonably require in order that the leased premises may be properly
and timely developed and produced in accordance with good operating
practice,' (3) requirement that the lessee carry on all operations
-16-

in accordance with approved methods and practice as provided in
C-l
the Oil and Gas Operating Regulations, ' and (D agreement that the
rate of prospecting and developing and the quantity and rate of
production from the lands covered by the lease shall be subject
to control in the public interest by the Secretary of the Interior.'
These are the identical matters that are dealt with by State
oil and gas conservation statutes; consequently, State efforts to
regulate these matters is an effort to regulate a property right of
the United States. The next section discusses the extent to which
the State can properly regulate this property right.
One of the functions of the United States under the Constitution
is "To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
59
States.'" Pursuant to this authority Congress has passed the
Natural Gas Act. In Cities Service Gas Co. v. State Corporation
Commission of Kansas the United States Supreme Court held orders
of the Corporation Commission setting a minimum wellhead price for
gas to be invalid; the Court held this to be an area of interstate
commerce in which Congress had, through the medium of the Natural
Gas Act, preempted the field of regulation. The extent to which the
Natural Gas Act will invalidate State conservation laws is a matter
for future judicial determination. In any event the decisions will




C. Power of Congress to Make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting Property of the United States .
1. In General.
The Constitution of the United States provides that provisions
62
therein shall be the supreme law of the land. With respect to
property of the United States the Constitution provides that "The
Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules
and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging
to the United States." ' The United States Supreme Court in Pollard
v. Hagan ' decided that this clause does not give the United States
exclusive legislative jurisdiction over its property within the
United States; and the validity of the exercise of the State police
65
power over the public domain was upheld in Omaechevarria v. Idaho.
In the latter case the State of Idaho, in an effort to avert clashes
between cattle rangers and sheep herders on the public domain, passed
a law prohibiting any person having charge of sheep from allowing them
to graze on a range previously occupied by cattle; the United States
Supreme Court upheld the law and said that "The police power of the
State extends over the federal public domain, at least when there is
no legislation by Congress on the subject." '
The power of the United States to regulate with respect to the
public domain is plenary; the Supreme Court in Gibson v. Chouteau said:
With respect to the public domain, the Constitution vests in
Congress the power of disposition and of making all needful




That the power is plenary, even though the United States attempts
to control the use cf its property after its disposal, is illustrated
60
by the United States v. City and County of San Francisco.
That case involved a grant by the United States to the City
and County of San Francisco of land in the public domain in the
Yosemite National Park and the Stanislaus National Forest. The
grant was subject to several express conditions, one of which pro-
hibited the City of San Francisco from ever selling electric energy
generated on such lands to any corporation, unless it was a muni-
cipality, or to any individual. The United States contended that the
City had violated this condition by the sale of power generated on
these lands to the Pacific Gas and Electric Company, a private
utility. The City countered by contending, in part, that this ex-
press prohibition was an unconstitutional invasion of the rights of
the State of California since it attempted to regulate the manner
in which the electricity should be disposed of in San Francisco.
69
The Supreme Court said:
Article 4, Section 3, CI. 2, of the Constitution provides that
"The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory and
other Property belonging to the United States". The power
over the public land thus entrusted to Congress is without
limitations
. . . Thus, Congress may constitutionally limit
the disposition of the public domain to a manner consistent
with its views of public policy.
If the United States is producing oil and gas from the public
domain itself, as it does on the Naval Petroleum Reserves, attempted
-19-

State regulation would be a clear interference with a Federal
function. If the United States elects to have lessees produce
oil and gas from the public domain, Congress can, under its
plenary disposal power, lease the lands under any conditions it
deems appropriate; in the language of United States v. City and
County of San Francisco, supra, Congress "may constitutionally
limit the disposition of the public domain to a manner consistent
with its views of public policy." Therefore, next considered is
whether Congress has by express provision, or by inference, excluded
the State oil and gas conservation statutes from applying to
Federal lease operations.
2. Analysis of Pertinent Provisions of the Mineral
Leasing Act of 1920, and the Mineral Leasing Act
for Acquired Lands of 1947.
Two provisions of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 (30 USC 107,
189 (1950)), neither of which have been amended, are pertinent:
Sec. 30 ... . Each lessee shall contain provisions for the
purpose of insuring the exercise of reasonable diligence,
skill, and care in the operation of said property; a
provision that such rules for the safety and welfare of the
miners and for the prevention of undue waste as may be
_
prescribed by said Secretary /Secretary of the Interior7
shall be observed, including . . . and such other provisions
as he may deem necessary to insure the sale of the produc-
tion of such leased lands to the United States and to the
public at reasonable prices, for the protection of the
interests of the United States, for the prevention of monopoly,
and for the safeguarding of the public welfare: Provided,
That none of such provisions shall be in conflict with the




Sec. 32. That the Secretary of the Interior is authorised
to prescribe necessary and proper rules and regulations and
to do any «nd all things necessary to carry out and accomplish
the purposes of this Act, also to fix and determine and bound-
ary lines of any structure, or oil or gas field, for the pur-
poses of this Act: Provided, That nothing in this Act shall
be construed or held to affect the rights of the States or other
local authority to exercise any rights which they may have, in-
cluding the right to levy and collect taxes upon improvements
,
output of mines, or other rights, property, or assets of any
lessee of the United States . (Emphasis supplied.)
71
The Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands of 1917 also gave the
Secretary of the Interior authority to prescribe necessary and ap-
propriate rules and regulations with respect to the leases issued
72 73
under the Act; ' but this authority was limited as follows:
Sec. 8. Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to
affect the rights of the State or other local authorities to
exercise any right which they may have with respect to properties
covered by leases issued under this Act, including the right
to levy and collect taxes upon improvements, output of mines,
or other rights, property, or assets of any lessee of the
United States.
Congress has consistently made the State laws applicable to
operations of Federal lessees. This language does more than "stress
74
cooperation with the State conservation programs;' it expressly
makes such laws applicable. There is no conflict between Congress
giving the Secretary of the Interior authority to make conservation
type rules and regulations, and at the same time making the State's
conservation laws applicable. There is no consistency among the oil
and gas producing States in the scope of their conservation laws, and
Congress has essentially authorized the Secretary of the Interior to
-21-

supply needed regulations when the State where the land is situated
has not done so.
This interpretation of the statutory provisions is consistent
75
with the Connally Hot Oil Act, which prohibits the shipment or
transportation in interstate commerce from any State of contraband
oil produced in such State. ' Contraband oil is defined as "...
petroleum which, or any constituent part of which, was produced,
transported, or withdrawn from storage in excess of the a.nounts
permitted to be produced, transported, or withdrawn from storage under
the laws of a State or under any regulation or order prescribed there-
under by any
. . .
duly authorized agency of such State, or any
77
products of such petroleum." This Act clearly puts the imprimatur
of Congress on the State conservation laws.
In Mid-Northern Oil Co. v. Montana the United States Supreme
Court considered the right of the State of Montana to assess an
annual license tax based upon the gross value of the annual pro-
78duction on a lease of Federal lands. The Court upheld the tax
on the basis of Section 32, Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, supra,
which provides:
. . . nothing in this Act shall be construed or held to affect
the rights of the States or other locnl authority to exercise
any rights which they may have, including the right to levy
and collect taxes upon improvements, output of mines, or other
rights, property, or assets of any lessee of the United States.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The Court viewed this portion of the Mineral Leasing Act in the




. . . view ... we adopt, is that Congress, having
provided for leasing the public lands to private corpora-
tions and persons whose property, income, business and
occupations ordinarily were subject to state taxation,
meant by the proviso to say in effect that, although the
act deals with the letting of public lands and the rela-
tions of the government to the lessees thereof nothing
in it shall be so construed as to affect the rinht of the
states, in respect of such private persons and corporations,
to levy and collect taxes as though the government were not
concerned.
What is the affect of this decision on the applicability of
the State oil and gas conservation laws to Federal lessees? It
is determinative; the portion of the Act set out above not only
reserves "the right to levy and collect taxes" to the States, it
also reserves "any rights which they may have." The Supreme Court,
in Omaechevarria v. Idaho, supra, held that the States do have
police power over Federal lands. Consequently, until Congress
limits that power by specific legislation, the State conservation





An essential factor in making State oil and gas conserva-
tion measures applicable to Federal lessees is the existence of
State legislative jurisdiction. Without this jurisdiction the
State laws can have no application unless Congress adopts them.
Congress has not adopted them with respect to Indian lands and
the Outer Continental Shelf; however, as to the Outer Continental
Shelf Congress has expressed a policy of cooperation with the
States and the Secretary of Interior will undoubtedly regulate
this area so as to substantially comply with the laws of the
littoral States.
Federal lands leased under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920
and the Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands of 1947 are
normally subject to the State legislative jurisdiction. If they
are not, sections 30 and 32 of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1020
(30 USC 107, 109 (1950)) and section of the Mineral Leasing Act
for Acquired Lands of 1947 (30 USC 357 (1950)) at the mirimum
express a Congressional policy of cooperation with those adminis-
tering the State lasfS. It might be argued these sections adopt
the State laws; however, the better argument is that these sections
are designed to apply to areas where the State laws are applicable
and have no effect in areas where they are not applicable.
-24-

If Mineral Leasing Act lands are subject to the State
legislative jurisdiction, Congress in the above cited sections
has made the State laws applicable. The Secretary of the
Interior can provide for lease provisions or rules and regu-
lations which are more stringent than the Slate oil and gas




PART THREE: IMPEDIMENTS TO PUBLIC DOMAIN
OIL SHALE DEVELOPMENT
I„ INTRODUCTION
The estimates of recoverable shale oil in place in the
Piceance Basin of northwestern Colorado exceed those for crude
oil in the world crude oil reserves. Yet the oil shale in
this Basin is but a part of the oil shale resources of the
o
United States,, To keep pace with the burgeoning energy demands
in the United States and throughout the world this energy
source must be developed in the near future. ^ The difficulties
of developing public domain oil shale deposits are important
since 90 percent of the richest deposits in the United States
are on the public domain.** The first difficulty discussed, a
blanket of mining claims of ancient origin, is peculiar to the
public domain, whereas the second, the tax treatment of oil
shale, is equally applicable to private and public oil shale
lands.

II. TITLE CLOUDS PRESENT ON PUBLIC DOMAIN OIL SHALE LANDS.
Today the right to develop the public oil shale lands car.
only be acquired under the terms of the Mineral Leasing Act of
1920. The Department of the Interior however has never issued
an oil shale lease, ostensibly because of the large number of
unpatented mining claims covering such lands. '
A. Source of Title Clouds .
Location of mining claims on oil shale lands on a large scale
took place from 1915 to 1920 under the Petroleum Placer Act of
1897. This was a period of short supply of crude oil in the
United States, a situation aggravated by the heavy demands for
crude during the First World War. Over 20,000 oil shale claims
were made in Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming, and they virtually
Q
blanketed the oil shale deposits. Most of these claims were
made on speculation, and little work was ever performed on
them. In 1920 the right to claim oil shale deposits under
the Petroleum Placer Act was terminated by the Mineral Leasing
Act. The discovery of large quantities of crude oil in the
United States during the 1920*s caused interest in oil shale to
wane.
12
President Hoover by Executive Order in 1930 temporarily
withdrew, subject to valid existing rights, all deposits of oil
-2-

shale and lands containing such deposits owned by the United
States from lease or other disposal, "for the purposes of
investigation, examination and classification," This order
is still in effect and reportedly the Department of the Interior
considers it infeasible to revoke the withdrawal because of
the large number of outstanding unpatented mining claims on
13
oil shale lands.
The crux of the problem of clearing these unpatented claims
from the public domain is the interpretation the Supreme Court
has placed upon Section 37 of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920.
This section provides:
. . .
the deposits of oil shale . . . shall be subject to
disposition only in the form and manner provided in this
Act, except as to valid claims existent at date of passage
of this Act and thereafter maintained in compliance with
the laws under which initiated
,
which claims may be per-
fected under such laws, including discovery. (Emphasis
supplied.
)
Under the Petroleum Placer Act locators needed to make a
discovery, distinctly mark their location on the grounds, and per-
form at least $100 work on the claim each year. A patent would
be issued upon application accompanied with a plat of the loca-
tion and affidavit of two persons that a notice of the application
was posted on the claim, provided the land office published the
application in a newspaper for 60 days and applicant certified
15he had expended at least an aggregate of $500 on the claim.
-3-

The Supreme Court interpreted the interrelationship of
Section 37, supra, and the applicable placer mining laws in
Wilbur v. Krushnic in 1930. *" The court was considering the
refusal of the Secretary of the Interior to issue a patent to
an oil shale claimant who failed to perform $100 work on the
claim each year since its location. The claimant had otherwise
done everything necessary to receive a patent, including an
aggregate expenditure of $500 on the claim. The court stated:
. . .
when the location of a mining claim is perfected
under the law, it has the effect of a grant by the
United States of the right of present and exclusive
possession. The claim is property in the fullest sense
of the term . . . The owner is not required to purchase
the claim or secure patent from the United States; but so
long as he complies with the provisions of the mining
laws, his possessory right, for all practical purposes of
ownership, is as good as though secured by patent. While
he is required to perform labor of the value of $100
annually, a failure to do so does not ipso facto forfeit
the claim, but only renders it subject to loss by loca-
tion. And the law is clear that no relocation can be made
if work be resumed after default and before such reloca-
tion.
Prior to the passage of the Leasing Act, annual per-
formance of labor was not necessary to preserve the
possessory right, with all the incidents of ownership
above stated, as against the United States, but only as
against subsequent locators. So far as the government was
concerned, failure to do assessment work for any year was
without effect. Whenever $500 worth of labor in the ag-
gregate had been performed, other requirements aside, the
owner became entitled to a patent, even though in some
years annual assessment labor had been omitted.
After this recitation of the law that existed with respect to oil
shale placer claims prior to 1920, the court held that the phrase
-4-

in Section 37, which preserved claims "thereafter maintained
in compliance with the laws under which initiated", meant that
the failure of a claimant to perform the yearly $100 assessment
work per year did not give the Secretary of the Interior the right
to forfeit the claim and deny an application for patent so long
as the claimant resumed work and, during the total period of his
location, performed the aggregate of $500 worth of work. The
court by dictum indicated the United States might divest the
claimant of his right by appropriate action initiated after
cessation of the annual assessment work, and prior to resumption
1 o
of such work. The Secretary of the Interior was led by this
dictum to attack claims upon which annual assessment work had
not been resumed.
The Supreme Court in Ickes v. Virginia-Colorado Development
20
Corp. cleared up this point by holding that a failure to per-
form the annual assessment work did not ipso facto cause a for-
feiture of the claim, but did make the claim subject to relocation.
However, if there was no relocation the claimant could preserve his
claim by again performing the annual assessment work.
These decisions produced a peculiar situation. A claimant,
who initially made a valid discovery and filed a notice of his
claim within the locality as prescribed by local law or custom,
had an inchoate right to patent the claim whether or not he
-5-

performed any annual assessment work on it. He could not be
divested of this right by someone else locating on the claim
since the Mineral Leasing Act proscribed any means of acquiring
rights to public oil shale deposits except by its terms. No
longer is there a law authorizing location of oil shale deposits.
This does not mean that the claimant can not be divested of his
inchoate right; only that he can not be divested of the right
solely because of failure to perform the annual assessment work.
The court in Ickes v. Virginia-Colorado Development Corp. stated
that the Secretary of the Interior had authority "by appropriate
proceedings, to determine that a claim was invalid for lack of
discovery, fraud, or other defect, or that it was subject to
21
cancellation by reason of abandonment."
The Department of the Interior however has no simple and
inexpensive way of eliminating obviously abandoned claims, or
claims otherwise patently defective, e.g., no discovery. The
Secretary had attempted to oust the claimants by directing the
local land offices to post notices on all unworked claims that
the United States assumed title because of failure to perform
22
annual assessment work. The court invalidated this approach
in Ickes v. Virginia-Colorado Development Corp.
B. Present Legal Situation Resulting from Title Clouds .
There are two broad categories of factual situations with
-6-

respect to these old mineral locations: First, the mineral
locations which the Department of the Interior administratively
determined to be invalid prior to the Supreme Court decisions
in the Krushnic and Virginia-Colorado Development Corp. cases,
supra, and second, those locations upon which no final administra-
tive action has been taken.
1. Mining Locations Administratively Invalidated Prior
to Krushnic and Virginia-Colorado Development Corp.
Cases.
The efforts of Interior to clear title to the oil shale
lands during the 1920' s and early 1930* s resulted in a number of
administrative proceedings at which the usual due process require-
ments of notice, et cetera were followed. The basis for the actions
was in some instances the failure to perform annual assessment work,
and in others a combination of failure to perform assessment work
and an allegation of abandonment. The Supreme Court in the
Virginia-Colorado Development Corp. case determined that these pro-
ceedings maintained solely on the basis of lack of assessment work
were without proper legal foundation, but in dictum indicated that
a proceeding based on abandonment would be proper. Acting in
conformity with this decision the Commissioner of the General Land
Office directed that all pending contests involving the charge of
failure to perform assessment work which had not proceeded to final
• • 23decision be discontinued. Now being questioned is the status of
-7-

those administrative contests which had gone to final decision
by Interior prior to the Supreme Court decisions.
Successors in interest to these mineral locations have per-
formed a total of $500 assessment work and have applied for patents
to the lands. This is an effort to breathe life into mineral
locations which Interior has previously invalidated. Interior has
taken the position that these claims are invalid on slightly
different bases depending upon the substance of the complaint
utilized in the administrative proceedings. With respect to
those which had the single foundation of failure to perform the
assessment work, the Land Office Manager, Bureau of Land Management,
25
Denver, has held that:*"
In view of the principles of finality of administrative
action, estoppel by adjudication, and res judicata, the
Commissioner's decision /of 19327 must be regarded as con-
clusive.
As to proceedings based upon both failure to perform assessment
work and abandonment, Interior has relied not only on the above
arguments, but also on the Supreme Court dictum that a proceeding
based on abandonment is proper. "
a. Locations Invalidated on 3asis of Failure to
Perform Assessment Work.
If similar proceedings had not been carried through to final
determination within the Interior Department prior to the Supreme
-8-

Court decision in the Virginia-Colorado Development Corp. case,
27
they were dismissed. However, as is noted above, the Land
Office Manager, Bureau of Land Management, Denver, now takes
the position that the decisions in these cases are not now subject
to attack. Whether or not the Director, Bureau of Land Manage-
ment, and the Secretary of the Interior will adopt this position
is unknown. A recent decision of the Secretary by dictum seems
to approve a contrary statement by the Director, Bureau of Land
29
Management. The Denver office may feel bound by this prior
determination because of inter-Departmental rules. It has been
30
stated that:
No rule is more settled than the rule that the Commissioner
/General Land Office, now Director, Bureau of Land Manage-
ment^ has no authority to overturn the decision of the
Department
. . .
The earlier Departmental holdings as to the invalidity of these
claims will probably be changed only on the Secretarial level
of the Interior Department.
The general ground rules which the Secretary will follow are
31
outlined in the following language:
Although the Department is not controlled in its decisions
by the doctrine of res judicata and may open any proceedings
and correct and reverse its decision so long as the legal
title to the land involved remains in the Government . . .
the Department has frequently recognized and applied the
doctrine as essential to the orderly administration of the
laws of the United States by its executive officers . . .
and whenever necessary to protect the rights of the
Government and where equity and justice demand it . . .
_9_

This Departmental rule would grant the Secretary latitude in these
cases. But it must be compared with the axiomatic rule that "The
executive department cannot exceed the powers granted to it by the
Constitution and Congress, and if it does exercise a power in a
manner not authorized by statutory enactment, such executive act is
32
of no legal effect." ' The Supreme Court has determined that the
33former decisions were not authorized by Congress. The Secretary
will, it seems, invalidate his prior decisions by his own action,
or be compelled to do so by subsequent judicial action.
This does not necessarily mean that those who have purchased
these old locations will prevail. The decision of the Land Office
Manager, Bureau of Land Management, Denver, did not consider
whether these claims were abandoned prior to the effort to revive
them by new assessment work; it is based solely upon the legal
conclusion that the question of validity or invalidity of the lo-
cations is not open for further consideration. Any Secretarial
or judicial action should be limited to this legal conclusion, and
thereby permit the United States or others to prove, if necessary,
in future administrative proceedings that the mining locations
were abandoned.
This factual picture will sometimes be complicated because
of interests in the lands granted by the United States on the
assumption that the old mining locations were invalid. For example,
-10-

For example, the United States has issued oil and gas leases
to some of these lands. If the ancient mining location is
valid, it will be necessary to invalidate the oil and gas
lease. If the lessees have expended monies on the leases,
or made discoveries, the problem is further complicated.
But the course of action of the United States is clear. It
must invalidate leases to lands over which it had no authority
35
to lease in the first instance.
The position of the oil and gas lessee vis-a-vis the
mining locator is not so bleak. If the locator failed to put
the oil and gas lessee on notice as to his latent interest,
the equitable position of the lessee is strong. This failure
would also strengthen an assertion by the lessee, or the United
States, that the mining claim had been abandoned.
b. Locations Invalidated on Dual Basis of Failure
to Perform Assessment Work and Abandonment.
This factual situation is now being considered by the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in the case styled
Gabbs Exploration Company v. Udall. For this discussion the
essential facts are that administrative proceedings were in-
stituted in 1930 against several oil shale locations on the
basis of failure to perform assessment work and the allegation
that "every one of said claims has been abandoned." The record
titleholder of the claims defaulted, and the Commissioner of
-11-

the General Land Office stated that the "oil shale placers
are declared null and void and the United States has taken
possession of the lands within the claims for its own uses
and purposes." The Gabbs Exploration Company purchased these
mineral locations, the requisite assessment work ($500) was
performed, and in 1956 Gabbs Exploration Company applied for
patent. The Secretary of the Interior rejected the application
for patent on the basis of the earlier decision of the Com-
37
mission of the General Land Office; the Gabbs Exploration
Company appealed the decision to the courts, and after an un-
reported adverse decision by the Federal District Court has
appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Two basic arguments are being used to overturn the 1930
Land Office decision. One is the assertion that the original
administrative proceedings were invalid since the complaint
had merely alleged a conclusion of law, i.e., abandonment, with-
out setting forth any factual basis for the conclusion; the
other is that even if the claims were abandoned the United
States could not avail itself of such abandonment.
Interior has held in the past that the allegation of a
conclusion of law is not a proper basis for an adverse decision.
The decisions in these cases however were not being attacked
collaterally, as is the decision in the Gabbs Exploration Com-
39
pany case. Interior has also held that an objection to the
-12-

sufficiency of a contest charge should be raised by timely
demurrer.'10 The Secretary* s decision in the Gabbs Exploration
Company case distinguished between an allegation of a "conclusion
of law" by a private party and the Government. The applicable
rules of the Department required that prior to making such an
allegation, the General Land Office should consider the facts
upon which it would be based and determine if they would sup-
port the allegation. 42 A general presumption exists that the
43
General Land Office acted in conformity with these rules.
These factors give support to the conclusion that the complaint
was valid.
A strong equitable argument might be asserted against this
conclusion. For, it may be true, and is being contended, that
the allegation of abandonment was but another way of evaluating
the failure to perform assessment work. However, the distinc-
tion between forfeiture which results from failure to conform
to the statutory requirement to perform assessment work, and
abandonment which hinges upon the intention of the locator,
is clear in the law. Absent evidence to the contrary, the
contest complaint listing the two separate grounds should be
construed as reflecting an intended distinction between facts
which would support each.
The contention that the United States would not automati-
cally assume its full title to the located lands after
-13-

abandonment is weak. Case law declares that ground covered
45
by an abandoned claim becomes part of the public domain.
Undoubtedly the Gabbs Exploration Company case is but a
forerunner of similar cases which will arise with the increas-
ing value of oil shale deposits. These proceedings should be
carefully considered by those desirous of acquiring patents
to oil shale lands.
2. Elimination of Title Clouds by Proceedings under the
Administrative Procedure Act.
The Department of the Interior can invalidate defective
46
or abandoned oil shale claims by administrative proceedings.
To do so, it must first be determined what claims exist in any
particular area. Since the Petroleum Placer Act of 1897, under
which the oil shale locations were made, did not require that
claims be filed with any agency of the United States, local
records up to the time of passage of the Mineral Leasing Act
of 1920 must be examined. After establishing the names of the
initial claimants and the extent of the claim, it is necessary
17
to determine who currently has an interest in the claim/
Substantial effort in time and expense is involved. Over 40
years have passed since the latest of these claims was made.
Following ascertainment of the adverse parties, notice of the
48
administrative proceeding must be given to them.
-14-

Until recently the difficulty of ascertaining interested
parties was but one of the roadblocks to instituting adminis-
trative proceedings. Interior had ruled that notice by publi-
49
cation was not proper in this type of abandonment proceeding.
The rationale of the decision was that Congress has specified
the type of proceeding in which notice by publication is proper,




In cases of contest as to the mineral or agricultural
character of land, the testimony and proofs may be
taken as herein provided on personal notice of at least
ten days to the opposing party; or if such party cannot
be found, then by publication of at least once a week for
thirty days in a newspaper . . .
Hence, the opinion states:
It is plain that the publication mentioned in this
statute is authorized only in cases where the issue
is as to the physical character of the land, whether
mineral or agricultural. It can not be construed to
extend to proceedings where the sole issues are whether
mining locations on lands classified as mineral are valid
or not, and there is no issue as to the character of the
land involved.
To attack these claims on the grounds of abandonment is
logical. The fact that assessment work has not been done for
30 to 40 years nay not ipse facto result in forfeiture of the
claim, but it is strong evidence of the intention to abandon.
However, after the passage of 40 years due process could seldom
be accomplished other than by publication of the notice of hearing,
-15-

This impediment to clearing titles was removed by the
52
Interior Solicitor's office in May of 1%1/ An opinion
directed to the Denver Solicitor's office held that service by
publication is proper. It was reasoned that although Congress
has not specifically authorized publication in such cases, it
has given the Secretary of the Interior rule-making authority
and that regulations promulgated under this authority have the
force and effect of law.^ The Secretary has implemented this
54
authority by promulgation of Appeals and Contests Regulations
and these Regulations provide for service by publication in
55
Government initiated contest proceedings.* This decision is
consonant with the Administrative Procedure Act which does not
56
prohibit service by publication.
An interesting feature to administrative proceedings in-
stituted today is the quantum of evidence required to establish
abandonment. What will establish a prima facie showing that
the locators or their successors intended to abandon their
mining claims? If the claims had been subject to relocation
by others during the past 40 years, the failure of the locators
to perform any assessment work in and of itself should suffice.
But these claims have not been subject to relocation since the
enactment of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. Therefore, ad-
ditional evidence should be required. It would appear that a
long continued failure to assert any right over the claim, i.e.,
-16-

not only the failure to do $100 in assessment work annually but
also the failure to do anything with respect to the land, would
establish a prima facie case. This conclusion is bolstered if
the failure occurred between 1920 and 1930. It was not until
1930 that the Supreme Court ruled that failure to perform the
assessment work would not result in forfeiture of the claim.
Interior, which is the trustee of these lands for all the people,
will probably tend towards invalidation of such claims.
If Interior accepts such evidence as prima facie es-
tablishing abandonment, the courts will be severely taxed
to overrule the decision. The court review will be limited to
the matters specified in the Administrative Procedure Act. This
Act in part provides that the court shall:'
. . .
(B) hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be (1) arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law
. . . (5) unsupported by sub-
stantial evidence . . .
Evidence of marginal adequacy at the Interior level of decision
should be more than sufficient when tested against these guide-
lines.
To this point it has been assumed the oil shale mining claims
are based upon valid discoveries. Discovery is so important how-
ever that it is worthy of mention; without a discovery the locator
acquires no rights against the Government.
-17-

The mining statutes do not define what constitutes a dis-
covery, but they do prescribe what is to be discovered, namely,
CM
"valuable mineral deposits," Since the mineral character of
oil shale has never been questioned, discussion will be limited
to what is a "valuable" oil shale deposit.
In 1894 the Department of the Interior stated its require-
ments for discovery as follows:
e e o where minerals have been found and the evidence
is of such a character that a person of ordinary pru-
dence would be justified in the further expenditures of
his labor and means, with a reasonable prospect of
success, in developing a valuable mine, the require-
ments of the statutes have been met.60
Presumably in implementation of this general rule, the Department
held in 1926 that the adequacy of an oil shale location would be
determined by the following requirements:
6 . . (1) Where the oil-shale beds are too deep to be
mined by open-cut methods, such lands must contain shale
capable of yielding 1,500 barrels of oil per acre, in
beds not less than one foot thick yielding not less than
15 gallons per ton and within a reasonable depth below the
surface; (2) where the oil-shale beds are at or suffic-
iently near the surface to be mined by open-cut methods,
such lands must contain shale sufficient to yield 750
barrels of oil per acre in beds not less than six inches
thick and yielding not less than 15 gallons per ton. 61
If the Department adheres to the 1926 rule, no legal problems
will be involved. There would be a discovery only if the oil
shale was rich enough to meet the stated requirements. However,
if the more general rule of 1894 is applied, difficult legal
-18-

questions arise, With the benefit of hindsight, the prudent
man in 1920 should not have expended further labor and means in
developing his claim. In fact there has been no expenditure in
forty years on most of the claims, and successful commercial
oil shale development is still a matter for the future Of
course, the locator in the 1910s did not realize this would be
the case, and the test of discovery should be made within the
perspective of the locator at the time of his location. But it
is difficult to close ones eyes to what has happened since 1920,
even though it is legally required. Herein lies the danger of
abrogating the 1926 holding.
Assuming application of the 1894 rule, the attitude of the
prudent man of today is not germane. Although technical and
economic conditions of today might lead a prudent man to make
further expenditures on an oil shale claim, this is irrelevant
in determining the validity of a pre-1920 location. The discovery
had to take place prior to the enactment of the 1920 Mineral
Leasing Act, otherwise, there was no mining law extant to give
the location legal significance, A discovery does not ralate
back to the date of location of the claim; a valid location dates
from the time of discovery,^
Abrogation of the 1926 rule could lead to even more
stringent otvjovery requirements than those of the 1894 rule.
-19-

The Departmr.-nt of the Interior's tendency today is to impose
a marketability test against purported discoveries. ** The
mineral is considered valuable only if it can be commercially
marketed, 64 All oil shale claims would probably fall by the
wayside if this test were applied.
There is no reason to believe the Interior Department
will attempt to circumvent the 1926 rule, and valid legal
reasons exist for not doing so. This rule is an administra-
tive interpretation of an ambiguous statute. The Supreme Court
views such interpretations as having the force of law unless
there is a clear conflict with Congressional intent.^
-20-

III. TAX TREATMENT OF OIL SHALE.
The ability to market shale oil competitively with crude
oil is the key to the establishment of an oil shale industry;
and the tax treatment which would be given to shale oil produc-
tion is largely determinative of what dollar return an oil shale
industry could expect. Yet, the proper treatment under the
Internal Revenue Code is not clear.
Congress has established a statutory policy of giving a
deduction in the computation of taxable income for exhaustion
of capital assets. Section 611(a) of the Internal Revenue Code
provides as to natural resources that "there shall be allowed
as a deduction in computing taxable income a reasonable allowance
for depletion." Section 613 provides for the amount of the
depletion allowance in part as follows:
(a) General rule. — In the case of the mines, wells, and
other natural deposits listed in subsection (b), the al-
lowance for depletion under section 611 shall be the per-
centage, specified in subsection (b), of the gross income
from the property . . .
(b) I'ercentage depletion rates. — The mines, wells, and other
natural deposits, and the percentages, referred to in subsec-
tion (a) are as follows:
* * « * *
(6) 15 percent — all other minerals . . .
(c) Definition of gross income from property. — For the
purposes of this section —
— fc.i—

(1) Gross income from the property. — The term "gross
income from the property" means, in the case of a
property other than an oil or gas well, the gross income
from mining.
(2) Mining. — The term "mining" includes not merely the
extraction of the ores or minerals from the ground but also
the treatment processes considered as mining described in
paragraph (1) (and the treatment processes necessary or
incidental thereto)
. . .
(4) Treatment processes considered as mining. — The fol-
lowing treatment processes . . . shall be considered as
mi n inn
. . .
(C) in the case of . . . minerals which are customarily
sold in the form of a crude mineral product — sorting,
concentrating, sintering, and substantially equivalent
processes to bring to shipping grade and form, <;nd
loading for shipment;
O) in the case of . . . minerals winch are not custom-
arily sold in the form of the crude mineral product —
crushing, grinding, and beneficialion by concentration
(gravity, flotation, amalgamation, electrostatic, or
magnetic), cyanidation, leaching, crystallization,
precipitation (but not including electrolytic deposition,
roasting, thermal or electric smelting, or refining),
or by substantially equivalent processes or combination
of processes used in the separation or extraction of the
product or products froii the ore or I he mineral or
minerals from other material from the mine or other
natural deposit;
(K) any other treatment process provided for by regulations
prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate which, kvith
respect to the particular ore or mineral, is not inconsistent




(5) Treatment processes not considered as mining. —
Unless such processes are otherwise provided for in
paragraph (4) (or are necessary or incidental to pro-
cesses so provided for), the following treatment pro-
cesses shall not. be considered as "mining": electrolytic,
deposition, roasting, calcining, thermal or electric
smelting, refining, polishing, fine pulverization,
blending with other materials, treatment effecting a
chemical change, thermal action, and molding or shaping.
The percentage depletion rate applicable to oil shale is not
specified in the Code. But the Internal Revenue Service has held
that oil shale falls within the category of section 613(b)(6), the
catchall category for "other minerals" to which a 15 percent rate
is applicable. °
To what gross income is the 15 percent rate applicable? Is
the income measured after the mining and crushing steps have been
taken, or after the crushed shale has been retorted? Since the
estimated cost distribution among the various processing steps is
30% for mining, 10?; for crushing, 20?; for retorting, and 40% for
refining, this determination can have great impact upon the
thinking of private industry as to the economic feasibility of oil
shale development. A recent Supreme Court decision and Congressional
enactment bear on this question.
Both prior to I960 and today the statutory definition of "gross
income from the property" under section 613, supra, for properties
other than oil or gas wells depends on the determination of gross
income from "mining". However, prior to I960 the definition of
"mining" included not only "the extraction of the ores or minerals
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from the ground but also the ordinary treatment processes normally
applied ... in order to obtain the commercially marketable mineral
product or products." A series of derisions by the Courts of
Appeal with respect to brick and tile clay and cement rock es-
tablished that the depletion rate could in certain instances be
applied to the finished products made from these materials. The
key to these decisions was the court determination that the product
resulting from the manufacturing process was the "commercially
marketable mineral product." The United States considered the re-
sults of these decisions so serious from the standpoint of equity
as between taxpayers, the theory of the depletion allowance, and
revenue considerations, that it requested the Supreme Court to
72
review a case with a similar factual base. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and in its decision, United States v. Cannelton
Sewer Pipe Co.,' concluded that:' 4
Congress intended to grant miners a depletion allowance based
on the constructive income from the raw mineral product, if
marketable in that form, and not on the value of the finished
articles.
This decision was reached in spite of taxpayers evidence that it
could not sell the fire clay it produced at a profit. The Court
had evidence that other producers of fire clay were selling the raw
product, and stated that such sales indicated fire clay was "commer-
cially marketable" in its raw state unless that phrase also implies
75
marketability at a profit. In essence the Court decided that the
depletion allowance was onewhich should be uniformly applied and that
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if certain miners could sell the raw material the depletion allowance
"cut off" point was at this stage, regardless of the inability of
certain integrated miner-manufacturers to sell the raw material at
a profit.
Three days after the Supreme Court decision Congress passed
legislation which confirmed the Court's conclusion. J Section 302
77
of the Public Debt and Tax Rate Extension Act of i960 amended
subsection (c) of section 613 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1054
so that it reads as set out above. Abolished is the phrase "ordinary
treatment processes normally applied ... in order to obtain the
commercially marketable mineral product or products." Substituted
is the phrase "treatment processes considered as mining" with detailed
description of what these treatment processes are.
Against this background what is the proper tax treatment of an
oil shale operation? Since the 15 percent depletion rate is applied
against the gross income from mining, the critical question is what
treatment processes are considered as mining. The Internal Revenue
Code does not specify what treatment processes count as mining in an
oil shale operation; consequently, the processes described in either
section 613(c)(4)(C) or (D), supra, would apply, dependent upon
whether or not oil shale is considered a mineral customarily sold
in the form of a crude mineral product. In either case the refining
step would not be considered a treatment process (see section 613(c)(5),
supra), however, as to both (C) and (D) above there is a question as to
-25-

whether "concentrating" should be considered to include "retorting"
of oil shale.
"Concentration" has been defined as the process by which the
desired mineral is separated from the more abundant waste material.
Petorting does this; it separates the desired mineral, shale oil,
79
from the waste material, spent shale. Section 613(c)(4)(D), supra,
seems to encompass this type of "concentration" since it has a catch-
all provision providing for "substantially equivalent processes or
combination of processes used in the separation or extraction of the
product or products from the ore or the mineral or minerals from other
material from the mine or other natural deposit." But section 613(c)
(4)(C), supra, even though providing for "concentration" has an overall
characterization of processes to bring to shipping grade and form."
Considering this characterization together with section 613(c)(5),
supra, which excludes "treatment effecting chemical change /and/ thermal
action" unless otherwise provided for, it seems doubtful if "con-
centrating" as used in section 613(c)(4)(C) includes "retorting".
Hence, whether "retorting" is a treatment process considered as mining
could depend upon whether or not oil shale is a mineral customarily
sold in the form of a crude mineral product. But there is no existent
industry and no existent custom, and, consequently, the issue is in
doubt. The Canr.elton Sewer Pipe case, supra, could be persuasive
in any judicial interpretation of these Code sections. A determination
-26-
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ihat t.'.c depletion allowance should be allowed after the "retorting"
stage would make it virtually impossible for a miner to compete with
an integrated operation which would receive a higher depletion
allowance by virtue of its higher gross income multiplier.
Obviously the treatment a court might determine to be proper
under section 613 as written today is uncertain. Equally obvious,
an investor will not venture millions of dollars to finance an oil
shale operation which might be profitable only if the depleiion
allowance is computed after the "retorting" stage. Congress can
and should remedy this uncertainty.
-27-

IV. COURSES OF ACTION AVAILABLE TO THE UNITED STATES TO FACILITATE
DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC DOMAIN OIL SliALE LANDS.
In addition to clarifying the tax treatment of oil shale,
Congress could stimulate the development of oil shale by
increasing the rate for depletion allowance. However, any
increase in the depletion rate seems unwarranted, unless
Congress clearly deems it in the national interest to subsidize
the industry. The great risk that is cited to justify the
27.5/o depletion rate for oil and gas is not present. The word
duster has no application to oil shale which has been located
and assayed with the results readily accessible through Govern-
ment publications. A decision to subsidize would undoubtedly
lead to later pressures to remove the subsidy, presumably after
the subsidy had become a fixed part of the price pattern. So
long as the nation has a comfortable cushion of crude oil reserves,
it seems preferable for shale oil to take its place in the energy
market on a non-subsidized basis.
The mining claims on these lands should be cleared. This will
take time, and should be done in an orderly fashion. Consequently,
Interior should be undertaking the job at this time when there is
no inordinate pressure for utilization of the shale lands. To in-
validate these claims within the terms of the Administrative
Procedure Act is a time consuming operation. A more expedient
-28-

method of clearing up the titles might be set up through
Congressional action, e.g., legislation requiring claimants
to file a notice of their claims or to forfeit their rights.
However, even if Congress could be persuaded to enact such
legislation, the due process requirements of the Constitution
and the general abhorrence of forfeiture that permeates the
law would require a careful testing of the legislation in the
courts. Because of this, and the relatively small amount of
money — on the Governmental scale — involved, the tedious
procedure of searching titles and service of process on current
interest holders is a more desirable approach.
In addition to clearing the way for future shale develop-
ment, the elimination or validation of the claims can avoid
future conflicts between oil and gas lessees and mining claimants.
Since these claims in most instances do not appear in the records
of the Bureau of Land Management, oil and gas leases have been
issued to the lands claimed. The vision of a good gas find with
a number of mining claimants filing for patent to the leased lands
is not too remote. The Oil and Gas Journal has reported that:'
Geologists expect to see major gas developments in two
big basins in the next few years. The two are Ficeance
Basin of Northwest Colorado and Cook Inlet basin of
Alaska. Both have yielded commercial gas fields, and
both have vast areas awaiting the drill.
In the order of speculation it is doubted if Interior would
recommend the cancellation of the Executive withdrawal of these
-29-

oil shale lands fron oil shale leasing even if the mining
claims are cleared. There are a number of sizeable private
holdings of oil shale lands at this time.' When the pressures
of the market place warrant, it these lands will be developed,
so what is to be gained by opening up the public lands? Until
there is a well founded affirmative answer to this question the
lands will not be opened for lease. "When there is an affirmative
answer, it is unlikely that lection 21 of the Mineral Leasing
Act of 1020 will be the vehicle of exploitation. Conditions
as yet unknown will probably set the standards by which these
public lands will be developed.
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PART FOUR: THE FUTURE OF THE MINERAL LEASING ACT
There is little reason to believe the basic principles
of the Leasing Act will be changed in the future. It has
quite successfully provided an avenue for the development of
Federally owned mineral resources. But the Act is not perfect.
The following discussion relates to changes which would
improve it.
LEASE LOTTERIES: The use of a lottery to dispose of
public oil and gas leases is hardly an advanced management
technique. But, as the law now stands, it is probably the
best applicable device under the following circumstances. If
a non-competitive lease is expiring the leaseholder has several
ways of extending its term, but each way involves a drilling
program. Consequently, if the area has promise, but not
enough to justify the expenditure of exploratory money, the
present holder will reluctantly let the lease expire. Of
course, in these circumstances, both the present holder, and
others following prospecting developments, will be anxious to
acquire a ten year lease for a small money outlay. This
formerly led to a race to file on expiring leases. The Bureau
of Land Management, to avoid the frustrations and difficulties
resulting from such races, has laid down ground rules for the

use of a lottery to dispose of such leases. The rules in
summary provide that monthly each land office shall post a
notice of leases that are expiring, have been canceled, relin-
quished, or terminated; lease offerings are accepted on
such lands for the next five days. If multiple offerings are
received the offer to be accepted is determined by a drawing.
Obviously, this leads to filings by those who never intend
to explore the property, but hope to win the drawing and
market their lease holding for the best price obtainable.
An apt solution to this situation is to make the issuance
of the lease competitive. This would have two valuable results:
any value that could be attached to gaining the lease would
accrue to the United States, rather than to a speculator who
happened to be lucky; and would enable any legitimate oil and
gas operator who wanted the property for development purposes
to get it if he was willing to pay the price, rather than
forcing him to take his chances with all others willing to pay
the deposit necessary to get in on the drawing. This solution
can only be achieved by legislation; the current statutory
requirement is for non-competitive leasing unless the land is
located on a known geologic structure.
1. 43 Code Fed. Regs. 192.43 (Cum. Supp. 1962).
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ADMINISTRATIVE CANCELLATION OF LEASES: Money and time
are often squandered in seeking judicial solutions to problems
which Congress can easily solve. An excellent example of this
is the present conflict as to the Secretary of the Interior's
2
authority to administratively cancel oil and gas leases.
The Secretary is exerting broad powers of cancellation, and
segments of the industry are attempting, by judicial action,
to limit his exercise of powers.
The nub of the problem is what Congress intended by
certain provisions in the Mineral Leasing Act. As to exist-
ing leases a Judicial solution is necessary; but as to future
leases Congress can, and should, clear the air by a definite
statement as to how it desires the Leasing Act to be admin-
istered. The Constitution vested the care of public lands in
Congress, and it is shirking this responsibility by not acting
to clear up this situation.
In 1960 Congress gave consideration to the problem, but
decided to withhold action pending completion of various
3judicial actions. Three years later the Supreme Court is
2. The judicial ramifications of the problem are discussed
at page 45, et seq., Part One of this paper.




considering a part of the question. The judicial process
is slow, and there is no justification for Congress delaying
its action pending the Supreme Court decision or any future
judicial action. The responsibility of Congress to act as to
the future administration of the Leasing Act is totally un-
related to the judicial responsibility of declaring what
Congress intended in the past. An excellent starting point
for Congressional action is the language suggested by the
late Senator O'Mahoney in S. 2983, 86th Congress. In essence
the language would have permitted administrative cancellation
of leases of non-producing lands, but require judicial action
to cancel leases to producing, or proven lands; if the Secre-
tary thought fraud was involved he could ask the Attorney
General to institute judicial proceedings and the court,
inter alia, could suspend guilty parties from acquiring
interests under the terms of the Leasing Act.
FEDERAL RECORDING ACT: In 1952 one B. D. McDonald, the
owner of a IX override in a Federal oil and gas lease, con-
veyed the same interest to three different persons. The first
person, in time of conveyance, one Dame, filed the conveyance
4. Boesche v. Udall, 303 F 2d 204 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert,
granted 371 U.S. 886 .
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with the Bureau of Land Management in February 1952
but failed to file it with the County Recorder until
1954; the third person, in time of conveyance, one
Mileskl, filed with both the Bureau of Land Management and
the County Recorder in November 1952. The Supreme Court of
Wyoming, in Dame v. Mileski (340 P 2d 205 (1959)), held Mileski
to be a bona fide purchaser without notice of Dame's earlier
interest; therefore, the filing of the conveyance by Dame
with the Bureau of Land Management did not constitute con-
structive notice to future purchasers.
Senator Allott introduced a bill (S. 413) in the 87th
Congress which would make oil and gas lease documents filed
with the Bureau of Land Management give notice to the world.
The bill would not allow constructive notice to flow from
the filing of documents in the County Recorder's office alone.
The Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Association favors the
bill, the Western Oil and Gas Association opposes it, and
the New Mexico Oil and Gas Association supports it in part.
The proponents find it anomalous that a decision such as
Dame v. Mileski could be reached; so long as the Government
5. Hearings before Subcommittee on Public Lands of the Senate
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs on S. 413, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
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requires filing with Land Management offices, it seems in-
appropriate not to protect interests properly filed there.
On the other side, the opponents do not favor opening up
lease records to all persons, as will be necessary if the
recording act provisions are adopted, because of "lease
scavengers and hijackers who spend years seeking to find
technical defects in title to all and any issued Federal oil
and gas leases- -particularly if a lease has become productive."
Also the opponents fear the enactment of a Federal recording
act would merely duplicate the State recording requirements,
double the necessary recording fee expenditures, and compli-
cate title research requirements. The Bureau of Land Manage-
ment neither opposes nor advocates the bill since it is
designed to clarify the rights of private parties, and does
not refer to any needs of the United States.
The political problem is to reconcile these conflicting
views into an acceptable bill. Duplicative filing should
not be necessary; and the duplication can only be eliminated
by disposing of the need for filing in the County Recorder's
office. Such a statute would result in great savings in the
cost of title searches; the mineral titles would not, as





CHRONOLOGICAL LISTING OF MAJOR CONGRESSIONAL ENACTMENTS AND EXECUTIVE
ACTIONS WHICH HAVE AFFECTED OIL, GAS, AND OIL SHALE DEVELOPMENT IN
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
Date and Reference Summary or Excerpt from Statute or Executive
Order.
1859-1866 During this period no federal statute applied
generally to the mineral resources on the
public domain; in California a system of ap-





"In all cases lands valuable for minerals
shall be reserved from sale ..."
1866 (July 26);
14 Stat. 251
"Sec. 1. That the mineral lands of the public
domain, both surveyed and unsurveyed, are hereby
declared to be free and open to exploration and
occupation by all citizens of the United States
... subject to such regulations as may be
prescribed by law, and subject also to the local
customs or rules of miners in the several min-
ing districts, so far as the same may not be





"Sec. 2. . . . whenever any person or associa-
tion of persons claim a vein or lode of quartz,





. may be law-
ful for said claimant ... to enter such tract
and receive a patent therefor ..."
".
. .
claims usually called 'placers', includ-
ing all forms of deposit, excepting veins of
quarts, or other rock in place, shall be subject
to entry and patent ... under like circumstances
and conditions, and upon similar proceedings,
as are provided for vein or lode claims;
. .
."
General Mining Act reenacted provisions of Acts
of 1866 and 1870.
APPENDIX A page 1.

Date and Reference Summary or Excerpt from Statute or Executive
Order
.
1897 (Feb. 11); ". . . That any person authorized to enter
29 Stat. 526 lands under the mining laws of the United
States may enter and obtain patent to lands
containing petroleum or other mineral oil,
and chiefly valuable therefor, under the pro-
visions of the laws relating to placer mineral
claims."
NOTE: Since the 1870 Placer Act provided for placer claims to be made
the same as claims were made for veins or lodes, the miners* local
regulations were recognized to the extent not in conflict with laws of
the United States, or with the laws of the apposite State or Territory
Rev. Stat. Sec. 2324 (1875). Specific federal requirements were for
the location to be distinctly marked on the grounds so that its boun-
daries could be traced, and for at least $100 worth of labor to be per-
formed or improvements made during each year. Rev. Stat. Sec. 2324
(1875). Although it was often more noted for its breach that for any
other reason, the law did require a discovery prior to a location;
"... no location of a mining claim shall be made until the discovery
of the vein or lode within the limits of the claim located." Rev. Stat.
Sec. 2320 (1875). Patent could be achieved by an application to the
land office which would include a plat showing the boundaries of the
claim and affidavit that the plat and a notice of patent application
had been posted on the ground claimed; thereafter the land office would
make newspaper publication of the patent application for sixty days
and if no adverse claims developed the patent would issue. Rev. Stat.
Sec. 2325 (1875). The mineral laws were primitive because of the un-
developed state of the lands being exploited; this is indicated by the
provision that the monuments locating the boundary of the claim "shall
at all times constitute the highest authority as to what land is
patented, and in case of any conflict between the said monuments of such
patented claims and the descriptions of said claims in the patents issued
therefor the monuments on the ground shall govern ..." Rev. Stat. 2327
(1875). The Act of July 9, 1870 provided that "no location of a placer
claim, made after July 9, 1870, shall exceed one hundred and sixty acres
for any one person or association of persons
. .
." Rev. Stat. Sec. 2330
(1875). Any placer claim, not including a vein or lode claim, could be
patented for $2.50 per acre, together with all costs of proceedings.
Rev. Stat. Sec. 2333 (1875).
1909 (Sept. 27); The Secretary of the Interior issued an order
Executive Order withdrawing from entry a large number of acres
of supposedly oil lands "in aid of proposed
legislation affecting the use and disposition
of the petroleum deposits on the public domain,
. .
.All locations or claims existing and
APPENDIX A page 2
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43 U.S.C. 141 (1958)
1910 (July 2);
Executive Orders
valid on this date may proceed to entry in
the usual manner after field investigation
and examination." This was the first of
several land withdrawals for the same stated
purpose.
The so-called Pickett Act gave the President
the power to make withdrawals for public pur-
poses to be specified in the orders of with-
drawals; such withdrawals remain in force un-
til revoked by the President or by an act of
Congress. This Act protected the rights of
any locator who, at the date of an order of
withdrawal, was a bona fide occupant or
claimant of oil lands and who, at such date,
was in diligent prosecution of work leading
to the discovery of oil so long as he con-
tinued in diligent prosecution of the work.
The President, after the enactment of the
Pickett Act, confirmed the earlier land
withdrawals.
1911 (Mar. 2); "That in no case shall patent be denied to
36 Stat. 1015 or for any lands heretofore located or
claimed under the mining laws of the United
States containing petroleum, mineral oil,
or gas solely because of any transfer or
assignment thereof or of any interest or
interests therein by the original locator
or locators, or any of them, to any quali-
fied persons or person, or corporation, prior
to discovery of oil or gas therein
. . .:
Provided, however, That such lands were not
at the time of inception of development on
or under such claim withdrawn from mineral
entry."
NOTE: Congress was recognizing local customs. To have a valid loca-
tion a discovery was required by Rev. Stat. Sec. 2320 (1875); however,
the custom in California was to make a paper location which would be
assigned to a corporation which would explore for oil. The land office
took a dim view of this procedure (Lindley on Mines, Sec. 437 states:
APPENDIX A page 3.

The Land department has uniformly held that discovery is essential
in the case of placers, going so far at one time as to hold that
such discovery was essential in each 20 acre tract within a location
of 160 acres located by an association of persons.); and it was to
protect assignees of the paper locators who had subsequent to the land
withdrawals proceeded with diligence to prove up their inchoate claims
that this statute was passed. Generally on this matter, see hearings
held before the Committee on Public Lands of the House of Representa-
tives on H.R. 31437 on January 21, 1911, 61st Cong., 2d Sess.
Date and Reference Summary or Excerpt from Statute or Executive
Order
.
1914 (Aug. 25); Subsequent to theland withdrawals the Depart-
38 Stat. 708 ment of Justice contested many of the titles
to oil and gas properties. Because buyers
were reticent to take oil from lands with a
cloud on the title, this statute was enacted
to facilitate the disposal of oil from proper-
ty, title to which was questioned. The statute
provided that if an application had been made
for lands on which oil and gas was discovered
prior to the land withdrawal, or if drilling
operations were in progress at the time of the
withdrawal, and if the Secretary of the Interior
had made no final determination regarding the
issuance of a patent, the Secretary of the
Interior was authorized to enter into agree-
ments with the patent applicants as to what
should be done with proceeds from the ques-
tioned lands.
1920 (Feb. 25); Sec. 1. ". . . deposits of . . . oil, oil shale,
41 Stat. 437 or gas, and lands containing such deposits
owned by the United States, including those
in national forests /excluding those acquired
under Appalachian Forest Act, national parks,
and lands withdrawn for military purposes/ ...
shall be subject to disposition in the form
and manner provided by this Act to civilians
of the United States, or to any association
of such persons, or to any corporation ..."
There was reserved to the United States the
right to helium. Foreigners could not hold
any interest to a lease through stock owner-
ship if their country did not allow United
States citizens to hold similar interests.
APPENDIX A page 4.

Date and Reference Summary or Excerpt from Statute or Executive
Order
.
1920 (Feb. 25); Sec. 2-8 and 9-12 dealt with leasing of coal
41 Stat. 437 and phosphate deposits respectively.
Sec. 13. The Secretary of the Interior was
authorized to grant "under such necessary
and proper rules and regulations as he may
prescribe" a prospecting permit for not more
than two years, which permit gave an exclusive
right to prospect for oil or gas upon an area
not to exceed 2,560 acres, in reasonably com-
pact form, which area did not lie within "any
known geological structure of a producing
oil or gas field." The permittee was obligated
to commence drilling within 6 months, to drill
within 1 year one or more wells to a depth of
not less than 500 feet, and to drill within
2 years an aggregate depth of not less than
2,000 feet. An applicant could obtain a 30
day preference right to a permit by the erection
of a monument not less than 4 feet high and the
posting of a notice that a permit was to be
sought
.
Sec. 14. Upon discovery of oil or gas the
permittee was entitled to a lease of one-fourth
of the land embraced in the permit, or a min-
imum of 160 acres, for a term of 20 years at
a 5% royalty. The permittee had a preferential
right to lease the remainder of the permitted
area at a royalty of not less than 12|%, "and
under such other conditions as are fixed for
oil or gas leases in this Act, the royalty to
be determined by competitive bidding or fixed
by such other method as the Secretary may by
regulations prescribe: Provided, That the
Secretary shall have the right to reject any
or all bids."
Sec. 15. Permittee was to pay a 20% royalty
on production prior to application for lease.
APPENDIX A page 5.

Date and Reference Summary or Excerpt from Statute or Executive
Order
.
1920 (Feb. 25); Sec. 16. Generally no drilling could take
41 Stat. 437 place closer than 200 feet to outer boundary
of the permit or lease. Explorations and oper-
ations were to be carried on so as "To prevent
waste of oil or gas." Violations of this sec-
tion were grounds for forfeiture of the permit
or lease "through appropriate proceedings in




of oil or gas situated within the known geo-
logic structure of a producing oil or gas field
. . .
not subject to preferential lease, may
be leased by the Secretary of the Interior by
competitive bidding." The lease was to contain
not more than 640 acres, be for not less than
12|% royalty, and for a term of 20 years.
Lease was to be renewable for successive 10
year periods "upon such reasonable terms and
conditions as may be prescribed by the Secretary
of the Interior, unless otherwise provided by
law at the time of the expiration of such
periods." The Secretary was authorized to
reduce the royalty on wells producing 10
barrels per day, or less. The renewal and
royalty relief provisions were applicable to
all oil and gas leases issued under the Act.
Sec. 18-19. Relief provisions for claimants
upon withdrawn public oil lands.
Sec. 20. Gave preferential right to permit
or lease to certain agricultural land entries.
Sec. 21. OIL SHALE LEASES. The Secretary of
the Interior could grant lease of oil shale
deposits "under such rules and regulations,
not inconsistent with this Act, as he may
prescribe." No lease was to exceed 5,120 acres.
Indeterminate term. Royalty as specified in
the lease, with royalties subject to readjust-
ment at the end of each 20 year period. Secre-
tary could waive rentals and royalties for five
years to encourage production of oil from shale,
APPENDIX A page 6.

Date and Reference summary or Excerpt from Statute or Executive
Order.
1920 (Feb. 25); "Provided, That any person having a valid
41 Stat. 437 claim to such minerals under existing laws
on Janaury 1, 1919, shall, upon the relin-
quishment of such claim, be entitled to a
lease ..." Not more than one lease could
be granted to any one person, association,
or corporation.
Sec. 22. Alaska Oil Proviso.
Sec. 23-25. Dealt with leasing of sodium
deposits.
General Provisions Applicable to Coal, Phosphate,
Sodium, Oil, Oil Shale, and Gas Leases.
Sec. 26. The Secretary of the Interior should
reserve and exercise authority to cancel any
prospecting permit "upon failure of permittee
to exercise due diligence in the prosecution
of the prospecting work."
Sec. 27. Acreage Limitation Provisions.
"
... no person, association, or corporation
shall take or hold, at one time, more than
three oil or gas leases granted hereunder in
any one State, and not more than one lease
within the geologic structure of the same
producing oil or gas field." It was further
provided that this limitation could not be
exceeded by holdings of stock or interests in
associations or corporations. "Any interest held
in violation of this Act shall be forfeited to
the United States by appropriate proceedings
instituted by the Attorney General ..."
Sec. 28. Rights of way through public lands,
including forest reserves, of the United States
were granted for purposes of pipeline trans-
portation of oil or natural gas from leases
"under such regulations as to survey, location,
application, and use as may be prescribed
APPENDIX A page 7
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by the Secretary of the Interior and upon
41 Stat. 437 the express condition that such pipe lines
shall be constructed, operated, and maintained
as common carriers." Government lessees operat-
ing or controlling any pipe line "shall at
reasonable rates and without discrimination ac-
cept and convey oil of the Government or of
any citizen or company not the owner of any
pipe line, operating a lease or purchasing gas
or oil under the provisions of this Act."
Sec. 29. Reservation to the United States to
grant easements and rights of way across any
permits or leases issued under the Act; or to
dispose of land surface to the extent not
necessary for use of the lessee.
Sec. 30. Prohibits assignment of lease without
consent of the Secretary of the Interior.
Various required lease provisions relating to
working conditions, etc. include below:
Lease shall contain provisions "for the purpose
of insuring the exercise of reasonable diligence,
skill, and care in the operation of said
property" and a provision "that such rules ...
for the prevention of undue waste as may be
prescribed by said Secretary shall be observed"
. .
. "Provided, That none of such provisions
shall be in conflict with the laws of the State
in which the leased property is situated."
Sec. 31. Lease may be forfeited and cancelled
by "an appropriate proceeding in the United States
district court" whenever the "lessee fails to
comply with any of the provisions of this Act,
of the lease, or of the general regulations
promulgated under this Act and in force at the
date of the lease."
Sec. 32. ".
. .
the Secretary of the Interior
is authorized to prescribe necessary and proper
rules and regulations and to do any and all
things necessary to carry out and accomplish
the purposes of this Act ... Provided, That
nothing in this Act shall be construed or held
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Date and Reference summary or Excerpt from Statute or Executive
Order
.
1920 (Feb. 25); to affect the rights of the States or other
41 Stat. 437 local authority to exercise any rights which
they may have ..."
Sec. 33. Statements, representations, or
reports to be under oath, or in such form
as specified by the Secretary of the Interior.
Sec. 34. Act applies to lands which United
States has or may dispose of under laws reserv-
ing to the United States the mineral deposits.
Sec. 35. Disposition of Royalties. 10% of
bonuses, royalties, and rentals to United
States Treasury, 52^% to the reclamation fund,
and 37£% to State where minerals are located,
"said moneys to be used by such State
. . .
for the construction and maintenance of public




Sec. 36. The United States may on demand of
Secretary of the Interior take its royalty
oil or gas in kind. Such royalty oil or gas
is to be sold at public sale, unless the
Secretary of the Interior determines it is in
the public interest to sell at a private sale,
or accept the value thereof from the lessee.
Sec. 37. ".
. .
the deposits of oil, oil shale,
and gas, herein referred to
. . .
shall be subject
to disposition only in the form and manner pro-
vided in this Act, except as to valid claims
existent at the date of passage of this Act and
thereafter maintained in compliance with the
laws under which initiated, which claims may be
perfected under such laws, including discovery."
Sec. 38. The Secretary of the Interior was to
prescribe fees and commissions to be paid
registers and receivers of the United States
land offices on account of business transacted
under the provisions of this Act.
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Order.
1926 (Apr. 30); Sec. 27 Amended so that the limitation on
44 Stat. 373 holdings by any person, association, or
corporation was not more than 7,680 acres
in any one State, and no more than 2,560
acres within the geologic structure of the
same producing oil or gas field, whether
such acreage was held by lease or permit,
and whether held directly or indirectly.
NOTE: The legislative change which made the holding of permits, as
well as leases, the subject of acreage limitations confirmed an
Interior Department administrative practice. The Department had
held in 51 L.D. 135, 137 (1925) that "There is no reference in section
27 of the leasing act to prospecting permits, but since a discovery
under a permit gives the permittees a right to a lease, the limitations
of section 27 of the said act have been regarded as applicable to
holdings under permits." The change from a proscription against
holding more than a certain number of leases within one State or on a
known geologic structure to a proscription against a certain amount of
acreage was necessitated by an Interior Department holding that
differentiated between the amount of land which might be held directly
by lease or permit, and the amount which might be held indirectly by
lease or permit. The Department held in 50 L.D. 652, 654, 655 (1924)
that "The limitation as to direct holdings is on the number of leases
(or permits) which may be held, and restricts persons, associations,
and corporations equally, to one lease (or permit) upon a geologic
structure, and to not more than three such leases (or permits) in a
State. As to indirect interests, however, there is a general limita-
tion upon persons, associations, and corporations, in terms of acres,
which limits them to aggregate interests, direct and indirect, in 2,560 acres
not on a geologic structure, and to 7,680 acres in a State."
1931 (Mar. 4); Sec. 17 Amended so that leases committed
46 Stat. 1523 to a cooperative or unit plan of development
or operation, which plan has been approved by
the Secretary of the Interior as necessary or
convenient in the public interest, shall con-
tinue in force beyond their initial 20 year
term until the unit plan is terminated. It
provided that "Any cooperative or unit plan
of development or operation, which includes
land owned by the United States, shall contain
a provision whereby authority, limited as
therein provided, is vested in the Secretary
... to alter or modify from time to time in
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Date and Reference Summary or Excerpt from Statute or Executive
Order.
1931 (Mar. 4); his discretion the quantity and rate of pro-
46 Stat. 1523 duction under said plan." It provided that
"The Secretary of the Interior ... with
the consent of lessee ... /could? suspend
or modify the drilling or producing requirements
of any oil and gas lease heretofore or hereafter
issued ..."
Sec. 27 Amended to allow permittees and lessees
to enter unit type agreements when the Secretary
of the Interior determined it to be necessary or
advisable in the public interest* Permitted
the Secretary, with the lessee or permittee con-
sent, to establish, alter, change, or revoke
drilling, producing, and royalty requirements of
such leases or permits. Provided that when a
portion of a prospecting permit was determined to
be within the limits of a producing oil or gas
field and the permit was included in a unit
operating agreement a lease would issue to that
portion of the permit within the unit without
further proof of discovery. Authorised the
Secretary to approve operating, drilling, or
development contracts made by permittees or
lessees regardless of acreage limitations, when
the conservation of natural products or the
public convenience or necessity required it.
1933 (Feb. 9); Sec. 39 Added. If the Secretary of the Interior
47 Stat. 798 should direct, or agree to, suspension of oil and
gas production in the interest of conservation,
lease term extended for such period of suspension,
and lease rentals suspended.
1935 (Aug. 21); Sec. 13 Amended so that applications for pros-
49 Stat. 674 pecting permits filed more than 90 days after
effective date of Act would be considered as a
lease application. Any prospecting permit,
prior to its termination, could be exchanged
for a lease of same area as that covered by
prospecting permit at a royalty of not less
than 12$%. Such leases were not to be subject
to acreage limitations of Sec. 27 until one year
after discovery of oil and gas. Extended all
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Date and Reference summary or Excerpt from Statute or Executive
Order.
1935 (Aug. 21); outstanding prospecting permits until Dec, 31,
49 Stat. 674 1937 , and gave the Secretary of the Interior
discretionary authority to extend permits until
Dec. 31, 1938.
Sec. 14. Amended so that leases based upon
discoveries under prospecting permits should be
issued to J of the permitted area for 5%
royalty, $1 per acre per year rental, 20 year
term renewable for successive 10 year periods
"upon such reasonable terms and conditions as
may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior^;
provided, if the lease became the subject of a
unit plan, it was extended until termination
of the unit. The preferential right of the
permittee to lease the remainder of the permitted
area was restricted to a royalty of not less than
12£% and for a term of 5 years if the land was
not within any known geologic structure of a
producing oil and gas field, and for a term of
10 years if the land was within any known geologic
structure of a producing oil and gas field, and
in either case the lease would continue so long
as oil and gas was produced in paying quantities*
A rental of not less than 25 cents per acre per
year was set for the preferential leases.
Sec. 17, Amended so that competitive leases
of lands "known or believed to contain oil or
gas deposits" would be at not less than 12|%
royalty, with an annual rental of not less than
25 cents per acre, on not more than 640 acres,
and for 10 years or so long thereafter as oil
or gas is produced in paying quantities. Non-
competitive leases of lands not within any known
geological structure of a producing oil or gas
field would be issued to first applicant; the
royalty would be flat 12|% for production up to
50 barrels per day per well per calendar month,
and not less than 12.5% for average production
exceeding 50 barrels per day, and the term would
be 5 years or so long as oil or gas is produced
in paying quantities. Three additions to the
section in the field of conservation were: (a)
lands within unit plan areas were excluded from
acreage limitation computations, (b) authorized
the Secretary to issue future leases on the con-
dition that the lessee enter into unit or
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,
cooperative plans deemed advisable by the
Secretary, and (c) when lands owned by the
United States were being drained by lands
not so owned, the Secretary of the Interior
could negotiate compensatory agreements to
reimburse the United States, and its lessees
and permittees, but only with the agreement
of the lessees or permittees. The Secretary
of the Interior was given authority to cancel
leases not known to contain valuable deposits
of oil or gas, after 30 days* notice, if the
lessee violated any of the terms of the lease;
"Leases covering lands known to contain valu-
able deposits of oil or gas shall be canceled
only in the manner provided in section 31 of
this Act", that is, by judicial action. The
Secretary was given considerable control over
the rate of production from leased lands by the
provision that unit agreements should authorize
the Secretary "limited as therein provided
...
to alter or modify ... in his discretion the
rate of prospecting and development and the
quantity and rate of production," and the pro-
vision that the Secretary could, with the con-
sent of the lessee, suspend or modify the
drilling or producing requirements of non-
utilized leased lands.
Sec. 28 Amended so that rights of way issued
under the terms of the section shall be con-
ditioned "upon the express condition that such
pipe lines shall be
. , .
maintained as common
carriers ... and shall accept, convey, trans-
port, or purchase without discrimination, oil
or natural gas produced from Government lands
in the vicinity of the pipe line in such proportion-
ate amounts as the Secretary of the Interior may,
after a full hearing with due notice thereof to
the interested parties ... determine to be
reasonable."
In addition to the foregoing amendments the Act
authorized the issuance of new leases in exchange
for leases already held under the Act, but not
at a royalty rate of less than 12£% and "upon
such other terms and conditions as the Secretary
of the Interior shall by general rule prescribe."
APPENDIX A page 13.



















Provided, That no limitation of acreage not
provided for in the law or regulations under
which any such old lease was issued shall be
applicable to any such new lease."
In regard to leases issued under Sec. 17 of the
Act of February 25, 1920, as amended, the
Secretary of the Interior shall waive payment
of lease rentals for second and third lease
years in the case of lands not within any known
geologic structure of a productive oil or gas
field.
Upon expiration of 5 year non-competitive
leases issued pursuant to the Act of August 21,
1935, the record title holder has a preferential
right to a new lease, if application is made 90
days before lease expiration, and if leased land
is not within a known geologic structure of a
producing oil or gas field at time of lease
expiration.
The statute also authorized compromise settle-
ment of rental claims under leases issued
under sec. 13, if such compromise is beneficial
to the U.S. or if full collection is inadvisable
because of the limited financial resources of
the lessee.
Lessees discovering new oil or gas fields would
pay flat 12|% royalty as to such new deposits
for 10 years following date of discovery. This
right was abolished by Congress by Joint Resolu-
tion of July 25, 1947 (61 Stat. 449).
Amended 56 Stat. 726, supra, by adding sentence
which extended term of any five-year lease ex-
piring prior to Dec. 31, 1944, and for which
no preference right to a new lease is granted,
to Dec. 31, 1944.
Each of these statutes amended 56 Stat. 726,
supra, in the same fashion as did 57 Stat. 608,
supra, except that the terminal dates in each
instance were Dec. 31, 1945 and Dec. 31, 1946,
respectively.
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1946 (Jul. 13); Amended sec. 36 to provide a preference right
60 Stat. 533 to refineries without a supply of crude oil
of their own to purchase U.S. royalty crude
oil.
1946 (Aug. 8); Sec. 17 Amended to provide for competitive
60 Stat. 951 leasing of lands within known geological
structures in blocks of not more than 640
acres at a royalty of not less than 12.5%
and for a term of 5 years or so long there-
after a 8 oil or gas is produced in paying
quantities. Non-competitive leases were to
be issued to the first applicant at a flat
12.5% for 5 year terms or so long thereafter
as oil or gas is produced in paying quanti-
ties; provided, the lessee had a preference
right to one 5 year renewal if the lease was
not within the known geological structure of
a producing oil or gas field, if not other-
wise provided by law at such time. Rental was
not less than 2 5c per acre per annum, except
as to leases not within any known geological
structure of a producing oil or gas field on
which second and third lease year rentals were
waived. The Secretary had authority to negotiate
compensatory agreements if United States lands
were being drained.
Sec. 17(a) Added. 20 year leases, or renewal
leases issued therefor, could be exchanged
for new 5 year lease at not less than 12.5%
royalties, provided that a flat 12.5% 5 year
lease would be issued (1) as to portion of
lease not within "productive limits of any
producing oil or gas deposits," (2) as to
production discovered after May 27, 1941
which is determined by the Secretary to be a
new deposit, and (3) as to unit production
discovered after May 27, 1941 which is deter-
mined by the Secretary to be a new deposit.
Sec. 17(b) Added. Unit plans authorized when
Secretary of the Interior determines such to
be necessary or advisable in the public inter-
est. Authorized Secretary, with consent of
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1946 (Aug. 8); lessee, to establish, alter, change, or revoke
60 Stat. 951 drilling, producing, rental, minimum royalty,
and royalty requirements of leases committed
to units. Authorized Secretary to provide in
future leases that the lessee would unitize
under unit plans prescribed by the Secretary.
Unit plans "may, in the discretion of the
Secretary, contain a provision whereby
authority is vested in the Secretary of the
Interior, or any such person, committee, or
State or Federal officer or agency as may be
designated in the plan, to alter or modify
. . .
the rate of prospecting and development and the
quantity and rate of production under such plan."
Unitized leases were excluded from acreage
limitations. Leased lands could be joined in
"comraunitization or drilling agreement providing




separate tracts of land
. . .
when determined
by the Secretary of the Interior to be in the
public interest." Authorized subsurface storage
of oil or gas on leased lands.
Sec. 27 Amended. Acreage limitations were
increased to 15,360 acres in any State, and
acreage limitations on known geologic structures
were abolished. Leases owned in common by two
or more persons dre chargeable, insofar as
acreage limitations are concerned, only as to
the percentage interests of the person or
persons. Excluded nonrenewable options to
purchase leases, which options were taken for
geological or geophysical work, from acreage
limitation computations, provided the total
acreage under option in any one State did not
exceed 100,000 acres, and that the options were
not for Over two years without express approval
of the Secretary of the Interior. Required
filing of statements by optionees semiannually
of options held. Provided, that interests held
in violation of the Act were subject to cancella-
tion or forfeiture "in any appropriate proceedings
instituted by the Attorney General."
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.
1946 (Aug. 8); Sec. 30(a) Added. Permitted partial assign-
60 Stat. 951 ment of leases upon approval by the Secretary
of the Interior. Provided, that if portion of
lease assigned was undeveloped, but portion re-
tained is in extended term because of produc-
tion, the assigned undeveloped portion would be
extended for two years or so long thereafter as
oil or gas is produced in paying quantities. If
portion of lease retained was within primary
term, the assigned portion would continue for this
primary term, but in any event "for not less than
two years after the date of discovery of oil or
gas in paying quantities upon any other segre-
gated portion of the lands originally subject to
such lease."
Sec. 30(b) Added. Permitted relinquishment of
all or part of lease (legal subdivision) by
lessee at any time.
Sec. 31 Amended. Lease could be forfeited or
canceled by appropriate judicial proceedings
for failure to comply with Act or regulations
issued under Act. Leases issued after Aug. 21,
1935 subject to cancellation on 30 days notice
for failure to comply with lease terms, unless
lease covers land containing known valuable de-
posits of oil or,gas.
Sec. 39 Amended. Secretary authorized in
interest of conservation to "waive, suspend,
or reduce the rental, or minimum royalty, or
reduce the royalty", or to direct or assent to
suspension of operations and production. In
the event of suspension of operations and pro-
duction, rental and minimum royalties suspended
and term of lease extended equal to period of
suspension.
Royalty rates on non-competitive leases issued
or to be issued reduced to 12.5%.
Repealed Act of July 8, 1940 /pertained to
waiver of 2nd and 3rd year lease rental s/$
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section 1 of Act of July 29, 1942 , as amended,
/pertained to preference right to renewal of
non-competitive 5 year leases/ and section 2
of Act of Aug. 21, 1935 /pertained to right to
exchange leases for new leases under terms of
1935 Act?.
Rights vested by virtue of leases issued under
prior acts were not to be effected, but lessees
could file to make his lease subject to terms
of this Act.
The Act of August 8, 1946 which placed a limi-
tation on the acres which could be held under
option (100,000 acres) had provided that "nothing
in this section /27/ shall be construed to in-
validate opt ions"taken prior to June 1, 1946,
and on which such geological or geophysical ex-
ploration has been actually made, and which are
exercised within two years after the passage of
this Act." The Act of June 1, 1948 struck out
"within two years after the passage of this Act"
and inserted in lieu thereof "on or before
August 8, 1950."
Section 6 of this Act amended section 27 of the
Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, as amended, to
read slightly different, but made no substantive
changes insofar as oil, gas, and oil shale are
concerned. Section 7 of this Act amended section
39 of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, as amended,
by including "oil shale, phosphate, sodium,
potassium and sulfur" within its terms.
Amended section 35 of the Mineral Leasing Act
of 1920 "to provide that payments to States
. . .
shall be made biannually."
Amended section 28 of the Mineral Leasing Act
of 1920 by adding the following proviso: "Pro-
vided, That the common carrier provisions of this
section shall not apply to any natural gas pipe-
line operated by any person subject to regulation
under the Natural Gas Act or by any public
utility subject to regulation by a State or
municipal regulatory agency having jurisdiction
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to regulate the rates and charges for the
sale of natural gas to consumers within the
State or municipality."
Amended 2d paragraph of section 17 to
allow 60 days to start reworking or drilling
operations when production ceases on a lease
which is being held by production.
Amended 3rd paragraph of section 17 to allow
5 year extension to record titleholder in the
case of a non-competitive lease when the lease
is not within the known geologic structure of
a producing oil or gas field, and a 2 year
extension if it is within the known geologic
structure of a producing oil or gas field.
/Note: under the Act of August 8, 1946 a
2 year extension was only allowed if diligent
operations were being carried on at the time
of lease expirat ion./
Amended 5th paragraph of section 17 to provide
for extension of lease in connection with which
compensatory royalty is being paid for the
period of such payments plus one year after
the cessation of the payments.
Amended 2d sentence of 4th paragraph of section
17(b) to provide for extension of lease committed
to unit plan agreement if production is had with-
in unit anytime within either primary or secondary
term of the lease. Also provided for segregation
of non-unitized portion of lease into a separate
lease with a 2 year term which could be held
thereafter by production in paying quantities.
Amended 5th paragraph of section 17(b) to ex-
clude from acreage holding limitations leases
"operated under approved operating, drilling,
or development contracts."
Amended section 30(a) to allow assignment of part
of a lease even if the lease was extended for
any reason under the Act.
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Amended section 31 by adding a sentence to
automatically terminate a lease upon failure
to pay lease rental on or before anniversary
date of lease, provided the lease did not have
a well on it capable of producing oil or gas
in paying quantities.
Amended section 27 to increase maximum acreage
which may be held under lease from 15,360 acres
to 46,080 acres; the maximum term of options
from 2 years to 3 years ; and the maximum acreage
under option from 100,000 acres to 200,000 acres.
Amended section 35 to provide that 52| percent
of the U.S. royalties collected in Alaska would
be paid to the Territory of Alaska for disposi-
tion by the Legislature of the Territory.
The Act admitting the State of Alaska into the
Union made certain appropriate changes in the
Mineral Leasing Act because of the change from
Territorial to State status. See sections 6(h),
6(k), and 28(b).
Amended section 27 to provide that bona fide
purchasers of leases, options for a lease, or
interests in leases who are not themselves in
violation of the acreage holdings under the Act
should not have their interests canceled or for-
feited by virtue of the violations of their pred-
ecessors in title. During proceedings with
respect to violations of the Act, lease interests
may be extended for the period of proceeding by
filing with the Secretary of the Interior a waiver
of rights to drill or assign under the lease.
Amended Sections 17, 17(a), and 17(b) so that the
terms of these sections appear in Sections 17(a),
(b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), and (j).
In addition to this stylistic change, the sections
were amended to provide for the following
substantive matters:
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1960 (Sept. 2); (1) Lease rental increased to "not less than
74 Stat. 781 50 cents per acre" with no waiver of 2d and 3rd
year rentals (section 17(d)); (2) Primary term
of noncompetitive leases increased to 10 years;
any lease committed to a unit plan and "actual
drilling operations" are commenced under the
plan and are being "diligently prosecuted" the
lease term shall be extended for 2 years, and
similar extension for any lease if it is not
committed to a unit plan and the drilling opera-
tions are on the lease (section 17(e)); (3) Added
provision that in the event an adverse mining
claim is filed under the Multiple Mineral Develop-
ment Act (68 Stat. 708), the running of time
against the lease will be suspended as to the
lands involved in the claim until a final de-
cision has been rendered (section 17(h)).
Amended Section 27 so that the terms of this
section appear in Sections 27(a), (b), (c),
(d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j), (k). In
addition to this stylistic change, the section
was amended to provide for the following sub-
stantive matters:
(1) Combined acreage limitations on leases and
options provided to be a total of 246,080 acres,
but total acreage under option could only be
200,000 acres; changed acreage limitations as
to Alaska (section 27(d)); this section also made
other technical changes with respect to report-
ing on options, etc.; (2) Delineated rules of
acreage chargeable to shareholders in associa-
tions and corporations (section 27(e)).
Section 4(a) of this Act extended the rights
to extension of existing leases in accord with
law existing prior to this Act, i.e., noncom-
petitive lease for five years if not within
known geologic structure, for two years if
within known geologic structure, and any lease
if primary term and drilling operations are
being maintained for a two year period.
Added section 42 which placed time limit on
contesting decisions of Secretary to within
90 days after final decision of the Secretary.
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1960 (Sept. 2); Amended last sentence of Section 30(a) so
74 Stat. 781 that only partial assignment of lease held
by production or payment of compensatory
royalty would be extended for 2 years or
so long as production is maintained (applies
to both assigned and retained portion of
lease)
.
Amended sections 1, 21, and 34 to provide
for "native asphalt, solid and semisolid
bitumen, and bituminous rock (including
oil- impregnated rock or sands from which
oil is recoverable only by special treatment
after the deposit is mined or quarried)";
section 21 placed limit of 7,680 acres in
any one State on native asphalt type leases
and added two subsections to section 21
dealing with this type lease.
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APPENDIX B
REFERENCES TO STATUTES AMENDING MINERAL LEASING ACT OF 1920 (41 STAT. 437)
A* Chronological listing of statutes amending Mineral Leasing Act of 1920
























1926 1[44 Stat. 1942 (56 Stat. 1950 (64 Stat. 402)







1942 (56 Stat. 1953 (67 Stat. 557)
1928 1[45 Stat. 1943 (57 Stat. 1954 (68 Stat. 583)
1930 { 46 Stat* 1943 (57 Stato 1954 (68 Stat. 648)





1931 i[46 Stat. 1523)
1
445)
1945 (59 Stat. 1958 (72 Stat.
1932 ([47 Stat. 1946 (60 Stat. 533) 1958 (72 Stat.
1933 ([47 Stat. 798) 1946 (60 Stat. 950) 1959 (73 Stat. 571)





1947 (61 Stat. 119) 1960 (74 Stat. 200)
1937 ([50 Stat. 1948 (62 Stat. 285) 1960 (74 Stat. 781)
1939 ([53 Stat. 1948 (62 Stat. 289)
,
1« These statutes did not amend the Act, but related to extension
of terms of prospecting permits. No prospecting permit was
extended beyond December 31, 1939.
2. Expired by its own terms on January 31, 1931.
3. Did not substantively change Mineral Leasing Act, but did operate
on rights under leases issued under the Act.
4. Statute did not amend the Act, but authorized the Secretary of the
Interior to accept surrender of Mineral Leasing Act leases under
certain circumstances. This statute is codified as 30 U.S.C* 188a (1958),
5. Relates to Alaska Oil Proviso.
6. Act admitting Alaska as State made certain appropriate amendments be-
cause of this change of status
o
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liEFELENCKS TO STATUTES AMENDING MINERAL LEASING ACT OF 1920 (41 STAT. 437)
Sections of Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 relating to oil, .gas, and
oil shale with notations of subsequent amendatory statutes and
appropriate code sections:
SECTION 1. (.HO USC 181)
1946 (60 Stat. 950)
1960 (74 Stat. 781)
SECTION 13. (30 USC 221-222h)
1935 (49 Stat. 674)
SECTION 14. (30 USC 223)
1935 (49 Stat, 674)
SECTION 15. (30 USC 224)
SECTION 16. (30 USC 225)
1946 (60 Stat. 950)
SECTION 17. (30 USC 226)
1
1930 (46 Stat. 1007)
1931 (46 Stat. 1523)
1935 (49 Stat. 674)
1946 (60 Stat. 950)
1954 (68 Stat. 583)
1960 (74 Stat. 200)
Completely rewritten by
1960 Revision Act, infra.
SECTION 17(a). (30 USC 226)
Added: 1946 (60 Stat. 950)
Completely rewritten by
1960 Revision Act, infra.
SECTION 17(b). (30 USC 226)
Added: 1946 (60 Stat. 950)
Completely rewritten by
1960 Revision Act, infra.
SECTION 17(a), (b), (c), (d), (e),
(f), (g), (h), (i), (j).
The 1960 Revision Act (74 .Stat. 781)
completely rewrote section 17, 17(a),
and 17(b) into the above form.
SECTIONS 18-20. (30 USC 227-229)
SECTION 21. (30 USC 241)
1960 (74 Stat. 781) Amended and
added to section so that it is now
in form of section 21(a), (b), (c).
SECTION 22. (30 USC 251)
1958 (72 Stat. 324)
SECTION 26. (30 USC 183)
SECTioN 27. (30 USC 184)
1926 (44 Stat. 373) -,
1930 (46 Stat. 1007)
1931 (46 Stat. If23)
1946 (60 Stat. 950)
1948 (62 Stat. 285) 2
1948 (62 Stat. 289, 291)
1954 (68 Stat. 648)
1959 (73 Stat. 571)
Completely rewritten by
1960 Revision Act, infra.
SECTION 27(a), (b), (c), (d), (e),
(f), (g), 00, (i), (j),
(k).
1960 Revision Act (74 Stat. 781)
revised and rearranged section into
above form.
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B. Sections of Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 relating to oil, gas, and
oil shale with notations of subsequent amendatory statutes and
appropriate code sections: (continued)
SECTION 28. (30 USC 185)
1935 (49 Stat. 674)
1953 (67 Stat. 557)
SECTION 29. (30 BSC 186)
SECTION 30. (30 USC187)
SECTION 30(a). (30 USC 187(a))
Added: 1946 (60 Stat. 950)
1954 (68 Stat. 583)
1960 (74 Stat. 781)
SECTION 30(b). (30 USC 187(b))
Added: 1946 (60 Stat. 950)
SECTION 31. (30 USC 188)
1946 (60 Stat. 950)
1954 (68 Stat. 583)
SECTION 32. (30 USC 189)
S-CTION 33. (30 USC 190)
SECTION 34. (30 USC 182)
1960 (74 Stat. 781)
SECTION 35. (30 USC 191)
1947 (61 Stat. 119)
1950 (64 Stat. 402)
1957 (71 Stat. 282)
SECTION 36. (30 USC 192)
1946 (60 Stat. 533)
1949 (63 Stat. 682)3
SECTION 37. (30 USC 193)
SECTION 38. (30 USC 194)
SECTION 39. (30 USC 209)
Added: 1933 (47 Stat. 798)
1946 (60 Stat. 950)
1948 (62 Stat. 289, 291)
SECTION 42. (30 USC 226-2)
Added: 1960 (74 Stat. 781)
1. Expired by own terms January 1, 1931.
2 Provided for change in arrangement, but no change in substance.
3. When the 1946 Act (60 Stat. 533) was enacted crude oil was in short
supply and it was desired to give aid to small refineries by granting
them a preference right to buy U.S. royalty crdue. Because of the
short supply the contracts awarded called for market price plus a
premium. Subsequent to this period the availability of crude oil
changed from scarcity to abundance and therefore the market price
was unrealistic since crude was being bought and sold under market
price. The Act of September 1, 1949, gave relief to the small
refiners who were tied to Goverrment contracts calling for market
price plus a premium. No substantive change was made to section
36 by this statute.




The phrase "public domain" as used here, encompasses all lands
that were at any time owned by the United States and subject to
sale or other transfer of ownership under the laws of the
Federal government.
Ill Pound, Jurisprudence (1959), p. 429: "More than half of the
states provide by statute (and elsewhere except in Louisiana the
same doctrine exists by custom, coming down in older states
from colonial charters, recognized by judicial decision) that
the common law of England shall be the rule of decision in their
courts, so far as applicable, except in so far as cases are
governed by constitutions or by statutes." In the prefatory
material to Cooley's edition of Blackstone's Commentaries it was
written in 1870 at vi : "... though in England, where the
common law and the statutes mentioned by this author (Blackstone)
have been so greatly changed by recent legislation, new works
adapted to the present condition of things may, to a considerable
extent, supersede the one before us, in America where many of
these changes have n<°ver been made,. and where much of the recent
English legislation has no importance, even by way of explanation
or illustration, the original work of Blackstone is much the
most useful, as presenting us the law in something near the
condition in which our ancestors brought it to America, leaving
us to trace in our statutes and decisions its subsequent changes
here, unembarrassed by irrelevant information about parliamentary
legislation whirr; in no way concerns us."
lj.i Pound, op. cit. supra i.ote 2, at 429.
This concept of mineral ownership was not entirely prevalent in
the Western Hemisphere. Spain in exploitation of its colonies
in the Americas followed the "Regalia" theory of mineral owner-
ship which is still prevalent in Latin America. Under the
"Regalia" system rshir, of minerals contained in the subsoil
is attributed to the State. See Campbell, Principles of Mineral
Ownership in the Civil Law and Common Law Systems, 31 Tul. L.
Rev. 303 (1957). To a very limited extent the law of England
recognized a regalian right in the government. This is noted in
1 Lindley, Mines (3rd ed. 1914), sec. 3: "Briefly stated, the
regalian right to mines, as recognized in England, was confined
to those of the precious metals — gold and silver. The baser
substances belonged to the owner of the soil, except in certain
localities where irrrjrmerinl cuntcm fcsd rsodiiicd the rule." Gener-
ally on civil law mining concepts, see 1 Lindley, Mines (3rd ed.
1914), sec. 11-14.
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5. Keogh, Comment on the Federal Organic Laws, U.S.C.A. Const.,
p: 3.
6. Pose, Survey of National Policies on Federal ..and Ownership,
Sen. Doc. No. 56, 85th Cong., 1st Sess . I (1957).
7. Riegel, America Moves West (Rev. ed . 1949), p. 14-47. Faulkner,
American Political and Social History (5th ed. 1948), p 124-126,
8. Hose, op. cit. supra note t> 5 at 2: "Thus 221, 987, 787 acres of
public domain resulted from the cessions of New lork (1781),
Virginia (1784), Massachusetts (1785), Connecticut (1786), South
Carolina (1787), North Carolina (1790), and Georgia (1802)."
9. Benjamin Horace Hibbard, A History of the Public Land Policies
(1924), p. 512. This reservation is consistent with the limited
regal ian ownership theory as was practiced in England, see note
4 supra.
10. Rose, op. cit. supra note 6, at 11. 1 Lindley, Mines (3rd ed.




op. cit. supra note 6, at 2„
12. In Gibson v. Choutean. 13 Wall. 9li, 99 (1872): "With respect
to the public domain, the Constitution vests in Congress the
power of disposition and of making all needful rules and regula-
tions. That power i subject t r > no limitation:-:. Congress has
the absolute right to prescribe the times, the conditions, and
the mode of transferring this property, or any part of it, and
to designate the persons to whom the transfer shall be made."
Also see United States v. Gratiot, 14 Pet. 530 (1840), Van
Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 167 (1866), Ashwander v. Ten-
nessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936), United States v.
San 1-rancisco, 310 U.S. 16 (1940).
13. Rose, op. cit. supra note o, at ii.
14. ibid.
15. 2 Stat. 448 (1807). The concern aver lead deposits during this
period indicates the unsophisticated state oi the art of war.
Lead for bullets was the principal strategic material of this
period.
The authority of the Congress to lease the public domain,
rather than patent it was tested in United Slates v. Gratiot,
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14 Pet. 526 (1840). The court, rejected the contention that
the Constitutional phrase "dispose of" vested in Congress the
power only to sell, and not to lease such lands, that is the
lead mines in the case considered. At page 538 the court
stated:
'This disposal must be left to the discretion of Congress.
And there can be no apprehensions of any encroachments
upon state rights, by the creation of a numerous tenantry
within their borders; as has been so strenuously urged in
the argument. The law of 1807, authorizing the leasing
of the lead mines, was passed before Illinois was organized
as a state; and she cannot now complain of any disposition
or regulation of the lead mines previously made by Congress.
She surely cannot clain a right to the public lands within
her limits. It has been the policy of the government, at
all times in disposing of the public lands, to reserve
the mines for the use of the United States."
16. 3 Stat. 260 (1816).
17. 4 Stat. 364 (1829); 9 Stat. 37 (1846); 9 Stat. 146 (1847).
18. 1 Lindley, Mining (3rd ed. 1914), sec. 34.
19. Id. at sec. 41.
20. Henry N. Copp, United States Mineral Lands (1881), p. iii: "The
motive underlying the earliest congressional legislation touching
the public mineral lands was to secure a revenue therefrom. To
this end the system of leasing the lead and copper mines was
adopted in 1807, with its attendant agencies accountings, etc.
After a trial of nearly forty years the system was pronounced a
failure and in 1846 the mines were offered at sale, with a
preference right in those who had leases or were in the occupation
of the mines. When the gold mines of California were discovered,
and the varied mineral wealth of the Pacific coast was brought
to the attention of Congress, several revenue bills were intro-
duced, at different times, and earnestly debated. But the
notorious failure of the lease system in the Mississippi Valley,
and the difficulties in the way of securing a revenue otherwise,
gave success to the friends of free mining of 1866.
Except in a few states, the object of congressional legislation,
since 1866, has been to prevent the disposal of mineral lands to
states and railroads, or in large quantities to individuals. Explo-
ration of hidden mines is encouraged, and no efforts are used to
compel miners to expend money in securing government title. The
mining law of May 10, 1872, JLs essentially a poor man's law, and
has been the source of incalculable wealth to the country, and
indirectly of vast revenue to the government."
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21. 30 U.S.C. 22 contains substantially the same language as the
1866 enactment.
22. 16 Stat. 217 (1870).
23. 17 Stat. 91 (1872).
24. Public land states are normally considered to be those states
included in, and west of the tier of the States of Montana,
Wyoming, Colorado, and New Mexico. See, Clawson and Held, The
Federal Lands: Their Use and Management (1957), p. 38.
25. American Petroleum Institute, Petroleum Facts and Figures
(Centennial ed. 1959), p. 1. Although the Drake well is
normally proclaimed as the birthplace of the oil industry in
the United States, see Frank J. Taylor and Earl M. Welty, The
Black Bonanza (1958), p. 1: "... several years before the
Drake Well was drilled, two enterprising Spanish Californians,
Andreas and Romulo Pico, were gathering 'brea', as they called
the sticky tar seeping into pits they dug in Southern California,
and cooking the stuff at San Fernando Mission to boil off lamp
oil and make axle grease. And by 1857, two years prior to the
Drake discovery, George S. Gilbert, a whale-oil merchant, had
already consigned to New York a hundred kegs of lamp oil he
had extracted in a still near Ventura Mission from heavy tar
seeping out of a nearby mountain.
Decades before this, the Indians and the early French
explorers had collected 'rock oil' floating on Pennsylvania's
Oil Creek to make medicines. For a century or more the
California Indians had gathered 'chapapote' to calk canoes, to
waterproof baskets, and to fasten arrowheads to shafts. So if
it is anybody's good guess where and when the oil golconda was
born."
26. Gird v. California Oil Co., 60 Fed. 531, 532 (C.C.S.D. Cal
.
1894): "The premises in controversy are oil-bearing lands, the
government title to which, under existing laws, can alone be
acquired pursuant to the provisions of the mining laws relating
to placer claims."
27. Ex parte Union Oil Co., 23 L.D. 222 (1896). This was a reversal
of an earlier position of the Interior Department which allowed
location of petroleum lands under the placer laws, see 1 L.D. 560.
28. American Petroleum Institute, op. cit. supra note 25, at 40, 41.
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29. Hearings before House Committee on the Public Lands on H.R. 24070
(To Authorize the President of the United States to make With-
drawals of Public Lands in Certain Cases), 61st Cong., 2d Sess.
(May 13, 17, 1910), p. 91.
30. Id. at 140.
31. Act of June 25, 1910, c. 421, 36 Stat. 847, 43 U.S.C. 141.
32. Indicative of the continuing interest of the Congress to arrive
at a procedure to open up the withdrawn oil lands are the following
bills which were introduced, and upon which hearings were held:
S. 5434, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. (lease), S. 4898, 63rd Cong., 2d
Sess. (patent); H.R. 14094, 63rd Cong. 2d Sess. (patent), H.R. 406,
64th Cong., 1st Sess. (lease), S. 45, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. (patent),
H.R. 3232, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. (lease), and S. 2812, 65th Cong.,
2d Sess. (lease). The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 was passed
during the 66th Cong., 2d Sess. The parenthetical word "lease"
or "patent" indicates the type of right which would have been
granted discoverers under the bills.
33. See Appendix A, p. 2, 3 for a summary of the placer mining laws
applicable to petroleum locations.
34. Atty. Gen. of the United States, Supplement to the Annual Report,
Upon the Litigation over Withdrawn Oil Lands of the United States
(1915), p. 6: "Under the mining law, an individual or corporation,
sufficiently financed, might occupy and operate any number of
tracts of public oil land without any restraint upon the quantities
of oil produced or the methods of production, and without rendering
to the General Government anything in return. Successful opera-
tions, under favorable conditions were known to be productive of
large profits. Add to this the fact that the oil in one tract is
often subject to be partly drained off through wells operated upon
another, and the incentives to speculative occupation, negligent
and wasteful operation, and excessive production, become obvious."
and at p. 10: "I am informed that the waste of oil after extraction
and the irreparable damage done to the subterranean deposits due
to negligent operation and consequent intrusion of water are very
serious. In certain instances the operators seem to have been
actuated only by the desire to reap the greatest profit possible
before the Government could enforce its rights."
35. Hearings before Senate Committee on the Public Lands on H.R. 406,
64th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 2, 1916), pp. 15, 16:
"A placer miner's essential equipment is a shovel and a
pan. When theUil prospector strikes oil—that is, makes
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his discovery—he has ordinarily spent many times more
than $500. He has nothing more to do to entitle him
to patent. Finding oil he gets title to 20 acres. If
seven associates go in with him, they may take 160
acres. Then the ground about the scene of feverish
activity. Some rich and powerful adventurer or a
flock of such sink on the adjacent ground, and
reaching oil sands proceed by means of pumps of great
power to empty his claim and the whole pool, the
existence of which was revealed by his genius and his
enterprise. Even while he is going down he is at the
risk of finding himself in a race with a competitor
lured to the region by the promise his labors have
excited. It is not the man who first begins, but the
man who first gets oil who takes the ground. What
chance has the ordinary man in such a race with Standard
Oil? Rivalry of that character naturally breeds hatreds
that lead to bloodshed and breaches of the peace."
This is part of a statement by Senator Thomas J. Walsh of Montana.
36. Apparently the common practice on the public lands was to send
out a crew of eight people who would locate a great number of
claims. (See, Hearings before Senate Subcommittee of the
Committee on Public Lands on S. 5434 (A Bill for Leasing of Oil
and Gas Lands Withdrawn from Entry), 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. (May 21,
1914), pp. 6, 14.) After the location was made the 8 locators
would assign their 8 separate 20 acre locations to a corporation-
all this before any discovery was made. To protect bona fide
purchasers of rights so conceived Congress passed the Act of March 2,
1911, 36 Stat. 1015 (See Appendix A, p. 4).
37. Atty. Gen. of the United States, op. cit. note 34, Appendix B, in
a letter to Scott Ferris, Chairman of the Committee on Public
Lands from T. W. Gregory, Attorney General. The letter states in
part:
"I am reliably informed that practically all of the known
oil areas in California have been covered by paper locations-
many parts of them again and again—at one time or another
. . .
Those parties whom we have sued and those whom we contemplate
suing are those who appear to have no right or equity either
under the mining law or the Pickett Act of June 25, 1910, but
who have entered on the withdrawn land in spite of the withdrawal
and in spite of the known purpose of the Government to enforce
it, and who in many instances have taken enormous quantities of
oil and appropriated proceeds—millions of dollars—without
making any provision to indemnify the Government, besides in-
flicting grave damage to the oil deposits through hasty and
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negligent operation. Some of these parties acted in pursuance
of plans which were inchoate or half abandoned when the with-
drawal occurred. In other cases the plans were carried out
through the practical expulsion of earlier claimants. In
some the claims are now sought to be supported by fraudulent
dummy locations and fraudulent locations of gypsum."
38. See, John Ise, The United States Oil Policy (1926), Ch. XXIII
The Public Oil Lands: Discussions in Congress.
39. Id. at 329.
40. Id. at 330.
41. Clawson and Held, op. cit. supra note 24, at 26, 27:
"Concern grew throughout the nineteenth century that the
land disposal practices were not working as well as had been hoped.
Even earlier many leaders had deplored the cycle of clearing land,
cultivating it until it was exhausted, abandoning it, and moving,
usually westward, to clear new land. But the process had been
on a relatively small scale until the nineteenth century. Then
vast areas of lands were cleared, forests were cut in ways not
conducive to their regrowth, fire was rampant in the woods, and
the plains began to be plowed in areas where they should not have
been. The census of 1880, which first obtained information on
farm tenancy, shocked the nation by showing that the ideal of the
independent landowner tilling the soil he owned had not been
achieved to the extent that had been fondly hoped. One-fourth of
all farmers were tenants, even in this period of generally free
public domain."
For a detailed discussion of the wasteful practices employed in
the recovery of oil and gas see Ise, op. cit. supra note 38, Ch.
XIV-XVII. Ise summarized the situation in the following language
at p. 274:
"... the results of private ownership and exploitation of
oil were almost everywhere the same: instability in the industry,
over-production, wide fluctuations in prices, with prices always
far too low; curtailment campaigns carried on in a generally vain
effort to secure stability and reasonable prices; waste of oil
by the millions of barrels; waste of capital by hundreds of millions
of dollars; waste of human energy; speculation, and fraud, and
extravagance, and social inequality; and finally, the development
of monopoly conditions as the only means of escape from the
intolerable conditions of private competition."
42. American Petroleum Institute, Quarterly (Centennial Issue 1959),
Allan Nevins, Three Fabulous Decades, p. 23:




the British Navy steamed to its stations in 1914
with oil burning engines and Joffre repulsed the Germans on
the Marne with the aid of troops which General Galieni hurried
from Paris in taxicabs, trucks, and private cars. Gasoline
enabled airplanes to take to the skies. Tanks soon tore through
the German lines with the same fuel. Diesel-powered ships and
lorries carried troops and stores. When in April, 1915, the
Cushing field (Oklahoma) reached a maximum production of
300,000 barrels of oil daily—more than a third of the nation's
output—the Allies had reason to rejoice and the Germans to
show concern."
43. Note 34, supra.
44. Del Monte Mining Co. v. Last Chance Mining Co., 117 U.S. 55,
60 (1897): "The general rule of the common law was that whoever
had the fee of the soil owned all below the surface, and this
common law is the general law of the States and Territories of
the United States, and, in the absence of specific statutory
authority provisions or contracts, the simple inquiry as to
the extent of mining rights would be, who owns the surface."
and at p. 61: "In the acquisition of foreign territory since
the establishment of this government the great body of the land
acquired became the property of the United States, and is
known as their 'public lands'. By virtue of this ownership of
the soil the title to all mines and minerals beneath the
surface was also vested in the Government."
45. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Public Lands on H.R. 406




46. Ise, op. cit. supra note 38, at 334-337.
47. The reason for the original withdrawal of the public oil lands
from entry was in large measure the concern for a stockpile of
petroleum for national defense purposes. Acting in furtherance
of this concern Presidents Taft and Wilson withdrew four naval
petroleum reserves from the public oil lands in 1912 (Elk Hills-
Naval Petroleum 2), 1914 (Teapot Dome—Naval Petroleum Reserve
No. 3), and 1924 (Naval Petroieum Reserve No. 4 which includes
35,000 square miles on the northern tip of Alaska just south of
Point Barrow). See Sen. Doc. No. 187, 78th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1944), History of Naval Petroleum Reserves, pp. 2, 3.
48. 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
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49. Ise, op. cit. supra note 38, at 332-334.
50. Act of February 25, 1920, 41 Stat. 437.
51. Id. at sections 18, 18a, and 19.
52. Id. at section 13.
53. Id. at section 14.
54. Id. at section 14.
55. Id. at section 17.
56. Id. at section 16.
57. Id. at section 17.
58. Id. at section 16.
59. Id. at section 27.
60. Ise, op. cit. supra note 38, at 352 states:
"During the consideration of the bill, scouts and geologists had
studied the promising areas of reserved lands; and even before
the bill was signed claimants were camped within striking distance
of the reserves like 'crows on a fence'. It is said that some
oil prospectors had aeroplanes placed at the telegraph stations,
awaiting the word of the approval of the legislation, to carry
the news to waiting representatives near where claims had been
spotted. Applications under the act began to come in by tele-
graph on the day it was signed. In some sections, particularly
in Wyoming and Montana, important and unexpected discoveries were
made just about the time of the passage of the act, and the
entire areas for many miles around these discoveries were plastered
with applications."
61. Hardwicke, The Rule of Capture and Its Implications as Applied
to Oil and Gas, 13 Tex. L. Rev. 391 (1935).
62. This is a quotation from a letter dated August 11, 1924 from
Mr. Henry L. Doherty to the President of the United States; the
letter is set out in Terrill, Unit Agreements and Unitized
Operations: A Review of Their Past and Some Speculations as
to Their Future: With Particular Comments on Federal Unit Agree-
ments, First Annual Institute on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation,
Southwestern Legal Foundation, (1949), p. 4.
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63. Generally on this subject see Terrill, op c cit. supra note 61,
Murphy, Conservation of Oil and Gas, A Legal History, 1948,
Ch. 44, American Bar Association, Legal History of Conservation
of Oil and Gas (1938), and Report of the Attorney General
Pursuant to Section 2 of the Joint Resolution of July 28, 1955 ?
Consenting to an Interstate Compact to Conserve Oil and Gas
(1956).
64. Report of the Attorney General, op. cit. supra note 63, at 30.
Terrill, op, cit. supra note 62, at 10, 11 differs in the date
of the first state wide proration order: "... although
orders had been promulgated in Oklahoma prior to 1930 for the
purpose of regulating production in specific fields, state
wide regulation of oil first began with the order of the
Oklahoma Corporation Commission of June 30, 1930, and the first
state wide order was issued by the Railroad Commission of Texas
on August 13, 1930, the purpose of each order being designed
substantially to curtail total production in each state and to
allocate the allowable production as between fields and among
the properties or wells in each field."
65. Thompson, Fifteen Years of Accomplishments of the Interstate
Oil Compact Commission, 9 Interstate Oil Compact Quarterly
Bulletin (Dec. 1950) describes the difficulties resulting from
East Texas production during this period: "The enormous
quantity of oil that was being produced paralyzed oil development,
because the East Texas Crude posted price dropped to 10 cents
per barrel, and much oil was selling for a nickel a barrel ....
The Texas Railroad Commission repeatedly issued orders attempting
to reduce the allowable production of the East Texas Field, but
these orders were stricken down in the Federal courts time and
time again on the theory that the Commission was attempting to
limit production to market demand, when such was not permitted
by our statute.... The Governor of Texas called out the
National Guard and sent them into this field to close the field
down, and for a time the field was under martial law. But the
Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Constantin
Versus Sterling, decided that the Governor had exceeded his
authority and that martial law was not legal.... and in 1932 the
Legislature of Texas passed the market demand statute which says
that production of oil in excess of market demand is waste....
Under this law we were able to get a valid proration order upheld
by the Federal Courts, and by the State courts. And order was
again restored, and the price of oil moved back up to 75 cents
a barrel ."
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66. Report of the Attorney General, op. cit. supra note 63, at 35,
36.
67. See Murphy, op. cit. supra note 63, at Ch . 39, for a description
of the manner the Compact is implemented.
68. This is an excerpt from a report of the Federal Oil Conservation
Board which is set out in Terrill, op cit. supra note 62, at 6.
69. Terrill, op cit. supra note 62, at 3„
70. Act of February 25, 1920, 41 Stat. 437, sec. 27 provided: "That




shall be subleased, trusteed,
possessed, or controlled by any device permanently, temporarily,
directly, indirectly, tacitly, or in any manner whatsoever, so
that they form part of ... or form the subject of any contract
or conspiracy in restraint of trade in the mining or selling of
. . .
oil, oil shale, gas
. . .
the lease thereof shall be
forfeited by appropriate court proceedings ." Although it might
be argued that this provision did not prohibit unit type agreements,
the issue is questionable.
71. Terrill, op. cit. supra note 62„ at 4.
72. Murphy, op. cit. supra note 63, at 603. The authority of the
Secretary of the Interior to refuse issuance of new prospecting
permits was upheld in United States v. Wilbur, 283 U,S. 414 (1931).
73. 53 I.D. 640, 641 (1932).
74. Report of the Attorney General, op. cit. supra note 63, at 32.
75. Murphy, op. cit. supra note 63, at 603.
76. 46 Stat. 1007 (1930),
77. 55 I.D. 547, 559 (1936) quotes the Director, United States Geological
Survey as evaluating the Kettleman Hills unit operation as follows:
"... Records indicate that at this time there are approximately
236 wells in the North Dome field, and it is believed safe to say
that there would have been tern times as many wells drilled, possibly
more, had not the unit plan been operative."
78. 46 Stat. 1523 (1931).
79. See Appendix A for a more detailed summary of the Act provisions.
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80. 53 I.D. 640, (1932), Other stipulations required of permittees
are set out at p. 642: "(d) Operating methods: The applicant
agrees to conform to regulations of the Secretary ... as to
location and spacing of wells, time and method of drilling . . .
and production program
. . .
(e) „ . . The applicant agrees
to comply with all State and Federal laws, regulations and
orders and to conform to any allowance of production fixed
for the field, poo] or area by the State ..."
81. Act of August 21, 1935, 49 Stat. 674.
82. 30 U.S.C. 226(j) (Supp. Ill 1959-61).
83. 56 I.D. 174 (1937). Hearings before a Special Senate Committee
Investigating Petorleum Resources pursuant to S. Res. 36, 79th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1945), p. 8: "The United States Geological
Survey
. . .
estimated that as of January 1, 1922, the reserves
of oil recoverable by methods then in use detailed 9,150,000,000
barrels
. .
. These reserves, the report added, were-— 'enough
to justify the present requirements of the United States for
only 20 years of the oil could be taken out of the ground as fast
as it is wanted.' The Geological Survey asserted that the
United States was 'already absolutely dependent on foreign
countries to eke out her own production and, if the foreign
oil can be produced this dependence is sure to grow greater and
greater as our own fields wane'."
84. Id. at 178.
85. Hearings before Senate Committee on Public Lands and Surveys
on S. 1772 (Promotion of Mining on the Public Domain), 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1935), p. 6.
86. Act of August 21, 1935, 49 Stat. 674, section 1. See Appendix A,
pp. 11-14.
87. Note 85, supra.
88. Note 86, supra.
89. Note 85, supra at 7.
90. Note 86, supra.
91. 30 U.S.C. 226(c) (Supp. Ill 1959-61).
92. United States Department of Interior, Bureau of Land Management,
Offer to Lease and Lease for Oil and Gas, sec. 2(r).
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93. 30 U.S.C. 226(j) (Supp. Ill 1959-61).
94. Ibid„
95. Act of February 25, 1920, 41 Stat. 437, sec. 32.
96. 55 I.D. 502, 515 (1935).
97. Note 92, supra at sec. 4.
98. Sen. Rep. No. 1392, 79th Cong., 2d Sess . (1946).
99. Id. at 1.
100. 54 Stat. 742 (1940).
101. 56 Stat. 726 (1942).
102. 56 Stat. 1080 (1942).
103. Act of August 8, 1946; 60 Stat. 951. See Appendix A for detailed
summary of the Act.
104. This was the first time since the 1920 enactment that the Congress
has specified a flat royalty -— in the Act of February 25, 1920
a flat 5% royalty was specified for leases issued after discovery
under a prospecting permit, however, all other leases under the
original Act and amendments thereto had provided for royalties of
not less than 12.5%. The Secretary of the Interior had acted
in his discretion and established a sliding scale royalty rate on
Federal leases. The royalty provision would provide for a 12.5%
royalty on certain average production, however, it would provide
for increased royalty as the average production increased. For
example see leasing regulations set out in 47 L.D. 437 (regarding
1920 Act), 51 L.D. 597 (regarding 1931 Amendments), 55 I.D. 502
(regarding 1935 Amendments)
.
105. Sen Rep. No. 1392, op. cit. supra note 98, at 6.
106. 51 L.D. 241 (1925); 52 L.D. 359 (1928); 54 I.D. 371, 373 (1934).
Interior had not excluded all types of contractual arrangements
from the purview of acreage limitations, see 59 I.D. 4 (1945).
107. Act of August 7, 1947, 61 Stat. 913.
108. Id. at Sec. 3.
109. Special Committee Investigating Petroleum Resources pursuant to
S. Res. 253, 79th Cong., as extended by S. Res. 36, 79th Cong.
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110. For example see testimony of J. Edgar Pew, Vice President, Sun
Oil Co., Hearings before Special Committee Investigating Petroleum
Resources pursuant to S. Res 36, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., June 19,
1945, p. 4 et seq.
111. Sen. Rep. No. 9, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 16, 17 (1947).
112. Id. at 49.
113. Note 107, supra at Sec. 6.
114. 68 Stat. 583 (1954). See Appendix A for detailed summary of
this Act.
115. Oil Facts, Vol. 3, No. 2, April-May 1961, reports on the third
Joint Association Survey of Industry Drilling Costs and states
in part:
"An estimated 49,563 oil and gas wells were drilled in
the U.S. during 1959. Of these, 19,101 were non-productive
Musters .
*
Domestic oil producers expended $2,651,096,000 just for
drilling and equipping these wells, losing $820,775,000 of this
in dry holes.
Though the proportion of dry holes remained consistent
with past years at about 38 percent, and overall drilling
activity was slightly down from preceding years, average
drilling costs rose because the industry was forced to drill
deeper and deeper in the search for new supplies.
Total wells drilled dropped 13 percent from 1956, but
total expenditures were down only T/2 percent from the 1956
record levels.
. .
In 1959 a gas well cost an average of $101,000 to drill;
an oil well, $52,000. A dry hole averaged $43,000 down the
drain
. . .
Drilling costs rise steeply as wells go into the deeper
ranges, where more and more drilling is being concentrated. For
example, in productive wells of the 7500-10,000 foot depth range,
it costs an average of $27„48 for each additional foot drilled.
In wells of over 15,000 depth, however, it costs $101.50 for
each additional foot drilled."
116. 68 Stat. 583 (1954).
117. 74 Stat. 781 (1960).
118. Hearings before Subcommittee on Public Lands of the Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs, U.S. Senate, 86th Congress, 1st Sess,,
June 5, July 14 and 15, 1959.
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119. Sen. Rep. No. 1549, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960). 1960 USC
Cong, and Admin. News 3314, 3315.
120. 30 USC 181 (1958).
121. Sen. Rep. No. 1549, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960). 1960 USC
Cong., and Admin. News 3321.
122. Schurr et al
.
, Energy in the American Economy 1850 - 1975 Its
History and Prospects, Table 22, p. 86.
123. Ibid.
124. Id. at Figure 34, p. 237.
125. 40 Op. Atty. Gen. 9 (1941).
126. 30 USC 181 (1958) and 30 USC 352 (1958).
127. 30 USC 352 (1958).
128. 60 Stat. 951 (1946).
129. Act of Feb. 29, 1958, 72 Stat. 28, 43 USC 155 et seq. (1958)
provides that minerals in withdrawn or reserved public lands for
use of the Department of Defense shall generally be under the
jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior for disposition
or exploration; provided the Secretary of Defense determines such
disposition or exploration is not inconsistent with the military
use of the lands.
130. 40 Op. Atty. Gen. 9 (1941) and 40 Op. Atty. Gen. 41 (1941).
131. Act of Aug. 7, 1953, c. 345, 67 Stat. 462, 43 USC 1331 et seq.
(1958).
132. Act of May 22, 1953, c. 65, 67 Stat. 29, 43 USC 1301 et seq.
(1958K
133. Generally, see Bartley, The Tidelands Oil Controversy, University
of Texas Press (1953). Although the ownership of the seaward lands
has been decided as residing in the United States by the Supreme
Court, see U.S. v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947), U.S. v. Texas,
339 U.S. 707 (1950), U.S. v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950), at
the time of the enactment of these Acts, the issue being hotly
disputed, as it still is today, was where is the coast line.
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134. See Campbell, International Law Developments Concerning National
Claims To and In Offshore Areas, 33 Tul. L. Rev. 339 (1959).
135. Act of Aug. 13, 1954, c. 730, 68 Stat. 708, 30 USC 521 et seq.
(1958).
136. Sen. Rep. No. 1610, 83rd Congress., 2d Sess., 1954; 1954 USC
Cong, and Admin, News 3027. Under the Mineral Leasing Act a
lease was invalid insofar as it covered lands embraced in a
valid patented or unpatented mining claim (48 L.D. 5 (1921));
mining claims could not be located on lands for which a lease
application had been filed (58 L.D. 426 (1943)).
137. 30 USC 189 (1958).
138. Hodgson v. Midwest Oil Co., 297 F 273 (D.C. Wye., 1924), case
transferred to CCA, 1925, 269 U.S. 534.
139. Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Co. v. Krug, 172 F2d 282, (C.A., D.C.,
1949) reversed on other grounds 338 U.S. 621.
140. 30 CFR Part 221.
141. 284 F2d 649 (C.A., 10, 1960) cert. den. 366 U.S. 936.
142. Id. at 655.
143. 226 F2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
144. Id. at 46.
145. Id. at 47.
146. In Fenelon Boesche, Administrator, v. Udall, 303 F2d 204, (D.C.
Cir. 1961), cert, granted 371 U.S. 886.
147. 284 F2d 657 (10th Cir. 1960).
148. Brief for Appellee, D.C. Cir. No. 16,238, Boesche, Appellant v.
Udall, Appelle, at 16, 17.
149. 73 Stat. 571; 30 USC 184(h)(2) (Supp. Ill 1959-61).
150. Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
151. Sec. 27, Mineral Leasing Act of 1920; 30 USC 184 (Supp. Ill 1959-61)
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152. Sec. 17, Mineral Leasing Act of 1920.





1* Malone, Oil ami Gas Leases on United States Government Lands,
Second Annua] Institute on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation, South-
western Legal Foundation, Dallas, Texas, (1951), pp. 338, 339.
2. Third Report of the Attorney General, Pursuant to Section 2 of
the Joint Resolution of July 28, 1955, Consenting to an Interstate
Compact to Conserve Oil and Gas, (1958), pp. 32, 33.
3. The text in stating the power of the Secretary of the Interior to
limit public land production to market demand independent of State
action referred to the Federal Oil and Gas Operating Regulations,
which provide in 30 CFR 221.35 (1949 Ed.) as follows: " 9 . . The
production of oil and gas shall be restricted to such amount as
can be put to beneficial use with adequate realization of values,
and in order to avoid excessive production of either oil or gas,
when required by the Secretary, shall be limited by the market
demand for gas or by the market demand for oil." It may be safely
stated that the legal question will not be determined by operating
regulations issued by an administrative ; gency.
4. Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., p. 1045.
5. Id. at 991.
6. 318 U.S. 261 (1943).
7. 318 U.So 285, reh. den., 318 U.S. 801 (1943).
8. The dissent of Mr. Justice Faankfurther which appears id. at pp.
296-303 may be summarized by the following excerpts:
At p. 298: "The power given to Congress by Article I, Sec. S of the
Constitution, to 'exercise Legislation' over federal enclaves is
not so tyrannical as to preclude in law what good sense requires."
At p. 300: "If Congress speaks, state power is of course determined
by what Congress says ... But short of such Congressional assertion
of overriding authority, the phrase 'exclusive jurisdiction' more
often confounds than solves problems due to our federal system."
The Report of the Interdepartmental Committee for the Study of
Jurisdiction over Federal Areas within the States, Part II (1956),
at p. 176 interprets the dissent in this case as showing a disposi-
tion of the court minority to regard exclusive legisl tive juris-
diction as not constituting a barrier to the application of State
law absent an expression by Congress that such barrier shall exist.
With regard to such disposition the Report states: "Such a view
constitutes, it seems clear, a sharp departure from overwhelming
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precedent, and serves to Lur i:he histori ,?.il distinctions
between areas of exclusivi . Lative jurisdiction and areas
in which the Federal Government hasonly a proprietorial interest,,"
9. Report of the Interdepartmental Committee for the ."Study of Juris-
diction over Federal Areas within the States, Part II, A Text of
the haw of Legislative Jurisdiction (1957), p. 169.
10. Id. at I7uc
11. Act of Feb. 25, 1920, c. 85, 41 Stat. 437, 30 USC 181 et seq. (1958),
12. Act of Aug. 7, 1947, c. 513, 61 St; t. 913, 30 USC 351 et seq. (1958).
13. Section 1 of the Mineral Le. sing v ct of 1920, supra note II, as
amended, 30 USC 181 (Supp. II 1958), pertains to ". . . lands . . .
owned by the Unit d States, including those in national forests, but
excluding lands acquired under r.he Appalachian r orest Act, and those
in incorporated cities, towns, and villages and in national narks
and monuments, those acquired under other Acts subsequent to
February 25, 1920, and lands within the naval petroletim and oil-
shale reserves ..."
Section 3 of the Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands of 1947,
supra note 12, 30 USC 352 (1958), provides: "Except i/here lands
hage been acquired by the United States for the development of the
mineral deposits . . • all deposits of . e « oil, oil shale, gas .
e • which are owned or may hereafter be acquired by the United
States • • • (exclusive of such deposits in such acquired lands
as are (a) situated within incorporated cities, towns and villages,
national parks or monuments, (b) set apart for military or naval
purposes, or (c) tid elands or submerged lands) may be leased • • •
Provided, ^hat nothing in this chapter is intended ... to apply
to
. . .
the continental shelf, adjacent or littoral to any part
of the land within the jurisdiction of the United States of America."
14. Report of the Interdepartr,i>rital Committee for the Study of Juris-
diction over Federal Areas Within the States, Fart I, The Facts and
Committee Recommendations (1956), pp. I3 t 14.
15 Note 7, supra.
16. Note 9, supra at 146: "The civil authority of a State is extinguished
over privately owned areas and privately operated areas to the
samp extent as over federally owned and operated areas when such
areas are placed under the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the
Uni ed States."
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17. Note 9, supra at 138, 189: i rvations of jurisdiction
heve presented few legal problems. In no instance has a State
reservation of jurisdiction been invalidated, or its scope narrowed,
on the ground that its effect was to enlarge the power of the
State or to interfere with the functions of the Federal Government.
Instea.l, the reported cases involving such reservations have
presented euestions concerning the scope of the reservations
actually made. Thus, in Collins v. Yosemite Park ^o., 304 V,S*
513 (1933), it was held that a reserve tion by a State of the right
to tax the sale of liquor does not include the right to enforce
the regulatory features of the State's alcbholic beverage control
act in an area in which, inter alia the right to tax, the entire
jurisdiction of the State had been ceded to the Federal Governmento
Similarly, in Birmingham v. Thompson, 200 F. 2d 505 (C.A. 5, 1952),
it was held that even though the State, in ceding jurisdiction to
the Federal Government, reserved the right to tax persons in the
area over which jurisdiction had been ceded, a city could not
require the payment of a license fee by a contractor operating in
the area where issuance of the license was coupled with a v. riety
of regulatory provisions. The results reached in these two cases
suggest that State statutes transferring jurisdiction will be
construed strictly. Only those matters expressly mentioned as
reserved will remain subject to the jurisdiction of the State."
18. Note 14, supra at 123.
19. Table I, ibid, tabulates the amount of real property held country-
wide by Federal agencies and its legislative jurisdictional statuso
The following totals, rounded off to the nearest hundred thousand,






An examination of the tabulation also shows that the majority of
the land under exclusive legislative jurisdiction falls within
categories of land upon which little or no leasing takes place,
that is, national parks and military enclaves.
20. Note 11, supra.
21. 225 La. 379, 73 So. 2d 180 (1954).
22. United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management,
Offer to Lease and Lease for Oil and Gas, Form No. 4-1158, bth Ed.
(April 1957), Sec. 2(k) provides in part:
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"Taxes and wages, freedom of purchase.—To pay when due, all
taxes lawfully assessed and levie< i nder the laws of the State
or the United States upon improvement?;, oil and gas produced




23. 348 U.S. 831 (1954)
.
24. 234 F. 2d 898 (C.A., 5, 1956).
25. Id. at 902.
26. Id. at 902.
27. 352 U.S. 916 (1956)
28. Act of Aug. 7, 1953, c. 345, 67 Stat. 462, 43 USC 1331 et seq. (1958)
29. Act of May 22, 1953, c. 65, 67 Stat. 29, 43 USC 1301 et seq. (1958).
30. Id. at 43 USC 1301.
31. For a review of the manner and conditions under which the United
States asserted jurisdiction see Holland, The Juridical Status of
the Continental Shelf, 30 Tex. L. Rev. 586, 589-590 (1952).
32. Note 28, supra at 43 USC 1332, which provides in part "(a) It is
declared to be the policy of the United States that the subsoil
and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf appertain to the United




33. 332 U.S. 19 (1947)
.
34. Id. at 45.
35. 339 U.S. 699, 705 (1950)
.
36. Note 33, supra at 38, 39.
37. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950).
United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950).
38. Note 7, supra.
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39. ij ' r:>C 13 U (1958).
40. See 34 Y. <-tty. Gen. 171, 177 (1924).
41. KcLand, Oil ;iru! Cus Lousing on Iiv*ian Lands (1955), p. 10b,
42. ii Peters 515 (1332),
43. Id, at =557,
44. Id. at 561.
45. McLane, Op, cit. supra note 41, discusses +-!m-> matter of
Indian Tribes us States at pp. 20-22,
46. An article in Time Magazine, N^v. 10, 1953, p. 31, on the
Navajo Indians reports one possible area of judicial determination.
It states that the Navajos have "'^lurtly t<*»l ' the State of Utah
(the richest oil-producing Navajo Ian:! lies in Utah) that they
do not r^co^nise the authority of the Utah Oil and Gas
Conservation Cnr,imission in ictims dealing > Lth Navajo land,"
47. Note 9, surra at 45, 46.
48. U.S. C-nst., Art. IV, sec. 3, cl . 2.
49. 63 So, 2d 115 (Kiss. Sun. Ct. 1953).
50. Id. at 125.
51. Id. ; t 125,
52. 73 F. Supr. 225, 234 (S.D. Calif. 1944).
53. The extent to which the States can go within Constitutional
limits to regulate rnd control the drillin? for, and production
of, oil and gas from private lands for the purposes of
conservation loth in th • interest of the ru; lie < nJ for the
protection of the corrfi lativ^ \ ights of the Individual owners
is virtually unlimited so Ion? as the State does not ret unreason-
ably or arbitrarily. See Williams, Conserve tion and the Con-
stitution, & Okla. L, hev. 155 (1953). The usual grounds for
attack has been the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the
Constitution. The Supreme Court in Cities service Gas Co, v.
Peerless Oil and Gas o
., 340 U.S. 179, 185 (1950) said: "The Due
Process and ifcual Protection issues raist.c . . . arc virtually without
substauce. It is now undeniable that a State may adopt negotiable
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regulations to prevent economic and physical waste of natural
gas. This Court has upheld numerous kinds of State legislation
designed to curb waste of natural resources and to protect the
correlative i i?hts of owners through ratable taking, ... or
to protect the economy of the State. • . • These ends have been
held to justify control over production even though the uses to
which property may profitably be put are restricted. . .
"
54. These provisions are in substance found in Offer to Lease and
Lec'se for Oil and Gas, United States Department of Interior,
Bureau of Land Management, Form No. 4-1158, Sixth iSdition (April
1957)o
55. Id. at Sec. 2 (b).
56. Id. at Sec. 2 (c).
57. Id. at Sec. 2 (j). The Oil and Gas Operating Regulations referred
to are promulgated in 30 CFh 221 (1949 Ed.).
58. Id. at Sec. 4.
59. U.S. Const., Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 3.
60. Act of June 21, 1938, c. 556, 52 Stat. 821, 15 USC 7l7-7l7w (1958),
61. The decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas is reported in J 80
Kan. 454, 304 P. 2d 528 (1956). *he per curiam opinion of the
United States Supreme Court reversing the State court is reported
in 355 U.S. 391 (1958).
62. U.S Const., ^rt. VI, cl. 2, provides: "This Constitution, and
the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution of Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
63. U.S. Const., Art. IV, sec. 3, cl. 2.
64. 3 How. 212 (1845).
65. 246 U.S. 343 (1918).
66. Id. at 346.
67. 13 Wall. 92, 99 (1872).
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68. 310 U.S. 16 (1940).
69. Id. at 29, 30.
70. Note 11, supra.
71. Note 12, supra.
72. Note 12, supra at 30 USC 359 (1958).
73. Note 12, supra. Codified as 30 USC 357 (1958).
74. N te 2, supra at 32.
75. Act of Feb. 22, 1935, c. 18, 49 Stat. 30, 15 USC 715-715m (1958),
76. Id. at 15 US6 715b (1958).
77. Id. at 15 USC 715a (1958).
78. 268 U.S. 45 (1925).
79. Note 11, supra. Codified at 30 USC 189 (1958).
80. Note 78, supra at 48, 49.
81. Note 65, supra at 346.
PAKT TvVO FOOTNOTES page 7,

1. The estimated recoverable shale oil in place in the Piceance
Basin, if only the richer 25 gallons per ton shale deposits are
considered, is 400 billions of barrels. If shales of 15 gallons
per ton are considered the estimate is 1 trillion barrels. Duncan,
Oil Shale Deposits in the United States, The Independent Petroleum
Association of America Monthly, Vol. 29, No. 4, Aug. 1958, p. 22 at
p. 50. These estimates do not consider that certain losses will
occur in mining and processing the deposits. Recent world crude
oil reserve estimates are circa 301 billion barrels. Oil and Gas
Journal, Vol. 58, No. 52, Dec. 26, 1960, pp. 98, 99. The American
Gas Association, American Petroleum Institute, and Canadian
Petroleum Association, Reports on Proved Reserves of Crude Oil,
Natural Gas Liquids, and Natural Gas in the United States and Canada,
Dec. 31, I960, estimates the crude oil reserves of the United States
as 31.61 billion barrels. This estimate of crude oil reserves in-
cludes only oil recoverable under existing economic and operating
conditions. United States crude oil production in 1960 was 2.47
billion barrels.
2. Oil shale occurs in at least 29 States and the total United
States reserves in place is estimated to be 1.15 trillion barrels.
Bureau of Mines, Bull. 585, Mineral Facts and Problems, I960 Ed.,
Chapter on Oil Shale.
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3. The Atomic Energy Commission reports that world fossil-fuel
consumption in the year 2000 will be over five times consumption
in 1950, and that domestic consumption within the United States
will be over four times as great in 2000 as it was in 1958. ABC,
Office of Technical Information, Fossil Fuels in the Future,
TID-8209, Oct. 1960, p. 1. This study states at pp. 1, 2:
"The United States currently uses about 75 per cent of its
fossil fuels in fluid form. About 10 per cent of the fluid-
fuel total is now imported. If the United States should
cease to import fuels in the near future, domestic fluid-
fuel resources could supply domestic requirements for fluid
fuels in the 1970' s. Before 1980 it would become necessary
to produce large amounts of shale oil to help meet fluid-
fuel requirements. Together, shale oil and fluid hydro-
carbons could meet domestic requirements for fluid fuels for
the remainder of the century although the cost would be some-
what higher than if some petroleum fuels were imported."
4. Report to the Congress (Hoover Commission), Commission on
Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Business
Enterprises, May 1955, p. 70.
5. Sec. 37, 41 Stat. 451 (1920), 30 USC 193 (1958).
6. Ely, Conservation of Oil and Gas (1948-1958), p. 302. Secretary
of the Interior Ickes is quoted in Sen. Rep. No. 1792, 76th Cong.,
3rd Sess. 2 (1940) as follows:
"Since the recording of such mining locations was entrusted
to the control of the miners of each mining district in
conformity with local law, and since no complete examination
of these records has ever been made, accurate figures as
to the number and extent of such claims are not available.
However, an examination was made by the General Land Office
in the years between 1920 and 1930 to determine the status
of the oil-shale placer-mining claims on and about the
Green River shale formation in Colorado, Wyoming, and Utah.
That examination disclosed that more than 30,000 such claims,
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embracing more than 4,000,000 acres of the public domain,
were not being maintained by the performance of annual
assessment work."
7. Montgomery, The White Rock that Burns, Our Public Lands, Bureau
of Land Management, Vol. 10, No. 4, April 1961, p. 7.
8. The heavy reliance on petroleum products in World War I led to
the oft quoted statement by Lord Curzon that "The Allies floated
to victory on a sea of oil."
9. See note 7 supra.
10. There was active interest in oil shale during the 1916-1923
period on limited areas of the oil shale deposits. Winchester,
Oil Shale of the Rocky Mountain Region, Bull. 729, U. S. Geological
Survey, 1923, pp. 72-76.
11. See note 5 supra. Sec. 21 of the Act (30 USC 241 (1958))
authorizes issuance of oil shale leases.
12. Exec. Order 5327, Apr. 15, 1930.
13. Ely, op. cit. supra note 6, at 302. The rules governing the
issuance of oil shale leases are set out in 43 Code Fed. Regs.
Part 197 (Rev. 1954).
14. The Petroleum Placer Act, 29 Stat. 526 (1897), provided:
"... That any person authorized to enter lands under the
mining laws of the United. States may enter and obtain patent
to lands containing petroleum or other mineral oil, and
chiefly valuable therefor, under the provisions of the laws
relating to placer mineral claims."
Placer mining claims were made "under like circumstances and condi-
tions, and upon similar proceedings, as are provided for vein or lode
claims." Rev. Stat. Sec. 2329 (1895), 30 USC 35 (1958). Apposite
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provisions for vein or lode claims required discovery (Rev. Stat.
Sec. 2320 (1875), 30 USC 23 (1958)), marking of location (Rev. Stat.
Sec. 2324 (1875), 30 USC 28 (1958)), and annual labor of $100 (Rev.
Stat. Sec. 2324 (1875), 30 USC 28 (1958)).
15. Rev. Stat. Sec. 2325 (1875), 30 USC (1958).
16. 280 U.S. 306 (1930).
17. Id. at 316, 317.
18. Id. at 315: "No relocation of the claim was ever attempted,
nor was the valid existence or maintenance of the claim ever
challenged in anyway by the United States, or by anyone prior to
/application for patent/. H
19. Ely, Conservation of Oil and Gas, A Legal History, 1948, p. 606.
20. 295 U.S. 639 (1935).
21. Id. at 645.
22. Ely, op. cit. supra note 19, at 606.
23. Letter of July 29, 1935, from Commissioner of General Land
Office to Register, Denver, Colorado.
24. Patent application is made under 30 USC 29 (1958), and Interior
rules, 43 Code Fed. Regs. Part 185 (Rev. 1954).
25. Decision ME C-012327 of Feb. 16, 1962.
26. Gabbs Exploration Company*, 67 I.D. 160 (1960).
27. See note 23 supra.
28. The Land Office Manager decision may be appealed to the Director,
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Bureau of Land Management, and the Secretary of the Interior.
43 Code Fed. Regs. Part 221 (Cum. Supp. 1962).
29. Gabbs Exploration Company, 67 I.D. 160, 162 (I960) states:
"In affirming the manager's rejection of the appellant's
patent application, the Director's decision pointed out
that the charge, in the adverse proceedings brought
against these claims in 1930, of failure to perform
assessment work could not serve as a basis for declaring
the claims null and void . . . The decision held, however,
that since the 1930 contest proceedings included the
charge that each of the claims had been abandoned, the
claims were properly declared null and void in a default
judgment of abandonment of these claims."
30. 58 I.D. 550, 553 (1943).
31. Id. at 556.
32. 91 CJS, United States, Sec. 29.
33. See note 26 supra.
34. Executive Order No. 5327 of April 15, 1930, which withdrew
all deposits of oil shale and lands containing such deposits
owned by the United States from lease or other disposal, was
modified by Executive Order No. 6016 of February 6, 1933, so as
to authorize oil and gas leases for the withdrawn lands.
35. 63 I.D. 71, 74 (1956); 64 I.D. 103, 105 (1957); Union Oil
Company of California v. Udall, 289 F. 2d 790 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
36. Civil No. 16, 803, D.C. Cir.
37. 67 I.D. 160 (1960).
38. 51 L.D. 46 (1925); 51 L.D. 183 (1925).
39. 42 Am. Jur. , Public Administrative Law, Sec. 159 states in
part:
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"Attempts to question, in a subsequent proceeding, the
conclusiveness of a prior administrative decision have
often been rejected by the courts on the ground that
like the judgment of a court, a determination made by an
administrative authority in its judicial or quasi-judicial
capacity is not subject to collateral attack, at least
where the administrative authority has acted within its
jurisdiction and the ground of attack asserted relates to
mere error or irregularity."
49C.J.S., Judgments, Sec. 430 states in part:
"A judgment may not be impeached collaterally because of
any defects in the pleadings which are amendable, even
though such pleadings are bad on general demurrer."
40. 47 L.D. 558, 560 (1920).
41. 67 I.D. 160, 164, 165 (I960).
42. Circular No. 460, Proceedings in Contests on Report by
Representatives of the General Land Office, 44 L.D. 572, 573 (1916).
43. Sutherland Statutory Construction Sec. 6605 (3rd ed. 1943).
44. McKay v. McDougall, 64 Pac. 669, 670 (Mont. 1901); Farrell v.
Lockhart, 210 U.S. 142 (1908).
45. Farrell v. Lockhart, supra note 44, at 147: "... we are
of the opinion, and so hold, that ground embraced in a mining
location may become a part of the public domain so as to be subject
to another location before the expiration of the statutory period
for performing annual labor, if, at the time when the second loca-
tion was made, there had been an actual abandonment of the claim
by the first locator."
46. Cameron v. U.S., 252 U.S. 450, 459, 460 (1920); "By general
statutory provisions the execution of the laws regulating the
acquisition of rights in the public lands and the general care of
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these lands is confided to the Land Department, as a special
tribunal; and the Secretary of the Interior, as the head of the
Department, is charged with seeing that this authority is rightly
exercised to the end that valid claims may be recognized, invalid
ones eliminated, and the rights of the public preserved. Rev.
Stat. Sees. 441, 453, 2478 /now codified as 5 USC 485, and 43 USC
2, 1201, respectively? * * * * * Of course, the Land
Department has no power to strike down any claim arbitrarily,
but so long as the legal title remains in the government it does
have power, after proper notice and upon adequate hearing, to
determine whether the claim is valid, and, if it be found invalid,
to declare it null and void . . . M Adams v. Witmer, 271 F. 2d 29,
33 (9th Cir. 1959); "There is no doubt but that the Bureau of
Land Management and the Department itself comes within the definition
of 'agency* found in the Administrative Procedure Act. Indeed
the Department itself has expressly held that a proceeding of
this kind is governed by and must be heard in accorance with re-
quirements of the Act /p USC 1001 et seq. (195827, United States v.
O'Leary, 63 I.D. 341 (1956)." The type proceeding involved in this
case was one testing the validity of a raining claim as a basis for
patent application.
See 43 Code Fed. Regs. Sec. 221. 67 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1962) pro-
vides in part: "The proceedings in Government contests shall be
governed by the rules relating to proceedings in private contests
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. .
.", and Sec. 221.54 relating to private contests requires that
there shall be named in the complaint "each party interested. 1'
48. 5 USC 1004 (a) (1958).
49. Proceedings Against Mining Claims Within the Area of the
Boulder Dam Project, 53 I.D. 228, 231 (1930).
50. 30 USC 40 (1958).
51. See note 49 supra.
52. M-36616 of May 12, 1961.
53. Standard Oil Company of California v. United States, 107 F.2d
402 (9th Cir. 1939).
54. 43 Code Fed. Regs. Part 221 (Cum. Supp. 1962).
55. Id. at Sees. 221.68 and 221.60.
56. 5 USC 1004(a) (1958).
57. 5 USC 1009(e) (1958). With respect to how the Supreme Court
views the phrase "unsupported by substantial evidence", see
Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S.
474 (1951) wherein it is stated at 488: ".
. .
Congress has merely
made it clear that a reviewing court is not barred from setting
aside a Board decision when it cannot conscientiously find that the
evidence supporting that decision is substantial, when viewed in
the light that the record in its entirety furnishes, including the
body of evidence opposed to the Board's view." The Court with candor
also commented at 489: "Since the precise way in which courts interfere
with agency findings cannot be imprisoned within any form of words,
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new formulas attempting to rephrase are not likely to
be more helpful than the old. There are no talismanic words that
can avoid the process of judgment. The difficulty is that we cannot
escape, in relation to this problem, the use of undefined defining
terms."
58. United States v. McCutchen, 238 F. 575, 579 (S.D. Calif. 1916).
As to discovery requirements for placer claims, see United States
ex rel. U. S. Borax Co. v. Ickes, 98 F. 2d 271, 273 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
59. 30 USC 22 (1958).
60. Castle v. Womble, 19 L.D. 455, 457 (1894).
61. Empire Gas and Fuel Co., 51 L.D. 424, 429 (1926).
62. Johanson v. White, 160 F. 901, 903 (9th Cir. 1908).
63. For a discussion of this trend: Mock, Marketability as a
Test of Discovery under the Federal Mining Laws, 7th Annual
Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute.
64. E.g., United States v. Estate of Hanny, 63 I.D. 369 (1956).
65. United States v. Hammers, 221 U.S. 220 (1911).
66. Rev. Rul. 57-529, 1957-2 Cum. Bull. 325.
67. The conventional method of recovering oil from oil shale
involves raining, crushing (to prepare for retorting), retorting
(the extraction of oil from oil shale by the application of heat),
and refining.
68. Bureau of Mines, Bull. 585, op. cit. supra note 2.
69. 68A stat. 209 (1954).
70. Ibid.
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71. E.g., United States v. Cherokee Brick & Tile Co., 2L8 F. 2d
424 (5th Cir. 1955); United States v. Merry Brothers Brick and Tile
Co., 242 F. 2d 708 (5th Cir. 1957); Dragon Cement Co., Inc. v.
United States, 244 F. 2d 513 (1st Cir. 1957).
72. For discussion of this matter see 1961 USC Cong, and Admin.
News 3016-3020.
73. 364 U.S. 76 (1960).
74. Id. at 86.
75. Id. at 88.
76. 74 Stat. 290 (1960).
77. Ibid.
78. Shepherd et al., Income Tax Aspects of Oil Shale Operations,
Prentice-Hall, Oil and Gas Service, para. 2014.4 and 2014.5 (1958).
79. The United States Bureau of Mines defines "oil shale" as a
laminated, sedimentary rock containing organic material (usually
called "kerogen") from which appreciable amounts of oil can be
obtained by the application of heat. Oil shale does not contain
oil as such. The oil is formed by the thermal decomposition of
the solid organic material derived from pre~existent plant and
animal life. See, Stanfield, K.E. , et al., Properties of Colorado
Oil Shale, Bureau of Mines Report of Investigations 4825 (1951).
80. Oil and Gas Journal, Newsletter, May 15, 1961.
81. Rocky Mountain Oil Reporter, Mar. 1959, tabulates ownership
of major Colorado Oil shale properties, and indicates 22 companies
hold shale bearing areas of over 1,000 acres. The three largest
owners shown are: Standard Oil Company of California (50,600
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acres). Union Oil Company of California (40,100 acres), and General
Petroleum (23,000 acres).
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